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INTRODUCTION: METHODS OF PHILOSOPHY
A critical examination of its method(s) belongs to the core business of philosophy from 
its beginnings. In recent discussion, however, metaphilosophical issues have gained an 
especially prominent role. As a constant flood of publications shows, metaphilosophy and 
philosophical metholodogy are among the areas in which the current debates are most lively.1 
The international conference hosted in 2017 by the Faculty of Philosophy of the Università 
Vita-Salute San Raffaele, and organised by Elisabetta Sacchi, Sarah Songhorian and Stefano 
Bacin with the support of the research centres CESEP, CRESA, CRISI, DIAPOREIN, GENDER, 
and PERSONA, aimed at gathering contributions on methodological issues in different fields 
of current philosophical studies: analytic philosophy, ethics, phenomenology, philosophy 
and gender issues, and history of ideas. The sections of this issue include most of the papers 
presented at that conference.
If there is a philosophical perspective that started as an intellectual endeavour based on a 
revolutionary methodology, which through decades brought original philosophical questions 
to light, it is analytic philosophy. In this spirit, Timothy Williamson scrutinises the analytic 
attitude towards testing philosophical theories via a falsificationist methodology. Though still 
widespread in the analytic community, a falsificationist methodology might be less fruitful 
and more prone to error than a more flexible alternative brought forward by Williamson, 
namely the reliance on model-building, carried over into the philosophical debate from 
empirical and social sciences.
Williamson’s contribution is followed by two papers devoted to two methodological divides 
in the analytic tradition. The first divide, which is a more classical one, concerns whether, in 
the analysis of core philosophical notions such as the notion of reference of singular terms, 
a methodological approach in terms of formal theories and their models versus an approach 
focusing on the analysis of natural language is preferable. This divide informs Francesca 
Boccuni’s contribution.
Bianca Cepollaro’s article, on the other hand, concerns the linguistic intuitions connected with 
the use of certain expressives such as derogatory terms in the light of the second, more recent, 
1  See e.g. the very diverse picture provided by two recent handbooks: Cappelen, Szabó Gendler & Hawthorne (2016) 
and D’Oro & Overgaard (2017). For a more recent, significant sample of the debate, see Baz 2018, along with the review 
by Cappelen & Deutsch (2018), and Williamson (2007, 2018).
12
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divide in the analytic tradition: whether the analysis of central philosophical notions should 
be carried out via a methodology relying exclusively on theoretical investigation (the so-called 
“armchair philosophy”) or via an experimental approach. 
The title of this special issue echoes that of a philosophical masterpiece that put 
methodological issues in the foreground, thereby marking a perspective that is still very much 
at the centre of the debate, namely Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics. Both papers of the 
section on ethics follow this connection and take their lead from Sidgwick’s views. 
Roger Crisp examines Sidgwick’s understanding of ‘method’ and his methodological practice. 
After considering Sidgwick’s conditions of proper self-evidence of intuitions and some limits 
in his assessment of ‘dogmatic intuitionism’, Crisp suggests in this light a more constructive 
debate between advocates of different normative theories as a methodological guideline in 
moral philosophy. 
Massimo Reichlin points out an issue in Sidgwick’s talk of a method of ethics that still affects 
current debates. Reichlin argues that Sidgwick’s construal of the three methods of ethics yields 
an infelicitous confusion between methods and normative theories of morality, which has in 
turn brought a consequentialist bias in the debates of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
In the first paper devoted to aspects of the phenomenological approach, Dermot Moran 
underscores the holistic nature of phenomenology. Moran examines the main features of 
phenomenology, characterising it as a philosophical method that, in opposition to objectivist 
naturalism, grounds on an investigation of the a priori relations between subjectivity and the 
different domains of objectivity. 
Sara Heinämaa investigates a Husserlian distinction between two ways of understanding other 
persons, their motivations and actions: the empirical way and the genuinely intuitive way, 
crucially grounded, according to Heinämaa’s interpretation of Husserl, on self-understanding. 
Both self-understanding and understanding of others enable ethical reflections, self-
shaping and judgements on others, by being not confined to the actual but by opening to the 
possibilities of change and renewal.
Roberta Lanfredini compares phenomenological empiricism with classical empiricism, on the 
one hand, and logical empiricism, on the other. She argues that phenomenology is a kind of 
radical, though not reductionist, empiricism that is to be assimilated neither to the first strain 
of empiricism nor to the second.
Roberta De Monticelli tackles some traditional philosophical issues revolving around the 
notion of value. She proposes a phenomenological answer in terms of Scheler’s material 
axiology to the vexed questions concerning the cultural versus the universal source of values 
and the truth and falsehood of value judgements. This proposal is spelled out in terms of a 
clarification of the bottom-up phenomenological approach , which De Monticelli supports via 
experimental phenomenology.
The fourth section of the volume is devoted to the debate concerning some philosophical 
considerations regarding gender issues, which have now established not merely as an object 
of philosophical analysis, but as a topic of metaphilosophical significance. This is fittingly 
illustrated in Marina Sbisà’s paper, which investigates several ways in which the discourse 
on gender can be tackled philosophically, examines the difficulties and limitations of each 
of them and proposes a consideration of gendered subjectivity in intersubjective relations 
understood as a basic process in human life.
Laura Caponetto focuses on the role that feminist philosophy of language has ascribed 
to Austin’s theory of speech acts to account for the notion of silencing in the debate on 
13
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pornography and censorship. The article’s aim is to discuss Austin’s theory in order to unveil a 
form of discourse injustice that has been largely undernoticed.
The final section gathers papers that do not directly address methodological issues, but 
exemplify a historical-critical approach. The paper included in this section revolve around two 
foci: central aspects of Descartes’ epistemology and their reception in Spinoza, and the current 
debate on the so-called “Italian Theory”.
In the first group of papers, Marcos Gleizer defends Spinoza’s solution of the circle between 
evidence and that would affect Descartes’ epistemology at its core. Against most readings, 
Gleizer argues that Spinoza’s thesis of the “self-manifestation of reason” allows him to avoid 
the circularity between the truth of clear and distinct ideas, and God’s existence.
Descartes’ conception of the eternal truths is under scrutiny in the two following papers. Ethel 
Rocha considers some epistemological consequences of Descartes’ conception of the divine 
creation of the eternal truths. Finally, Rocha argues that view seems to commit Descartes 
to the impossibility for the human mind to fully grasp the truth, but this in turn stands in 
tension with Descartes’ entire metaphysical project. In his paper, Alfredo Gatto explores the 
connection between Descartes’ thesis of God’s free creation of the eternal truths and the 
idea of a theodicy, to argue that Leibniz’ and Malebranche’s project of a theodicy entails the 
rejection of the basi tenets of Descartes’ thesis. 
Finally, two papers are devoted to recent debates on Italian philosophy. Corrado Claverini 
sketches a genealogy of the recent debates on what has been labelled “Italian Thought” and 
the grounds of the growing international reception of Italian philosophy. Focusing on one 
defining moment in that debate, that is, Roberto Esposito’s Living Thought, Raffaele Ariano 
points out in the reconstruction of an Italian philosophical tradition the striving to overcome 
the boundaries of academic philosophy, and the role played by the interpretation of Spinoza’s 
thought in the ontological transformation of Michel Foucault’s idea of biopolitics.
REFERENCES
Baz, A. (2018). The Crisis of Method in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press;
Cappelen, H., & Deutsch, M. (2018). Review of The Crisis of Method in Contemporary 
Analytic Philosophy, by Avner Baz, April. https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/
the-crisis-of-method-in-contemporary-analytic-philosophy/;
Cappelen, H., Szabó Gendler, T., & Hawthorne, J. (Eds.) (2016). The Oxford Handbook of 
Philosophical Methodology. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press;
D’Oro, G., & Overgaard, S. (Eds.) (2017). The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
Williamson, T. (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing;
Williamson, T. (2018). Doing Philosophy: From Common Curiosity to Logical Reasoning. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
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MODEL-BUILDING AS A 
PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD*
abstract
The method of building simplified formal models of phenomena under study is widespread in 
contemporary natural and social science; much scientific progress consists in the provision of better 
models. A model-building methodology has also been used with success in analytic philosophy, for 
example by Carnap in his development of intensional semantics. Arguably, philosophers have overlooked 
how much progress their discipline has made through their failure to conceive it in model-building terms. 
By using the method more extensively, they can overcome the fragility to error inherent in the naïve 
falsificationist methodology on which many analytic philosophers rely.
keywords
models, idealization, progress, Carnap, intensional semantics, falsificationism, Popper, error-fragility
* The ideas in this paper were presented at the 2018 conference on The Methods of Philosophy at Cesano Maderno; I 
thank participants for valuable discussion. Elsewhere I put this account of model-building in philosophy in the context 
of a general account of philosophical method (Williamson, 2018) and develop it further (Williamson, 2017).
TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON
University of Oxford
timothy.williamson@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Many natural scientists aim at a distinctive kind of progress which philosophers are just 
starting to recognize as an appropriate aim for them too.
The stereotype of scientific progress is discovering a new law of nature. Such laws are meant 
to be universal generalizations about the natural world, holding without exception for all 
times and places, by some sort of necessity: nice, if you can find one. However, most natural 
science studies messy complex systems – cells, animals, planets, galaxies – which are hard to 
characterize by universal laws. What laws must hold of all tigers, for example? ‘All tigers are 
striped’ won’t do, because there are albino tigers. ‘All tigers are four-legged’ won’t do either, 
because there are three-legged tigers, and so on. ‘All tigers are animals’ is true, but doesn’t get 
us far. Although tigers obey the fundamental laws of physics, like everything else in nature, 
that won’t console a biologist who wants to say something specific about living things as 
contrasted with elementary particles and stars. If we keep watering down our initial attempts, 
we may eventually reach something exceptionless, but the danger is that it will be too weak 
and uninformative to be of much interest. This isn’t just a problem about animals. Complex 
systems of all shapes and sizes tend to be messy and unruly.
To manage the problem, scientists have revised their objectives. Instead of seeking universal 
laws about complex systems, they build simplified models of them. Occasionally these are 
physical models: water running through a sand tray to model a river eroding its banks, a 
construction of colored rods and balls to model a DNA molecule. More typically, the models 
are abstract, defined by mathematical equations which describe how a hypothetical system 
changes over time. The hypothetical system is vastly simpler than the real-life systems of 
interest, but still has a few of their key features. The strategy is to analyse the behavior of the 
hypothetical system mathematically, in the hope that it will simulate some puzzling aspects 
of the real-life systems’ behavior, and thereby cast light on them (Weisberg (2013) provides a 
good introduction to the philosophy of scientific model-building). 
For example, you might wonder why a population of predators – say, foxes – and a population 
of prey – say, rabbits – keep oscillating, though rises and falls in one do not coincide with rises 
and falls in the other. A key point is that, holding other things equal, the more foxes there 
are, the more rabbits get eaten, but the more rabbits there are, the more fox cubs survive. 
One can write down differential equations that express the rate of increase or decrease of 
each population in terms of the current number of predators and prey. They are known as 
the Lotka-Volterra model. In most ways, it is grossly over-simplified: it ignores changes in 
the vegetation the rabbits feed on, changes in the tendency of humans to hunt foxes and 
1. Models in 
natural science
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rabbits, variations among foxes, variations among rabbits, and so on. Since such factors 
make a difference, the equations are not universal laws. Indeed, they couldn’t be, since for 
mathematical reasons the change in population is treated as continuous, even though in real-
life it changes in whole numbers: when one of 200 rabbits dies, the number goes straight down 
to 199, with no intermediate time when the number of living rabbits was 199.5. Nevertheless, 
despite all these over-simplifications, the model correctly predicts some general structural 
features of population change in predator-prey species. Much progress in natural science is 
now of this kind. Once we have a successful model, we can try building a little more real-life 
complexity back into it, step by step, but the models will always be vastly simpler than real life 
itself – otherwise they would be too complex to analyze.
Sometimes there is no workable alternative to model-building. For example, biologists wonder 
why two-sex reproduction is the norm for animals, since reproduction by three sexes or 
none is possible in principle. If you want to understand why a phenomenon doesn’t occur, 
you can’t go out and observe and measure it. Instead, a good strategy is to build hypothetical 
models of the phenomenon to see what goes ‘wrong’ with it. You might study a model where 
both two-sex reproduction and three-sex or no-sex reproduction occur, to see which does 
better, perhaps in achieving genetic variation within the species, which enables it to adapt 
evolutionarily to changes in the environment. Such models aim not to predict observed 
quantities but to explain an absence. 
Humans are a classic example of messy complex systems. In one way or another, much – 
though not all – of philosophy is about humans. Thus moral and political philosophy mainly 
concerns a good human life and a good human society. Philosophy of science concerns human 
science; philosophy of concerns human art; philosophy of language concerns human language. 
Though philosophy of art mind pays some attention to non-human animal minds, its main 
focus is on human minds, and in any case non-human animals are messy complex systems 
too. Though in principle epistemology concerns all knowledge, in practice it mainly concerns 
human knowledge. Logic and metaphysics are partial exceptions, since they tend to proceed 
at a level so fundamental that informative, precise, exceptionless laws are obtainable. For the 
rest, however, one might expect a model-building strategy to be appropriate.
That isn’t how most philosophers have seen it. Many still aim at exceptionless laws, even about 
messy complex systems – humans – for whom natural scientists have mainly abandoned that 
ambition. In that respect, philosophers have done their field a disservice, by inadvertently 
setting it up for failure. People who contrast progress in natural science with deadlock in 
philosophy often do so on the basis of a false image of natural science. Failing to appreciate 
how much scientific progress consists in building better models, they fail to ask how much 
philosophical progress consists in building better models too.
One example of progressive model-building in philosophy is epistemic logic, which advances in 
just that way. Its models are not universal laws; they involve grossly unrealistic simplifications. 
Nevertheless, they cast light on human knowledge in the manner of a scientific model.
When philosophers work with probabilities, they typically use models without emphasizing 
the fact. For instance, a simple model of uncertainty is a lottery. To make things definite, 
suppose that exactly 100,000 tickets have been sold, numbered in order; there is just 
one winner, chosen at random. Thus if you have one ticket, its probability of losing is 
99,999/100,000. Which statements about the lottery should you accept? You might decide that 
requiring 100% certainty is unreasonably demanding, and resolve to accept just statements 
with a probability of at least 95%. Immediately, there is a problem. By your rule, you accept 
the statement that the winning number is at least 5,001 (because its probability is 95%), and 
you accept the statement that the winning number is at most 95,000 (because its probability 
2. Models in 
philosophy
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is 95%), but you refuse to accept the statement that the winning number is between 5,001 and 
95,000 inclusive (because its probability is only 90%). Thus you accept each of two statements 
separately, but you refuse to accept the result of putting them together, their conjunction. 
A politician who did something like that on television in an election campaign could expect 
to get crucified. You might think that 95% was a bad choice of threshold for acceptance, 
and choose a different threshold. But a little calculation shows that the only thresholds for 
acceptance which avoid such problems, even when there are more tickets, are 0% and 100%. 
Since a threshold of 0% means accepting every statement whatsoever – total credulity – you 
are back to a threshold of 100%, the standard of certainty you already rejected as unreasonably 
demanding. Thus even such a ‘toy’ model can illustrate the difficulties of basing acceptance 
and rejection on information about probabilities.
If you think about the lottery model, you can quickly identify some of its simplifying 
assumptions. For instance, it assumes that you know exactly how many tickets have been 
sold. In practice, the organization running the lottery may not announce or even know 
how many tickets have been sold; even if they announce a number, you may give a nonzero 
probability to the hypothesis that they are mistaken or lying. Then you may also give a 
nonzero probability to the winning number being 100,001 (since more than 100,000 tickets 
may have been sold), and you may give a higher probability to the winning number being 1 
than to its being 100,000 (since fewer than 100,000 tickets may have been sold). But taking 
account of all those realistic complications is not time well spent. Thinking about the simple 
model takes one more quickly to the heart of the problem. When more complex probabilistic 
models are needed to understand more intricate problems, mathematically-minded 
epistemologists construct them too.
In philosophy of language, model-building as understood here goes back at least to Rudolf 
Carnap. An example is his theory of the meaning of modal operators, words like ‘possibly’ and 
‘necessarily’. He treated them as building up more complex sentences from simpler ones: thus 
from the sentence ‘Everything changes’ they make sentences such as ‘Possibly everything 
changes’ and ‘Necessarily everything changes’. 
Logicians had already designed precise formal languages with symbols for logical words such 
as ‘not’, ‘or’, ‘and’, ‘something’, and ‘everything’, which enable one to build up more complex 
expressions from simpler ones, without limit. We can think of them as taking expressions 
as input and delivering more complex expressions as output. For example, if you input the 
sentence ‘Everything changes’ to ‘not’, the output is the sentence ‘Not everything changes’. 
Logicians also had a framework for analyzing the meaning of such general words. To each 
expression, simple or complex, they assigned something called its extension, encoding its 
application to the world. For instance, since the word ‘red’ applies to red things and not to 
non-red ones, its extension includes the former and excludes the latter. If a sentence applies 
to the world, its extension is truth; if it doesn’t apply to the world, its extension is falsity. 
‘Not’ makes an output sentence the opposite in extension of the input sentence: if ‘Everything 
changes’ is true then ‘Not everything changes’ is false, while if ‘Everything changes’ is false 
then ‘Not everything changes’ is true. In effect, the extension of ‘not’ just swaps truth and 
falsity. ‘Or’, ‘and’, ‘something’, and ‘everything’ work similarly: they each transform the 
extension of the input into the extension of the output. Operators which do that are called 
extensional. For each expression of the language, such rules determine its extension from 
the extensions of the simple words from which it is built up. That helps explain how we 
can understand complex sentences we never previously encountered by understanding 
the familiar words of which they are made and how they are put together. In effect, such 
extensional semantics is an elementary – but very powerful – model of linguistic meaning, 
though people did not think of it like that at the time. 
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Carnap wanted to add symbols for ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’ to the formal language. His 
problem was that such modal operators don’t fit the previous model of meaning: they are not 
extensional. 
For suppose that ‘possibly’ is extensional. Then if I pick a sentence ‘X’ and don’t tell you what 
it is, but only whether it’s true, you should be able to work out whether ‘Possibly X’ is true. 
In one case you can do that: if I tell you that ‘X’ is true, you can work out that ‘Possibly X’ is 
true too, since actuality implies possibility. But if I tell you that ‘X’ is false, you can’t work out 
whether ‘Possibly X’ is true. I haven’t given you enough information; the answer depends on 
what ‘X’ is. For example, if ‘X’ is ‘Napoleon won at Waterloo’ (false), then ‘Possibly X’ is true: 
although Napoleon lost, he could have won. But if ‘X’ is ‘5 is more than 6’ (also false), then 
‘Possibly X’ is false too: 5 could not have been more than 6. Thus the extension of ‘X’ doesn’t 
always determine the extension of ‘Possibly X’. ‘Possibly’ is not extensional.
Similarly, suppose that ‘necessarily’ is extensional. Then you should be able to work out 
whether ‘Necessarily X’ is true. In one case you can do that: if I tell that ‘X’ is false, you 
can work out that ‘Necessarily X’ is false too, since necessity implies actuality. But if I tell 
you that ‘X’ is true, you can’t work out whether ‘Necessarily X’ is true. I haven’t given you 
enough information; the answer depends on what ‘X’ is. For example, if ‘X’ is ‘Napoleon lost 
at Waterloo’ (true), then ‘Necessarily X’ is false. But if ‘X’ is ‘6 is more than 5’ (also true), then 
‘Necessarily X’ is true too. Thus the extension of ‘X’ doesn’t always determine the extension of 
‘Necessarily X’. ‘Necessarily’ is not extensional.
Carnap solved the problem by considering not just extensions in the actual world, the way 
things are, but profiles of extensions over all possible worlds, ways things could have been. He 
borrowed the idea of possible worlds from Leibniz, though he preferred to use more linguistic 
entities, ‘state-descriptions’. He called the profiles intensions. For example, since the extension 
of ‘Napoleon lost at Waterloo’ is truth in every world in which Napoleon lost at Waterloo and 
falsity in every world in which Napoleon did not lose at Waterloo, the intension of ‘Napoleon 
lost at Waterloo’ assigns truth to each of the former worlds and falsity to each of the latter 
ones. Carnap’s crucial insight was that although the extension of the input to a modal operator 
doesn’t always determine the extension of the output, the intension of the input does always 
determine the intension of the output. He gave rules for calculating the latter in terms of 
the former. He interpreted ‘possibly’ as ‘in some possible world’ and ‘necessarily’ as ‘in every 
possible world’.
In more detail, Carnap’s rule for ‘possibly’ is that if the input is true in some possible world, 
then the output is true in every possible world, while if the input is false in every possible 
world, then the output is also false in every possible world. Thus ‘Napoleon won at Waterloo’ 
is true in some possible world, so ‘Possibly Napoleon won at Waterloo’ is true in every possible 
world. But ‘5 is more than 6’ is false in every possible world, so ‘Possibly 5 is more than 6’ is 
also false in every possible world. Thus the intension of the input determines the intension of 
the output; ‘possibly’ is intensional rather than extensional.
For ‘necessarily’, the rule is that if ‘X’ is true in every possible world, then ‘Necessarily 
X’ is also true in every possible world, whereas if ‘X’ is false in some possible world, then 
‘Necessarily X’ is false in every possible world. Thus ‘Napoleon lost at Waterloo’ is false in some 
possible world, so ‘Necessarily Napoleon lost at Waterloo’ is false in every possible world. By 
contrast, ‘6 is more than 5’ is true in every possible world, so ‘Necessarily 6 is more than 5’ is 
also true in every possible world. Thus the intension of the input determines the intension of 
the output; ‘necessarily’ is intensional rather than extensional. 
Since the rules for extensional operators like ‘not’, ‘or’, ‘and’, ‘something’, and ‘everything’ work 
for extensions in any possible world, Carnap easily adapted them to calculating intensions. The 
upshot was a complete intensional semantics for his whole formal language: every formula, 
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however complex, has an intension, determined step by step from the intensions of the simple 
constituents out of which it is composed. It’s a significantly more sophisticated model of 
meaning than extensional semantics. Through the work of Richard Montague, David Lewis, 
and many others, Carnap’s intensional semantics has massively influenced both philosophy of 
language and semantics as a branch of linguistics. Although the models have become ever more 
elaborate, they preserve the crucial move from extensions to intensions.
Carnap worked in a more model-building spirit than his predecessors. He didn’t construct 
his formal language to do mathematics in, or to reveal the hidden essence of all languages. 
He constructed a simple model language to demonstrate a way for modal operators to work. 
As we learn ever more of the extraordinary complexity underlying even the most ordinary 
conversations, philosophers of language and linguists may have to rely increasingly on a 
model-building methodology.
Models are fun. You can play with them. That’s not just an incidental side benefit; it’s what 
they are for, in both natural science and philosophy. We learn by manipulation, playing about: 
if you can’t manipulate the real thing, a good second-best is often to manipulate a model of 
it. You can fiddle with this or that component, changing it slightly to see what difference it 
makes, what varies with what. That way you come to understand more deeply how the model 
works. If the model is any good, you thereby come to understand better how the real thing 
works too. For instance, you can’t arbitrarily change how English works, to see what difference 
it makes, but you can arbitrarily change the rules of an artificial language, and calculate the 
consequences.
To be easily manipulated, a model should be defined in mathematically or logically precise and 
tractable terms. If the definition is vague, or too complicated, its consequences are unclear: 
one has to fall back on one’s prior philosophical instincts to guess how it behaves, instead 
of using the model to test those instincts. By contrast, a well-defined model allows one to 
calculate rigorously how it and variations on it behave, bypassing those prior instincts, and so 
to learn something unexpected. With a model-building methodology, rigor and playfulness go 
naturally together.
The rigor of model-building is not the rigor most philosophers are used to. Traditional 
philosophical rigor requires dismissing a claim once a counterexample to it has been given. In 
that sense, most models are born refuted, because they involve false simplifying assumptions. 
For instance, models in epistemic logic typically treat agents as logically perfect. Some 
philosophers dismiss those models accordingly. 
In physics, models of the solar system may treat a planet as a point mass, as if all its mass were 
concentrated at its center. Of course, physicists know quite well that planets are not point 
masses and do not behave exactly like them. Nevertheless, physicists do not dismiss such 
models, for they also know that much can be learned from them. By contrast, if one tried to 
write into the model a fully accurate description of the planet, with all its craters and bumps, 
the result would be too complicated to permit calculation. It takes skill to distinguish amongst 
the features of a model those which have lessons to teach us from those which are mere 
artefacts of the need to keep things simple. Philosophers are having to learn that skill.
To many philosophers, dismissing the true counterexample rather than the false 
generalization seems like a disregard for truth. It would indeed be intellectually irresponsible 
to go on believing the generalization in the face of a clear counterexample. But that’s not 
the model-building attitude. One can recognize that a generalization is both false and a key 
component of a model that points us towards genuine truths. 
If counterexamples don’t refute a model, what does? Within the model-building 
methodology, what displaces a model is a better model. Part of its superiority may be that it 
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deals more adequately with counterexamples to the old model, but it should also reproduce 
in its own way the old model’s successes. A new model with that combination of virtues may 
be very hard to find.
Model-building contrasts with the methodology of conjectures and refutations, championed 
by Karl Popper. On the crude version of his view, scientists put forward bold conjectures, 
informative universal generalizations, which can be falsified but can never be verified. A 
single negative instance, a counterexample, will falsify the generalization; no finite number 
of positive instances will verify it. Scientists do their utmost to refute it, by finding such a 
counterexample. Once it is refuted, they put forward another bold conjecture, and so on. 
One problem for such a falsificationist methodology, in both natural science and philosophy, 
is that it is error-fragile. In other words, a single mistake can have disastrous consequences. 
For suppose that we are testing a bold conjecture, and take ourselves to have found a 
counterexample. As good falsificationists, we dismiss the conjecture and go on to the next 
one. But what if the counterexample was a mistake? We are fallible; sometimes we misjudge 
single instances. In that case, the original conjecture may have been true after all. But we 
never return to it; we are too busy testing new bold conjectures. Philosophers’ reliance on 
counterexamples can be alarmingly close to crude falsificationism: once a counterexample 
is accepted, there’s no going back on it. By contrast, the model-building methodology is 
much less error-fragile, for it gives no such decisive power to a single judgment. Models are 
compared over a variety of dimensions.
None of this means that philosophy should go over entirely to a model-building methodology. 
In some areas, such as logic, we have found many true and informative universal 
generalizations. In others, good models may be too much to expect. Even where good models 
are available, as in epistemology, we may do best by using both methodologies. For if each 
independently pulls in the same direction, that’s stronger evidence that it’s the right direction. 
Such a combination of methodologies is more robust, unless they pull in opposite directions.
The potential of the model-building methodology for philosophy is only beginning to be 
explored. Its scope and limits should be clearer fifty years from now.
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The history of analytic philosophy is scattered with issues related to fundamental notions, 
which are hard to settle and, at the same time, such that (some) scholars do not seem to agree 
upon the most sensible methodology to tackle them.
By methodology, I mean the choice between the two horns of a very classic divide in the analytic 
tradition, i.e. whether in order to tackle those issues it is more reasonable to investigate them 
within and by formal languages or within and by natural language. In this respect, there are two 
radically opposing views: by the first view, one might translate natural language into a formal 
language, in order to unveil the significance of those basic notions, whose analysis in natural 
language can be subject to the ambiguities typical of this latter kind of context;1 by the second, 
formal languages are supposed to just model notions whose significance and relevance cannot 
be appreciated but in natural language.
The aim of this paper is to tackle the notion of reference of singular terms, in particular, with 
respect to whether its analysis, like the analysis of other basic notions, should be carried out 
in natural language or in the semantics of formal frameworks. I will incline toward the latter 
strategy, and consider reference in classical first-order logic as the simplest framework we 
have at disposal.
In §2, I will provide two classic examples of fundamental notions with respect to the proposed 
methodological divide. In §3, I will then focus on the notion of reference of singular terms, 
in order to provide some basis for the main claim that the semantics of formal languages, 
in particular of classical first-order logic, is the right source for the analysis of reference—in 
particular, supporting a deflationary view of reference, i.e. arbitrary reference (§4). In order 
to carry out this project, a few more issues will be addressed: what is meant by arbitrariness 
and whether arbitrary reference is genuine reference (§5); what semantics for the case 
study analysed, i.e. classical first-order logic, can be provided (§6). I will then conclude by 
mentioning some further issues that will need to be tackled in future research and by taking 
stock of the main claims in this paper (§7).
1 This strategy reminds one of Frege’s renown scorn for the use of natural language in the investigation of the 
foundations of mathematics. This attitude brought him to formulate his Begriffsschrift in 1879 and, consequently, his 
colossal and, alas!, fatally flawed opus magnum, i.e. the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, 1893-1903.
1. Overview
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Let us consider two examples to clarify what is at stake: the notion of truth, and the notion of 
quantification in formal languages—in particular with respect to the debate on the ontological 
commitment of classical second-order logic.
The notion of truth is one of those fundamental notions analytic philosophers have 
investigated at length, and for the analysis of which different strategies have been envisaged. 
With respect to the proposed divide, truth may be investigated by recurring to formal tools,2 
regardless of whether this analysis is somehow faithful to the apparent use we make of it in 
natural language. Consider, for instance, the work of Alfred Tarski, who proved in 1936 the 
inexpressibility of truth in classical first-order logic. Tarski showed that, as soon as we add 
a truth-predicate to first-order logic in order to express the truth and falsity of sentences of 
that language in that very language, the so-called Liar paradox arises.3 Tarski’s solution to the 
paradox was to construe a hierarchy of more and more expressive formal languages, each one, 
apart from the lowest, containing the truth predicate for the language immediately weaker. 
Tarski’s reliance on formal resources implied a rather pessimistic consideration of natural 
language: natural language is deemed as intrinsically inconsistent, since it is semantically 
closed, i.e. it contains its own truth-predicate and, thus, reproduces the Liar paradox.4 With 
respect to the divide I am proposing, if one agrees with Tarski on natural language, then the 
correct notion of truth should be the one regimented in a, possibly axiomatic, formal theory 
of the appropriate form. A second strategy to deal with the Liar paradox might be to revise 
one or more principles of the underlying logic – whether formal or informal, in order to 
comply with the manifest functioning of truth in natural language. This latter strategy is the 
one championed by, e.g., Kripke (1975) and Priest (2006). Though their respective solutions 
to the Liar paradox are indeed very different logically,5 they both agree that Tarski’s solution 
provides a rather unnatural reading of the behaviour of the notion of truth in natural 
language.6 On the face of the possible strategies on the market, then, it seems reasonable to 
ask: where does the notion of truth come from originally?7 And by what resources, whether 
formal or informal, are we supposed to provide an analysis of it?
A further, though somehow restricted, example comes from the philosophy of logic, in 
particular from the debate on second-order quantification and its ontological commitment. 
Second-order logic contains two sorts of variables, first- and second-order, and related 
quantificational resources. The former variables and quantifiers vary over a domain of 
individuals, the latter vary over a domain of second-order entities – properties, Fregean 
concepts, sets, classes, or the like. As Quine (1986) famously complained, second-order logic is 
set-theory in disguise, since its second-order variables are taken to vary over a domain of sets 
of first-order individuals.8 To be fair, Quine’s claim, in order to be motivated, hinges on two 
presupposed Quinean slogans, namely
2 This approach is underwritten by the many authors who have been working on axiomatic formal theories of truth, 
from possibly different logical strains, e.g. Hartry Field, Volker Halbach, Andrea Cantini, Leon Horsten, just to mention 
a few.
3 Famously, the sentence stating its own falsity, which informally might be rendered as e.g. (L) The sentence L is false.
4 And many other paradoxes, for that matter.
5 Kripke (1975) relies on a strong Kleene three-valued logic; Priest (2006), on a three-valued paraconsistent logic.
6 Namely a distinction in infinitely many languages, which, altogether, should capture what truth is. See for instance 
Kripke (1975, p. 695): “Unfortunately this picture seems unfaithful to the facts. If someone makes such an utterance as 
(1) [Most (i.e., the majority) of Nixon’s assertions about Watergate are false.], he does not attach a subscript, explicit or 
implicit, to his utterance of ‘false’, which determines the ‘level of language’ on which he speaks.”
7 Supposing it would be a great advantage, as I tend to think it would, if there were only one.
8 The correct quotation is “set theory in sheep’s clothing”. See Quine (1986, ch. 5).
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(1) to be is to be the value of a variable;
(2) since intensional entities like properties or Fregean concepts are “creatures of darkness”,9 
whereas sets have a clear identity criterion in the principle of extensionality, sets are to 
be preferred over intensional entities as the values of second-order variables in modelling 
second-order logic.
Both presuppositions are questionable to me, still, setting my qualms aside, a received view 
provides a set-theoretic semantics for second-order logic, by this, committing second-order 
logic to the existence of mathematical entities. So, for any sentence of natural language 
that can be expressed in second-order logic, the logical form and ontological commitment 
of that fragment of natural language are ultimately unveiled by the appropriate formal 
resources. Boolos (1984, 1985) championed an alternative view on second-order logic, aimed at 
vindicating its ontological innocence. He provided a semantics in terms of plural quantification, 
whose naturalness and primitivity is justified by examples taken from natural language,10 
(fragments of which are) used as a paradigmatic model for formal languages. To the best of 
my knowledge, Boolos did not explicitly claim that natural language is indeed the only source 
of linguistic expressibility we have to take into consideration. Still, on the basis of the debate 
between Quine and Boolos on second-order logic, it might be tempting to argue that, if both 
set-theoretic and plural semantics model the language of second-order logic while providing 
very different models for it, then the modelling of (fragments of) natural language into a 
formal language is not per se indicative of what is expressed and ontologically presupposed by 
natural language.11 This latter view is compatible with the claim that, as for the issue of the 
ontological commitment of quantification in formal languages, natural language can provide 
models that, at the very least, question views inspired by Quinean assumptions such as (1) and 
(2) from above.
The issue I will be interested in, in this paper, concerns yet another fundamental notion, i.e. 
the notion of reference, in particular as for singular terms such as proper names or individual 
constants. My question concerns the nature of this notion, its functioning, and how it comes 
about, i.e. how it is fixed. My main claim will be that looking into natural language for answers 
to these questions is not particularly illuminating, since, I claim, the philosophical analysis of 
reference in natural language is usually carried out by notions that do not come exclusively 
from semantic considerations and, as such, contribute to blurring it. My main thrust will 
be that we can go look into formal languages, instead, and devise a form of reference, 
9 Quine (1956, p. 180).
10 Especially examples of plural reference in natural language that is not formally reducible to first-order logic, but 
has to be translated into second-order logic, e.g. the so-called Geach-Kaplan sentence “Some critics admire only one 
another”.
11 Boolos (1984, p. 449): “The lesson to be drawn from the foregoing reflections on plurals and second-order logic is 
that neither the use of plurals nor the employment of second-order logic commits us to the existence of extra items 
beyond those to which we are already committed. We need not construe second-order quantifiers as ranging over 
anything other than the objects over which our first-order quantifiers range, and, in absence of other reasons for 
thinking so, we need not think that there are collections of (say) Cheerios, in addition to the Cheerios. Ontological 
commitment is carried out by our first-order quantifiers; a second-order quantifier needn’t be taken to be a kind of 
first-order quantifier in disguise, having items of a special kind, collections, in its range. It is not as though there were 
two sorts of things in the world, individuals, and collections of them, which our first- and second-order variables, 
respectively, range over and which our singular and plural forms, respectively denote. There are, rather, two (at least) 
different ways of referring to the same things, among which there may well be many, many collections”.
3. Reference
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which, unlike reference in natural language, is stripped to its semantic essentials, which is 
everything we need for reference to work in the first place. So, with respect to the proposed 
methodological divide, I am definitely on the side of formal languages in this.
As Shapiro (1997) stresses,
Probably the most baffling, and intriguing, semantic notion is that of reference. (…). How 
does a term come to denote a particular object? What is the nature of the relationship 
between a singular term (‘Fido’) and the object that it denotes (Fido), if it denotes 
anything? (p. 139).
Again, we have at least two options here: either we go look into the semantics of formal 
languages or we go look into the semantics of natural language. At first glance, the first route 
might seem to lead us nowhere:
Notice that model theory, by itself, has virtually nothing to say on this issue. In 
textbook developments of model theory, reference is taken as an unexplicated primitive. 
It is simply stipulated that an ‘interpretation’ includes a function from the individual 
constants to the domain of discourse. This is a mere shell of the reference relation. (…) 
As far as the model-theoretic scheme goes, it does not matter how this reference is to 
be accomplished or whether it can be accomplished in accordance with some theory 
or other. (…) As far as model theory goes, reference can be any function between the 
singular terms of language and the ontology (Ibid.)
To sum up the quotation from Shapiro, it seems that looking into model-theory for 
illumination on what reference of singular terms is and how it works is hopeless: any function 
will do. So, we might as well turn to natural language, in order to see if we can do any better:
If we assume that ordinary languages are understood and if we accept the premise that 
model theory captures the structure of ordinary interpreted languages, then we can do 
better. There is, of course, no consensus on how reference to ordinary physical objects 
is accomplished. The theories are legion. [But at the very least we can presume that] 
reference to proverbial medium-sized physical objects is accomplished (…) (Ibid., text in 
square brackets added.)
Nevertheless, even though, on the one hand, the semantics for formal languages might be 
thought to be of no help in analysing what the notion of reference is and how reference is 
fixed, on the other, at least two, to some extent incompatible views of reference have been 
proposed in the analysis of natural language, i.e. Kripke’s direct reference view and the 
classical descriptivist theory of reference supported by Russell and, to some extent, Frege, so 
that it might be questioned whether the reference relation is captured by any of those views at 
all.
To this latter claim, it might be objected that, even if natural language is of no more help than 
the semantics of formal languages with respect to the analysis of reference, at the very least in 
natural language we have a sense of what seems to be going on.12 Nevertheless, the attempted 
12 Notice that reference is taken as a primitive both in the semantics of formal languages and in (most of?) those 
philosophical pictures in philosophy of language. Reference is not reduced to more basic notions, but scholars have 
just tried to explain or elucidate it.
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analysis of reference and how it is fixed in natural language usually brings influences from 
different areas of philosophy, not semantics alone, but also e.g. metaphysics or philosophy 
of mind. In particular, the notions of individuation from metaphysics and of intentionality 
from the debate in the philosophy of mind carry a rather crucial import in the analysis of 
reference in natural language. In this paper, I would like to focus on the impact of the notion 
of individuation on reference fixing, in particular as for the two classic views on reference in 
philosophy of language.
A word of caution, though. The notion of individuation may not be particularly transparent 
conceptually: Lowe (2003) distinguishes between a metaphysical interpretation of individuation, 
and an epistemic interpretation of it. By metaphysical individuation, Lowe means:
an ontological relationship between entities: what “individuates” an object, in this 
sense, is whatever it is that makes it the single object that it is – whatever it is that 
makes it one object, distinct from others, and the very object that it is as opposed to any 
other thing (Lowe, 2003, p. 75). 
As Lowe argues, this conception of individuation may be very hard to capture. Epistemic 
individuation, i.e. the “singling out” of an entity as a “distinct object of perception, thought, 
or linguistic reference” (Lowe, 2003, p. 75), on the other hand, seems more straightforward, 
especially since it is often accompanied by some identity criterion.
In this respect, it seems reasonable to point out that the two main opposing views of reference 
in the philosophy of language seem to require a form of individuation for reference of singular 
terms to be fixed. Kripke’s initial baptism, in fact, can take place by pointing at an object and 
tagging it with a proper name – at least when the baptism takes place in præsentia, otherwise 
definite descriptions will do.13 Also, according to the descriptivist theory of reference,14 
the fixing of reference takes place via definite descriptions, which are a means to single 
out objects of reference. So, either way, reference via proper names seems to presuppose 
epistemic individuation in that it requires that objects of reference are somehow singled out, 
in order for reference of proper names to be fixed. This feature of reference via proper names, 
shared by the views mentioned above, induces what I like to call canonical reference.15
The idea that the fixing of reference of singular terms in natural language is usually 
accompanied by epistemic individuation is not problematic per se. Nevertheless, as soon as we 
ask for a uniform view of what reference is and how it works, and we take natural language 
as the only possible starting point in this enquiry, we might also be tempted to claim that the 
notion of reference in natural language is the one and only notion of reference. If, furthermore, 
we also want to apply this view of reference in natural language to the functioning of 
reference within formal frameworks, I think it is, first of all, disputable the notion of reference 
in natural language is to be reliably and exhaustively modelled in formal languages; secondly, 
implausible that, by extension, it is this kind of reference that takes place in formal languages. 
Hardly a function of assignment individuates, hardly by description (unless the function is 
provided with specific instructions) - let alone by ostension. If so, we are forced to assume 
the existence of at least two different notions of reference, i.e. one in natural language and 
the other in formal languages. But if we do think that the basic notions analytic philosophy 
13 See Kripke 1980, p. 96 & fn. 42.
14 E.g. Russell’s and, to some extent, Frege’s.
15 See also Boccuni & Woods (2018) for similar considerations.
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tries to unveil would better be unique, this option seems useless. The alternative view, 
which is the one I support, is that there is only one basic notion of reference, such that non-
semantic considerations are not necessary to fruitfully carry out its analysis. In particular, 
I do think that we can do only with one, basic notion of reference, which nevertheless does 
not presuppose individuation, and such that it can be fruitfully analysed in some appropriate 
semantics for formal languages. In a nutshell, my view is that, though reference is indeed a 
primitive tool of languages, it can still be stripped down of features that are, in some sense, a 
philosophical overload, leading thus to a deflated notion of reference i.e. arbitrary reference.16 
The outcome is an analysis of reference which is carried out in formal semantics, and such that 
it can also be reasonably applied to natural language.17
In some recent literature,18 a case has been made for (at least some) singular terms 
(in mathematical discourse) to be interpreted as parameters or arbitrary names: terms 
grammatically behaving like singular terms, but, at least to some extent, semantically 
functioning as pronouns or indefinites. For instance, in mathematical discourse arbitrary 
names can be introduced by locutions of the form ‘Let n be an arbitrary natural number’. 
This move has the advantage of being proposed on semantic-linguistic (non-metaphysical) 
grounds, but can be specified in very different, even incompatible, ways. Brandom (1996) 
provides a survey of the possible options on the table, according to which we may develop two 
distinct accounts of reference in mathematical discourse.
According to the first account, one may take a liberal view and make a case for two primitive 
and independent notions of reference: the one I called canonical reference; and arbitrary reference 
as embodying some notion of reference other than canonical. This view has the obvious 
disadvantage of multiplying the notions of reference præter necessitatem. Furthermore, this 
view does not seem appealing, for at least a very general reason: it is hard to justify that we 
have two different notions of reference, if we have a hard time in capturing what reference 
should be in the first place. According to the second option presented by Brandom (1996), one 
may have a confrontational attitude on the issue of reference. This latter view, in turn, may be 
spelled out in two possible ways:
(i) (at least some) singular terms are parameters, and they do not refer;
(ii) singular terms genuinely refer, just not (necessarily) via individuation: what is really basic 
is arbitrary reference, and, if at all, canonical reference may be built up from it.
16 For a claim in a similar spirit, though arising from a possible semantics of proper names in natural language, see 
e.g. Cumming (2008).
17 It might be objected that my view on reference does not imply that the best methodology to tackle this issue 
requires to analyse it in a formal framework. After all, it would still be compatible with my view that arbitrary 
reference is a primitive tool of natural language, in which it is already understood, and formal frameworks at best 
model it, to the effect that the proposed methodological priority of formal over natural language may well be 
reversed. Nonetheless, unlike in formal frameworks, I find it hard to envisage a clear methodology within natural 
language to account for arbitrary reference. The only examples of primitive arbitrary reference in natural languages, 
in fact, seem to be indefinites such as ‘a natural number’. Not all linguists and semanticists agree on the correct 
interpretation of indefinites, though: indefinites might be treated either as quantified expressions (sometimes 
existentially, sometimes universally), or as primitively referential, or as essentially predicates with free variables 
– see, e.g., King & Lewis (2016) and Ludlow (2018) for surveys on these different readings. It seems, then, that the 
systematic ambiguity of natural language that caused Frege’s scorn is still alive and kicking some a hundred and forty 
years after the Begriffsschrift and regardless the enormous progress in philosophy and linguistics. As things stand, thus, 
I think it is still methodologically preferable to look into formal frameworks rather than natural language to account 
for arbitrary reference. I would like to sincerely thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.
18 See e.g. Brandom (1996), Pettigrew (2008), Shapiro (2008, 2012), Woods (2014).
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Pettigrew (2008) and Shapiro (2008, 2012) seem to pursue option (i), since they take arbitrary 
names to be non-referential. Applying this view seems uneffective, but I’ll get back to it in §5. 
In what follows, I will pursue option (ii), namely the option by which we still have genuine 
referentiality, contra Shapiro and Pettigrew, and avoid appealing to individuation, thus 
supporting a metaphysically deflated notion of reference, i.e. arbitrary reference.19
The way in which I like to understand arbitrariness in arbitrary reference might be called the 
epistemicist view. Roughly, this view takes arbitrariness to be epistemic
arbitrariness. We cannot know which individual an arbitrary term refers to, but the arbitrary 
term genuinely refers: it refers to a full-fledged individual, equipped with properties. The 
motivations for this view can be found in natural deduction. Breckenridge & Magidor (2012), 
Martino (2001, 2004), and Boccuni (2013) conceive of arbitrary reference as genuine reference, 
and the arbitrariness involved in it as an epistemic feature.20 Mathematicians (and logicians, 
for that matter) often use locutions like ‘Let n be an arbitrary natural number’ in logico-
mathematical discourse. These kinds of expressions introduce reference to, e.g., an arbitrary 
natural number n, and, according to Breckenridge & Magidor (2012), are governed by the 
following principle of arbitrary reference:
Arbitrary Reference: It is possible to fix the reference of an expression arbitrarily. When 
we do so, the expression receives its ordinary kind of semantic value, though we do not 
know and cannot know which value in particular it receives.
According to Martino (2001), the possibility of referring, at least in a non-canonical way, to any 
entity of a universe of discourse is presupposed both by logical and mathematical reasoning, 
even when non-denumerable domains are concerned. As a consequence, quantification itself 
logically presupposes this possibility of referring to each and every element of a domain, 
before we consider those elements through generalisation. Such a possibility of reference is 
very well expressed by the crucial role arbitrary reference plays both in formal and informal 
reasoning. Its cruciality lies in that arbitrary reference exhibits two different logical features 
that make it essential for performing proofs, i.e. arbitrariness and determinacy.
Through arbitrary reference, we may consider any entity a of a universe of discourse: as 
arbitrary reference does not single out specific entities, ‘a’ does not refer to an individuated 
entity a, rather it refers to an arbitrary a. Consequently, the epistemic ignorance about which 
individual a is, and thus of what its specific properties are, retains the general validity of the 
arguments about a. This feature provides a justification for the correct uses of the rule of 
universal introduction in natural deduction, which sanction as legitimate a deduction from 
ϕa to ∀xϕx just in case the universal conclusion ∀xϕx does not depend upon any assumption 
concerning a. This restriction is based on the rationale that, in order to legitimately conclude 
that all x are ϕ from the fact that an arbitrary a is ϕ, we have to assure that no specific 
properties of a intervene in the deductive step to ∀xϕx. Those specific properties of a, in 
fact, may not be shared by all the individuals in the domain, and thus the soundness of the 
deductive step to ∀xϕx might be at risk.
At the same time, though, an arbitrary name ‘a’ is used to refer to the same individual a 
19 See Boccuni & Woods (2018) for the application of this view to the foundational
programme in the philosophy of mathematics known as Neologicism.
20 Of course, there is also Fine’s view on arbitrary objects, but taking it into consideration would lead us too far astray, 
so I shall leave the comparison between my proposal and Fine’s to some further work.
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within a derivation on a. Again, a crucial reason for this is to be found in the requirement of 
soundness we want to impose on some valid argument schemas. If sameness of reference were 
not a basic ingredient of derivations, soundness would be in jeopardy. Consider the rule of 
existential elimination in natural deduction. When we pass from a premise of the form ∃xϕx 
to the auxiliary assumption ϕ(a), ‘a’ has to be an unused arbitrary name, or at least it has not 
to appear in any of the assumptions which ∃xϕx depends upon. Consider now the following 
(invalid) deduction:
(1) ∃xHx  A
(2) ∃x¬Hx  A
(3) Ha  A
(4) ¬Ha  A
(5) Ha ∧ ¬Ha 3,4 intr. ∧
Invalidity stems out from that, in eliminating the existential quantifiers respectively from (1) 
and (2), we use the very same arbitrary name in (3) and (4). Say that H is the property of being 
even and x varies over the natural numbers: (1) and (2) say, respectively, that there is at least 
a number which is even and there is at least a number which is not. Both these sentences are 
true in the standard model of Peano arithmetic. Nevertheless, if we use the same arbitrary 
name to perform existential elimination in the derivation above, in (3) and (4) we respectively 
say that a number is even and that the very same number is not, from which the contradiction in 
(5). For this reason, using an already used arbitrary name in (4) cannot be allowed.
In order to explain the invalidity of the derivation (1)-(5) ‘a’ must be referring to the same, 
though arbitrary, individual both in lines (3) and (4). Thus, in order to achieve soundness in 
the previous example, in line (4) we have to use a different arbitrary name than ‘a’, because 
we need to express that a different individual than a is ¬H within the same derivation, in 
accordance with the restrictions imposed by the rule of existential elimination. But then again, 
in order to distinguish between a and any other arbitrary individual that is ¬H, we have to 
assume that a is a determinate, though arbitrary, individual of the domain. The motivation for 
this requirement is very nicely explained by Suppes:
(…) ambiguous names,21 like all names, cannot be used indiscriminately. The person 
who calls a loved one by the name of a former loved one is quickly made aware of this. 
(…) Such a happy-go-lucky naming process is bound to lead to error, just as we could 
infer a false conclusion from true facts about two individuals named ‘Fred Smith’ if we 
did not somehow devise a notational device for distinguishing which Fred Smith was 
being referred to in any given statement. The restriction which we impose to stop such 
invalid arguments is to require that when we introduce by existential specification 
an ambiguous name in a derivation, that name has not previously been used in the 
derivation (Suppes, 1999, p. 82).
The reasons for restricting the rules of introduction and elimination of quantifiers in natural 
deduction are semantic: in derivations, we perform a semantic reasoning that we want to 
proof-theoretically capture by deductive rules and the restrictions on them, in order to 
retain the soundness of our reasoning. Such a reasoning is crucially based, on the one hand, 
on arbitrariness and, on the other, on sameness and determinacy of arbitrary reference. But 
21 I.e. arbitrary names.
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then again, in order to make sense of sameness and determinacy, and consequently of the 
requirements we impose on deductive rules for the sake of soundness, we have to assume the 
genuine referentiality of arbitrary names to begin with. Genuine referentiality is a necessary 
condition for soundness.22
Let us now come to a possible semantics for arbitrary reference, and let us consider a formal 
framework that is as simple as possible: classical first-order logic (FOL). There are several 
semantics that may be utilised to make sense of arbitrary reference in this epistemic nuance, 
e.g., at least, choice functions, Hilbert-style ϵ-terms, and more recently Martino’s acts of 
choice semantics. Regardless what the preferred semantics is, any of them may be used to 
provide a semantics that fixes the reference of arbitrary names in classical FOL. I will provide a 
semantics in terms of choice functions, but I think nothing really substantial bears upon it.
For the sake of simplicity, let us focus on the monadic fragment L  of the language of classical 
FOL, i.e. the fragment containing an infinite list of free variables {x, y, z, …}, an infinite list of 
arbitrary names {a, b, c, …}, and an infinite list of monadic predicate letters {F, G, H, …}. Let 
us also assume that the arbitrary names are the only singular terms, i.e. in L  there are no 
individual constants.
Let now D be a non-empty domain, and let f be a choice function of assignment taking the set 
of the singular terms of L  as its domain.23 In order to model epistemic arbitrary reference, we 
want f to assign ‘a’ to a member of a set of candidate referents from D. Informally speaking, 
in order to attach a referent to ‘a’ we go look into the domain for possible referents, but since 
‘a’ is arbitrary the set of such possible referents may not contain exactly one member: there 
might be different individuals in D that are eligible as denotations of an arbitrary name ‘a’; 
f picks exactly one of them, still we don’t know which one. So, considering a subset C of D 
containing candidate referents for ‘a’, f assigns a member of C to ‘a’:
f : {a ∈ L : a is an arbitrary name} → C ⊆ D,
such that:
(1) C ⊆ D := {i : i ∈ D ∧ M |= Φi}, where i is an individual in D and Φ is an arbitrary condition 
expressible in L;
(2.a) if C ≠ ∅, then f (a) = i ∈ C, for any i ∈ C;
(2.b) if C = ∅, then f (a) = f (D).24
We have to extend this to predicate letters: assuming that predicate letters are interpreted 
22 Those who support the non-referentiality of arbitrary reference (e.g. Pettigrew, Shapiro) should provide some 
argument for explaining how classical formal and informal reasoning functions in the way it does, e.g., by certain 
constraints on introduction and elimination of quantifiers.
23 Free variables are interpreted as usual, through arbitrary infinite sequences Si of individuals of D that Si correlates 
to free variables, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ω.
24 One might wonder whether, in order to select appropriate candidate denotations for ‘a’, some form of individuation 
is still required, since we have to distinguish candidate referents for ‘a’, which are C, from those individuals in D that 
are ¬C and, thus, cannot be candidate referents for ‘a’. Nevertheless, since the underlying first-order logic is classical 
and also complete, any subset C of D will be such that its complement ¬C is completely determined, regardless our 
epistemic ability to single out which objects, if any, are in C and which are not. Since the logic is classical, we know 
for a fact that, if any individual at all is in C, it will not be in ¬C, and that both these subsets of D are completely 
determined with respect to the individuals they contain, even though we might not be able to single those individuals 
out. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.
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objectually, they are referential as well. Let g be a choice function of assignment taking the set 
of all predicate letters of L  as its domain, and ‘F’ a predicate letter. The function g assigns ‘F’ 
to a member of a class of subsets of D that are candidate referents for ‘F’. Informally speaking, 
in order to attach a referent to ‘F’ we go look into a class of subsets of D for possible referents, 
but since ‘F’ is interpreted arbitrarily such a class may not contain exactly one member: there 
might be different subsets of D that are eligible as denotations of ‘F’; g picks exactly one of 
them, still we don’t know which one. So, being π(D) a class of subsets of D containing candidate 
referents for ‘F’, g assigns a member of such class to ‘F’:
g : {F ∈ L : F is predicate letter} → π(D),
such that
(3) π(D) := {X : X ⊆ D ∧ M |= ΨX }, where X is a member of π(D) and Ψ is an arbitrary condition 
expressible in L ;
(4.a) if π(D) ≠ ∅, then g(F) = C ∈ π(D), for any C ∈ π(D);
(4.b) if π(D) = ∅, then g(F) = g(π(D)).
It might be objected that predicate letters in FOL are constants, functioning as proper names 
of properties of individuals, and thus my proposed view is not faithful to their intended 
meaning. Replying this objection is connected to one of the issues mentioned in passing in 
§4, bullet point (ii), i.e. the possible construal of canonical reference from arbitrary reference. 
If canonical reference is to be recovered, we can do so by taking arbitrary reference as 
primitive, and then build canonical reference from it. What is needed is some formal device for 
expressing individuating conditions, likely in their epistemic nuance i.e. by conditions singling 
out a specific object of reference. A possible way to do this would be to provide a uniqueness 
condition by a definite description. The uniqueness condition would impose a constraint on 
the codomain of a choice function of assignment, i.e. it would work in the limit case where the 
codomain of the function contains exactly one member. This goes as for both predicate letters 
such as ‘F’ and the introduction of individual constants from arbitrary names.
We can also extend this strategy to the semantics of natural language. All in all, when 
a Kripkean initial baptism takes place, reference fixing is usually accompanied by some 
individuating conditions, and this can be modelled as I just suggested. Though, that de facto 
reference fixing in natural language goes with individuation does not imply that the fixing 
of reference of a proper name and its semantics are necessarily and a priori intertwined with 
metaphysics.
A somewhat more difficult question concerns whether a general theory of arbitrary reference 
can be provided, such that it is applicable to the semantics of any formal theory, whether 
logical or not. After all, I only provided a semantics for classical first-order logic, and this 
might raise qualms about the feasibility of extending such arbitrary reference semantics 
to more complex formal languages. In principle, I see no obstacle to this, since reference is 
indeed a basic semantic tool of any language, but this topic I shall leave for future research.
In this paper, I investigated one of the most basic notions in the analytic debate, i.e. reference 
(of singular terms). My aim was to tackle the notion of reference in the light of a classic 
methodological divide: whether its analysis, like the analysis of other basic notions, should 
be carried out in natural language or in the semantics of formal frameworks. I argued that 
the most sensible strategy is to rely on formal resources, because relying on natural language 
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implies a philosophically overloaded analysis, weighed down with notions from philosophical 
areas other than semantics, like e.g. metaphysics. I argued for a deflated notion of reference, 
namely arbitrary reference, as a genuine, primitive notion, and provided a semantics for it apt 
for classical first-order logic – the simplest formal framework in which the referentiality of 
singular terms is relevant.
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INTUIZIONI LINGUISTICHE E 
FILOSOFIA SPERIMENTALE: METODI A 
CONFRONTO
abstract
Nell’ultimo decennio si è infittito il dibattito sul ruolo della filosofia sperimentale rispetto alla cosiddetta 
filosofia ‘in poltrona’ (‘armchair philosophy’). La discussione, che riguarda i metodi della filosofia 
analitica in generale, ha ricadute di grande interesse per la filosofia del linguaggio in particolare. In 
questo articolo presento un caso in cui una questione centrale nello studio dei termini espressivi – cioè 
se il contenuto offensivo delle espressioni denigratorie sopravviva o no nell’interazione con operatori 
semantici e in particolare con la negazione – è stata affrontata quasi contemporaneamente adottando 
metodi filosofici differenti: (i) in poltrona, (ii) attraverso l’applicazione di test linguistici e (iii) attraverso 
metodi sperimentali. I tre metodi – così diversi per tradizione e prospettive – offrono risultati convergenti. 
Casi come questi mostrano come una pluralità metodologica e un atteggiamento più ecumenico rispetto 
allo scontro tra filosofia sperimentale e filosofia ‘in poltrona’ non siano da temere ma anzi da perseguire.
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Nell’ultimo decennio, si è infittito il dibattito intorno al ruolo delle intuizioni, da intendersi 
sia come le intuizioni dei filosofi di professione, sia come le intuizioni dei cosiddetti ‘lays’, 
cioè la gente comune, o non-filosofi. Le intuizioni che ricoprono maggior interesse in questa 
discussione sono quelle relative agli esperimenti mentali (si vedano in proposito Weinberg et 
al., 2001; Williamson, 2007; Swain et al., 2008; Liao, 2008; Machery, 2017).
Gli interrogativi che hanno animato questo dibattito riguardano l’affidabilità delle intuizioni 
in generale, l’idea che le intuizioni degli esperti siano più affidabili di quelle dei non-esperti, la 
difficoltà nello stabilire chi siano gli esperti in ciascun campo, e così via. Inoltre, il fatto che su 
innumerevoli questioni filosofiche permanga un profondo disaccordo tra i filosofi di professione 
potrebbe suggerire che le intuizioni sugli esperimenti mentali di questi ultimi non sono in 
fondo così affidabili: se così fosse, dovremmo osservare nel tempo una certa convergenza di 
opinioni riguardo agli esperimenti mentali considerati dalla comunità. Ad alimentare la sfiducia 
nell’attendibilità delle intuizioni, vi sono anche studi che mostrano come fattori quali istruzione, 
situazione socioeconomica, formulazione del problema, forse genere e così via siano in grado di 
influenzare le intuizioni sugli esperimenti mentali (Weinberg et al., 2001).
La discussione sull’affidabilità teorica delle intuizioni sugli esperimenti mentali, insieme 
alla questione su chi conti come ‘esperto’ in materia di problemi filosofici, ha conseguenze 
rilevanti sul ruolo della filosofia sperimentale rispetto alla più tradizione filosofia ‘in poltrona’. 
Vi sono posizioni radicali a favore dell’uno o dell’altro modo di fare filosofia, così come 
posizioni più moderate (si vedano per esempio Kauppinen, 2007 e Knobe & Nichols, 2013), 
ma l’interrogativo da cui prendo le mosse è se questo dibattito possa davvero interessare 
solo chi è impegnato nell’indagine sui metodi della filosofia analitica, o se non sia piuttosto 
una questione con cui filosofe e filosofi si debbano confrontare nel portare avanti le proprie 
ricerche. Ogni modo di fare filosofia assume, quand’anche implicitamente, una certa posizione 
metafilosofica: questa osservazione scontata basta di per sé a rendere la domanda sui metodi 
una domanda di tutti. Il caso che in questo articolo discuto riguarda una questione molto 
circoscritta all’interno del dibattito sugli espressivi in filosofia del linguaggio e in linguistica. 
Quello che vorrei fare dopo aver fornito delle coordinate di massima sulla materia di 
discussione (Sezione 2) è mostrare quali metodi differenti siano stati adoperati per dipanare 
il dilemma in esame: dalla cosiddetta armchair philosophy, cioè la filosofia tradizionale che 
affronta i problemi filosofici sviluppando nuove analisi senza bisogno di collezionare dati 
empirici (Sezione 3.1), all’impiego di test linguistici per scandagliare le intuizioni dei parlanti 
– non necessariamente dei filosofi – (sezione 3.2), fino ad arrivare ai metodi di filosofia 
1. Introduzione
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sperimentale (Sezione 3.3). Il mio scopo è presentare un caso virtuoso in cui i diversi approcci 
messi in campo in filosofia hanno fornito risultati congruenti.
Gli slurs, in italiano ‘epiteti denigratori’, sono termini che denigrano i propri bersagli in quanto 
appartenenti a una certa categoria, spesso chiamata ‘categoria target’. Tali categorie possono 
essere l’orientamento sessuale, l’etnia, la provenienza geografica, la religione, eccetera. 
Alcuni esempi di slurs in italiano sono espressioni come ‘frocio’, ‘negro’, ‘terrone’, e così 
via. Vari nuclei di interesse hanno portato questi termini al centro del dibattito filosofico 
negli ultimi anni: innanzitutto essi sembrano mettere in discussione la distinzione fatti/
valori, dal momento che sono termini che contemporaneamente veicolano un’informazione 
fattuale ed esprimono un giudizio valutativo (negativo); oltre a ciò, lo studio degli epiteti 
denigratori diventa particolarmente rilevante quando ci si interroga su questioni legate al 
linguaggio d’odio e alla sua permissibilità nei discorsi pubblici, privati e sui social; inoltre, gli 
slurs sono spesso analizzati non solo come termini che rispecchiano un certo atteggiamento 
discriminatorio, ma come strumenti di propaganda (Cepollaro, 2017, p. 62 segg) e secondo 
alcuni – si veda ad esempio Jeshion, 2013a; 2013b – gli slurs svolgono una vera e propria 
funzione di disumanizzazione dei loro bersagli; infine – ed è su questo che ci soffermeremo in 
questo lavoro – gli epiteti denigratori presentano un comportamento linguistico particolare.
La domanda a cui molti in filosofia e linguistica hanno cercato di rispondere riguarda la 
relazione tra i termini denigratori che chiamiamo ‘slurs’ e quei contenuti dispregiativi a cui 
essi sono tipicamente associati. In altre parole, la questione è se il contenuto denigratorio 
degli slurs sia parte del significato vero-condizionale degli epiteti stessi, se sia un’implicatura 
conversazionale, una presupposizione, un’implicatura convenzionale, un effetto perlocutorio, 
un effetto della forza illocutoria degli enunciati in cui gli slurs compaiono, e così via. Non 
esiste al momento una teoria accettata all’unanimità, ma possiamo se non altro affermare che 
la maggior parte degli autori e delle autrici sostiene che la componente denigratoria degli 
slurs non sia parte del loro significato vero-condizionale (si vedano per esempio Schlenker, 
2007; Richard, 2008; Predelli, 2010; Camp, 2013; Jeshion, 2013a, 2013b; Bolinger, 2015; Cepollaro 
& Stojanovic, 2016). A motivare questa posizione, vi è l’osservazione di come la componente 
denigratoria di queste espressioni si comporta quando interagisce con gli operatori vero-
condizionali. Si considerino i seguenti enunciati:
(1) Lucia è terrona.
(2) Lucia non è terrona.
(3) Lucia è terrona?
(4) Lucia potrebbe essere terrona.
(5) Se Lucia è terrona, lo è anche suo fratello.
(6) Non ci sono terroni.
Il contenuto dispregiativo veicolato da ‘terrona’ in (1) non sparisce quando il termine viene 
negato in (2) e (6), né quando il termine compare in una domanda (e dunque non è predicato 
del soggetto) in (3), né, ancora, quando si trova nell’ambito di un predicato modale in (4), o di 
un condizionale in (5). Come accennato poc’anzi, la maggior parte delle filosofe e dei filosofi 
coinvolti in questo dibattito ritiene che gli esempi appena proposti dovrebbero spingerci a 
scartare una teoria vero-condizionale della componente denigratoria degli epiteti: se questa 
componente fosse parte del significato vero-condizionale (spesso chiamato impropriamente 
‘semantico’), allora essa dovrebbe interagire con gli operatori semantici in modo da, ad 
esempio, scomparire quando (1) viene negato o messa sotto forma di domanda, eccetera.
Contro questa opinione diffusa, Robert May e Christopher Hom (si vedano Hom, 2008, 2010, 
2. Il dibattito sugli 
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2012; Hom & May, 2013, 2014, 2018) hanno sviluppato e difeso la teoria vero-condizionale. 
Parte degli argomenti dispiegati per sostenere tale teoria si appella a intuizioni che sembrano 
differire da quelle sostenute dalla maggior parte della comunità linguistica e filosofica. 
In particolare, secondo Hom e May, gli enunciati (2)-(6) non sono davvero ‘denigratori’ 
nello stesso senso in cui (1) può esserlo. Per i due studiosi, (2)-(6) non predicano proprietà 
dispregiative di nessuno e pertanto non sono denigratori in senso stretto. Anzi, (2) e (6) 
possono essere usati secondo Hom e May proprio per fare affermazioni non razziste.
Di fronte a questo conflitto di intuizioni circa l’interpretazione di frasi come (2)-(6) – 
veicolano un contenuto dispregiativo nei confronti dei meridionali oppure no? –, l’obiettivo 
che ci si pone è di stabilire (i) quale interpretazione sia corretta (ammesso che via sia una 
interpretazione corretta) e (ii) cosa abbia suggerito l’interpretazione opposta. Per rispondere 
a questa domanda, ci troveremo a integrare strategie provenienti dalla cosiddetta filosofia ‘in 
poltrona’ (Sezione 3.1.), ma anche test linguistici (Sezione 3.2.) e infine dati dalla filosofia e 
linguistica sperimentali (Sezione 3.3).
Vari autori e autrici (Anderson & Lepore, 2013, citati sotto, ma anche Jeshion, 2013a e Bolinger, 
2015) hanno preso le distanze dalle intuizioni avallate da Hom e May circa la non-offensività 
degli enunciati negativi, classificando l’interpretazione non denigratoria di frasi tipo ‘Lucia 
non è terrone’ come metalinguistica.
Not all theorists agree that the negation of a slurring sentence is derogatory (e.g. 
Blackburn, p. 148; Dummett 2007, p. 527; Hornsby, p. 129, Hom, p. 31), invoking an 
alleged non-derogatory use of (7) in their favor.
(7) There are no niggers.
Careful examination of this datum is supposed to establish it as a case of metalinguistic 
negation (Horn, Ch. 6), as in (8).
(8) John is not good; he’s great.
(8), under a meta-linguistic reading, does not ascribe greatness while denying goodness.
It registers that, for one reason or another, its speaker refuses to use ‘good’ for John. By 
analogy, should we conclude that what (9) (and by extension (7)) expresses is a meta-
linguistic claim, namely, a refusal to apply the slur ‘nigger’ to anyone?
(9) There are no niggers; there are only African-Americans.
Blackburn says of such sentences they are a way of ‘disowning the attitude’. (Anderson 
& Lepore, 2013, p. 28)
Quella di Anderson & Lepore riportata sopra è, nelle loro stesse parole, un’analogia col 
fenomeno della negazione metalinguistica investigato da Horn in alcuni lavori fondamentali 
(Horn, 1985; 1989). Horn distingue due tipi di negazione che chiama ‘proposizionale’ e 
‘metalinguistica’: la prima si applica al contenuto vero-condizionale del termine negato; 
la seconda serve a prendere le distanze da una certa scelta lessicale, da un tono, da una 
pronuncia.
A device for objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatsoever - including 
its conventional or conversational implicata, its morphology, its style or register, or its 
phonetic realization (Horn, 1985, p. 121).
It is relevant that metalinguistic negation can be employed by a speaker who wishes to 
reject the bigoted or chauvinistic point of view embodied in an earlier statement within 
the discourse context: (c) I beg your pardon: Lee isn’t an ‘uppity {nigger/broad/kike/
wop/...}’ - (s)he’s a strong, vibrant {black/woman/Jew/Italian/...}. (…) ‘I’m not ‘colored’ 
3. Tre strategie
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- I’m black!’, ‘I’m not a ‘gentleman of the Israelite persuasion’ - I’m a Jew!’ (Horn, 1985, 
p. 133).
Nella frase ‘Lucia non è felice’ la negazione non segnala la falsità di ‘Lucia è felice’, ma 
sottolinea che l’uso del predicato ‘felice’ non è adeguato a descrivere lo stato di Lucia (e 
questo sarebbe ancora più chiaro se per esempio proseguissimo così: ‘Lucia non è felice, è 
felicissima’). Similmente, sostengono Anderson e Lepore, quando si leggono frasi come (2) 
o (6) come non offensive, non si sta interpretando la negazione come un operatore che nega 
un certo contenuto proposizionale, ma come un segnale che l’uso del predicato ‘terrone’ è 
inappropriato. Questa analogia, per quanto possa essere convincente, non è un argomento 
sufficientemente forte da scardinare la tesi di Hom & May. Nelle sezioni che seguono, 
consideriamo due modi diversi di testare questa ipotesi.
Una strategia per mostrare che effettivamente l’interpretazione non denigratoria di enunciati 
quali (2) e (6) dipenda da un’interpretazione metalinguistica della negazione è applicare 
appositi test linguistici. Questa procedura dovrebbe offrire dei risultati più solidi di una mera 
analogia ‘dalla poltrona’, nonostante anche in questi casi si faccia appello alle intuizioni 
linguistiche degli studiosi. Presento brevemente la strategia proposta in Cepollaro e Thommen, 
2019, sezione 3.
Nei suoi lavori fondamentali sulla negazione metalinguistica, Horn introduce dei test che 
consentono di distinguere la negazione metalinguistica da quella proposizionale. Uno di questi 
test prevede l’incorporazione morfologica della negazione (Horn 1985, 140). Si prendano i 
seguenti enunciati:
(10) Lucia non è felice.
(10’) Lucia non è felice. [è triste]
(10’’) Lucia non è felice. [è felicissima]
Secondo Horn, (10) è ambiguo tra due interpretazioni che dipendono da due letture alternative 
della negazione. Se la negazione si legge come proposizionale, allora (10) sembra dire 
che Lucia è triste (come suggerito dalla parentetica in 10’). Se la negazione si legge come 
metalinguistica, allora (10) sembra dire che non è adeguato dire che Lucia è (solo) felice, 
perché è addirittura felicissima (10’’). Horn suggerisce che per stabilire se la negazione in 
(10) sia metalinguistica o proposizionale, si può osservare cosa accade quando la negazione 
viene incorporata morfologicamente nel predicato ‘felice’, ottenendo il predicato ‘infelice’. 
L’incorporazione infatti blocca le letture metalinguistiche della negazione e consente invece 
quelle proposizionali. Consideriamo i seguenti enunciati:
(11) Lucia è infelice.
(11’) Lucia è infelice. [è triste]
(11’’) Lucia è infelice. [è felicissima]
Osserviamo con Horn che dicendo ‘Lucia è infelice’, abbiamo sì a disposizione l’interpretazione 
secondo cui Lucia è triste, ma non è più disponibile l’interpretazione secondo cui il termine 
‘felice’ è inadeguato poiché Lucia è felicissima. In altre parole, l’incorporazione della negazione 
lascia sopravvivere solo l’interpretazione della frase coerente con l’uso proposizionale della 
negazione e fa scomparire le letture metalinguistiche. In Cepollaro (2017, pp. 102-114) e 
Cepollaro e Thommen (2019, sezione 3) il test dell’incorporazione della negazione viene 
applicato agli slurs: se la lettura non denigratoria di una frase come ‘Lucia non è terrona’ non 
3.2. Test linguistici
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è più accessibile quando la negazione viene incorporata morfologicamente, questo vuol dire 
che – come sostengono Anderson & Lepore 2013; Jeshion 2013 e Bolinger 2015 – l’uso della 
negazione è metalinguistico. Viceversa, se la lettura non denigratoria di ‘Lucia non è terrona’ 
è ancora disponibile quando la negazione è incorporata morfologicamente, questo vuol dire 
che la negazione era proposizionale, come sostengono Hom e May. Questo interrogativo 
apparentemente molto circostanziato su come interpretare la negazione in (2) e (6) ha delle 
conseguenze teoriche più generali: una delle prove che Hom e May adducono per sostenere 
la teoria vero-condizionale degli epiteti denigratori è proprio che in frasi come (2) e (6) la 
negazione (proposizionale) può bloccare a volte il contenuto peggiorativo di questi termini. 
Tornando al test per la negazione metalinguistica, bisogna specificare che applicare questo test al 
caso degli slurs presenta una difficoltà: a differenza della coppia ‘felice’-‘infelice’, per incorporare 
morfologicamente la negazione in uno slur siamo costretti a creare un neologismo. Questo 
rende più complessa la valutazione delle intuizioni linguistiche e tuttavia non è impossibile 
ragionare su casi in cui si adoperano parole inventate: immaginiamo che un razzista che usi il 
termine ‘terrone’ per indicare i meridionali usi il termine ‘non-terroni’ per indicare tutti coloro 
che non sono meridionali. Consideriamo ora la frase ‘Lucia non è terrona’. Horn direbbe che (12) 
è ambigua tra una interpretazione della negazione come proposizionale (12’) e metalinguistica 
(12’’) (in entrambi i casi, la parentetica serve a suggerire una certa lettura della frase):
(12) Lucia non è terrona.
(12’) Lucia non è terrona. [è di Milano]
(12’’) Lucia non è terrona. [è meridionale]
Per verificare se l’interpretazione non denigratoria di (12) dipenda da una lettura 
metalinguistica della negazione, incorporiamo la negazione nel predicato ‘terrone’, ottenendo 
‘non-terrone’ e vediamo se, una volta incorporata la negazione e bloccata quindi ogni lettura 
metalinguistica, sia ancora possibile interpretare (12) come non peggiorativo. Se, quando la 
lettura metalinguistica della negazione è impossibile, il proferimento perde la sua lettura non 
denigratoria, allora possiamo inferire che la lettura non denigratoria altro non era che una 
lettura metalinguistica. Consideriamo ora (13) e le sue varianti.
(13) Lucia è non-terrona.
(13’) Lucia è non-terrona. [è di Milano]
(13’’) Lucia è non-terrona. [è meridionale]
Sembrerebbe che (13’) sia ancora felice, cioè che sia possibile proferire (13) con l’intenzione 
comunicativa suggerita dalla parentesi in (13’); al contrario, (13’’) sembra infelice, come se non 
fosse possibile proferire (13) con l’intenzione comunicativa suggerita dalla parentesi.
Se così fosse, allora la lettura non denigratoria di (12), che sparisce quando la negazione 
viene incorporata, dipende effettivamente da una lettura metalinguistica della negazione e 
tale lettura non denigratoria di (12) non conta come prova a favore dell’idea che sia possibile 
negare gli slurs eliminando la loro componente denigratoria (ipotesi invece accolta da Hom 
e May, interessati a sostenere che la componente dispregiativa degli slurs è parte del loro 
significato vero-condizionale). Per concludere, la strategia dei test linguistici, avanzata da 
Cepollaro e Thommen, 2019, sezione 3, suggerisce che, contra Hom e May, la negazione non 
interagisce col contenuto denigratorio degli slurs.
Panzeri & Carrus (2016) hanno perseguito un’altra strada per verificare quel che Anderson & 
Lepore (2013), Jeshion (2013) e Bolinger (2015) hanno suggerito ‘dalla poltrona’, conducendo 
3.3. Esperimenti
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degli esperimenti (nella fattispecie, dei questionari). Il primo studio sperimentale riguarda, 
tra le altre cose, il modo in cui i parlanti valutano gli slurs in isolamento e gli slurs in frasi 
complesse. Nella prima parte del primo studio, Panzeri e Carrus chiedevano ai partecipanti di 
valutare su una scala crescente da 1 a 7 l’offensività di una serie di termini (tra cui alcuni slurs) 
in isolamento. Nella seconda parte del primo studio, chiedevano di valutare su una scala da 1 
a 7 una serie di frasi complesse come frasi negative, frasi condizionali e domande, che in una 
condizione contenevano uno slur (es. ‘Lino non è un frocio’, ‘Lino è un frocio?’).
I risultati mostrano che il punteggio di offensività ottenuto dalle domande e dai condizionali 
contenenti slurs è in linea col punteggio ottenuto dagli slurs in isolamento. Non sorprende: 
come si accennava nella Sezione 2, la maggior parte di studiose e studiosi (con l’eccezione 
di Hom e May) ritiene che il contenuto denigratorio degli slurs resista all’incassamento 
(cioè all’interazione con gli operatori semantici). Quel che invece sorprende, e che sembra 
andare contro questa intuizione così diffusa, è che il punteggio di offensività ottenuto dalle 
frasi negative contenenti slurs è più basso di quello ottenuto dagli slurs in isolamento. Il 
risultato è interessante non solo perché contraddice quanto sostenuto nella letteratura 
filosofica e linguistica, ma anche perché sembra tracciare una distinzione tra la negazione e 
gli altri operatori semantici come ad esempio il condizionale. Questa apparente discrepanza 
– cioè l’idea che il contenuto denigratorio degli slurs interagisca con la negazione ma non, 
ad esempio, col condizionale – ha fatto nascere il sospetto che nel caso della negazione vi 
potesse essere qualche meccanismo particolare in azione. Nel secondo studio di Panzeri 
& Carrus (2016), gli autori hanno avanzato l’ipotesi secondo cui la ragione per cui le frasi 
negative contenenti slurs ottengono un punteggio più basso sia degli slurs in isolamento sia dei 
condizionali e delle interrogative contenenti slurs è che la negazione viene interpretata come 
metalinguistica. Per verificare tale ipotesi, gli autori sono ricorsi alla seguente tecnica: hanno 
fornito delle frasi negative (alcune delle quali contenevano slurs) e hanno chiesto ai parlanti di 
proporre una continuazione in modo che la frase risultante fosse dotata di senso. Per esempio, 
la frase ‘Non piove a Milano’ può essere continuata in modi diversi:
(14) Non piove a Milano.
(15) Non piove a Milano, c’è il sole.
(16) Non piove a Milano, diluvia.
Il tipo di continuazione in (15) e (16) rivela modi diversi di interpretare la negazione in (14). La 
continuazione proposta in (15) rivela un’interpretazione proposizionale della negazione che 
agisce sul contenuto vero-condizionale di ‘piove’: quando c’è il sole, è falso che piova; in (16), 
invece, la continuazione rivela un’interpretazione metalinguistica della negazione: non si nega 
davvero che piova, ma si nega che ‘piove’ sia una descrizione adeguata, visto che addirittura 
diluvia. L’idea di Panzeri e Carrus è quindi di usare la tecnica della continuazione (cioè 
chiedere ai parlanti di proporre una continuazione in modo che la frase risultante sia dotata di 
senso) per verificare se la negazione in frasi come ‘Lino non è un frocio’ venisse interpretata 
proposizionalmente (come in (15)) o metalinguisticamente (come in (16)). Le risposte fornite 
dai soggetti sono state suddivise in risposte che suggeriscono un’interpretazione proposizionale 
della negazione (continuazioni tipo quelle in (17)-(18)) e risposte che lasciano intendere 
un’interpretazione metalinguistica della negazione (continuazioni come quelle in (19)-(20)):
(17) Lino non è un frocio, ha una ragazza.
(18) Lino non è un frocio, è solo effeminato.
(19) Lino non è un frocio, è gay. 
(20) Lino non è un frocio, non mi piace che usi questo linguaggio omofobo.
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Quel che Panzeri & Carrus (2016) hanno trovato è che la negazione nelle frasi contenenti 
slurs riceve una continuazione metalinguistica circa nel 33% dei casi raccolti. Questo dato 
può spiegare perché il punteggio di offensività attribuito alle frasi negative che contengono 
slurs sia inferiore a quello attribuito agli slurs in isolamento e agli altri tipi di frasi complesse 
contenenti slurs: i soggetti interpretavano la negazione in modo metalinguistico.
Torniamo ora alla domanda da cui eravamo partiti, cioè se Hom e May abbiano ragione 
di sostenere che in frasi come ‘Lucia non è terrona’ la negazione blocchi il contenuto 
denigratorio degli slurs, rendendo gli enunciati non offensivi. Lo studio di Panzeri e Carrus 
sembra suggerire che l’intuizione ‘in poltrona’ di Anderson, Bolinger e Jeshion e supportata dai 
test linguistici applicati in Cepollaro (2017, pp. 102-114) e Cepollaro e Thommen (2019, sezione 
3), sia corretta: il motivo per cui una frase in cui lo slur è negato, come ‘Lucia non è terrona’, 
può suonare non dispregiativa dipende da un’interpretazione metalinguistica della negazione.
In questa sede, non entrerò nel merito delle altre strategie dispiegate da Hom e May per 
difendere ulteriormente la loro teoria vero-condizionale degli slurs, come ad esempio 
l’introduzione della nozione di ‘offesa’, che si aggiunge e si distingue da quella di 
‘denigrazione’. Il centro di interesse qui non è stabilire se la teoria vero-condizionale degli 
epiteti sia in generale difendibile o no; la domanda a cui, con tre diverse metodologie, studiose 
e studiosi hanno cercato di rispondere è molto più puntuale – e forse meno ambiziosa – e 
riguarda la possibilità di sostenere che vi siano delle letture non dispregiative di enunciati in 
cui gli slurs compaiono incassati (per esempio, gli enunciati considerati nella Sezione 2, (2)-(6)) 
perché gli operatori semantici interagiscono con il contenuto denigratorio degli slurs. Questa 
domanda, meno ambiziosa di quella sulla validità della teoria vero-condizionale, sembra ora 
avere una risposta negativa, dal momento che tre metodologie filosofiche indipendenti hanno 
fornito verdetti convergenti.
In questo articolo si è considerato il dibattito sugli slurs e in particolare il modo in cui la 
negazione interagisce o non interagisce col contenuto denigratorio di queste espressioni. 
Questo caso costituisce un esempio di come diverse strategie metodologiche della filosofia 
analitica (dalle ipotesi dalla poltrona, alle applicazioni di test linguistici, alla ricerca 
sperimentale) possano integrarsi e offrire risultati coerenti e convergenti. Nell’Introduzione, ci 
si chiedeva se certe questioni di metodo (ad esempio l’uso che si fa delle intuizioni in filosofia 
e del valore privilegiato che si attribuisce alle intuizioni – anche linguistiche – dei filosofi) 
possano preoccupare solo chi si occupa di metafilosofia o se invece queste vadano affrontate 
da ciascuna/o filosofa/o nel proprio ambito di ricerca. Senza avere una risposta alla questione 
spinosa di come affrontare il problema del metodo in ogni ambito della filosofia analitica, un 
possibile approccio che questo caso concreto esemplifica è quello di integrare metodologie 
diverse, adottando un atteggiamento in un certo senso ecumenico rispetto allo scontro 
tra filosofia sperimentale e filosofia ‘in poltrona’, osservando se e quando queste diverse 
metodologie offrono risultati convergenti.
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It seems only appropriate, in an issue of a journal dedicated to the the methods of philosophy, 
and in a paper on the methods of philosophical ethics, to begin with Henry Sidgwick’s book The 
Methods of Ethics, first published in 1874 and passing (sometimes rather painfully) through six 
further editions, until the seventh of 1907, which is now canonical.1 Of course, my title is not 
the real reason for beginning with Sidgwick. Rather it is the content of his book, and its quality. 
C. D. Broad famously said in 1930 that, in his view, Sidgwick’s Methods is ‘the best treatise on 
moral theory that has even been written’, an opinion recently echoed by Derek Parfit in 2011, 
who suggested that the Methods contains ‘the largest number of true and important claims’ of 
all books in the history of ethics.2 How one individuates claims, and judges importance, are of 
course not straightforward matters, but I think Parfit’s suggestion is at least highly plausible.
I do not, however, want merely to inflict exegesis of Sidgwick on my readers, though there will 
be some of that in what follows.3 I will begin with a little on what Sidgwick himself meant by a 
‘method’, an issue which, despite Sidgwick’s reputation for clarity, is in fact rather murky. I will 
then go on to describe his own philosophical method (in the standard sense) – that is, the way he 
did ethics, focusing in particular on his intuitionism. I shall then look critically at his intuitionist 
appraisals of common-sense morality, and at his own proposed alternative, suggesting an 
alternative to that alternative. I will end with a problem for any normative proposal, and then 
suggest some implications of that problem for the way we do philosophy now.
By the time the Methods was published, Sidgwick had for a decade been planning a book that 
might reconcile ‘moral sense’, or intuition, with utilitarianism. In the preface to the sixth 
edition, the editor, E.E. Constance Jones, included some illuminating notes for a lecture by 
Sidgwick on the development of his ethical views. Although Sidgwick is often, with some 
justification, described as the third of the great ‘classical utilitarians’, we can see from his 
own account of his intellectual journey that, though it began with utilitarianism strictly 
understood, it soon departed from there and was never to return.
Sidgwick tells us that he was initially committed to Millian utilitarianism, which he found 
1 Sidgwick, 1907. All otherwise unattributed page references in the text are to this volume.
2 Broad, 1930, p. 143; Parfit, 2011, p. xxiii.
3 Many of the arguments below are presented in Crisp, 2006 and Crisp, 2015. Readers may wish to consult those books 
for further background, elucidation, and development.
1. Sidgwick’s 
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liberating in contrast to the ‘arbitrary pressure’ of the dubious, confused, or dogmatic moral 
rules he had been taught. That commitment sat alongside antipathy to the views of the 
influential Cambridge philosopher William Whewell, whose Elements of Morality (1845) led 
Sidgwick to the view that ‘intuitional’ ethics was, in comparison with mathematics, ‘hopelessly 
loose’. (Note, by the way, Sidgwick’s rather confusing usage of ‘intutionism’ to refer both to 
the normative, first-order, deontological view he rejected, and to a range of epistemological 
positions, one of which he accepted. More on that below.) 
 Sidgwick understood Mill to hold that each person seeks her own happiness (psychological 
hedonism) and that each person ought to promote the happiness of all (ethical hedonism). 
He found both views attractive, not yet seeing the potential inconsistency between them. As 
he came to recognize the possibility of conflict between ‘interest’ and ‘duty’, Sidgwick began 
to think seriously about egoism as a normative view, and concluded that it is the opposition 
between ‘interest’ (that is, self-interest) and duty or the general good that is central to ethics, 
rather than that between ‘intuitions’ and hedonism. This, he says, explains the structure 
of the Methods, in which, after an introductory book, egoism (interest) is discussed in book 
2, intuitionism (duty) in book 3, and utilitarianism (the general good) in book 4. Further, 
Sidgwick decided that, despite his aversion to first-order intuitionist ethics, the only way to 
ground a utilitarian justification for sacrificing one’s own happiness for the sake of others 
was through a fundamental ethical intuition: ‘I must somehow see that it was right for me to 
sacrifice my happiness for the good of the whole of which I am a part’.
Where was he to find such an intuition? Sidgwick returned to Kant, and, though impressed 
by Kant’s view that what is right for any person must be right for all persons in similar 
circumstances, felt that this notion of universalizability was insufficiently substantive to 
ground a principle of duty in opposition to egoism. This led Sidgwick to Joseph Butler, who he 
believed also accepted a ‘dualism of the practical reason’. It was under the influence of Butler 
that Sidgwick rejected psychological hedonism and accepted the existence of disinterested, 
other-regarding motivation. Further, since Butler’s powerful critique of utilitarianism also 
worried Sidgwick, and Sidgwick realized that he himself was already an ‘intuitionist’ by 
accepting both the Kantian thesis about rightness and the need for an intuitionist foundation 
for utilitarianism, he decided to reconsider intuitionist ethics itself. Unsurprisingly, Sidgwick 
decided to study not Whewell, but Aristotle, seeing his Nicomachean Ethics as an impartial 
attempt to make consistent the common-sense morality of his day. Sidgwick set out to do 
the same for nineteenth-century British morality, and 3.1-9 was the first component of the 
Methods to be completed. Again, more below on how he got on.
The subject of philosophical ethics, Sidgwick says, is the ‘methods’ of ethics, where a method 
is ‘any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings “ought” – or 
what it is “right” for them – to do, or to seek to realize by voluntary action’. Such a ‘procedure’ 
need not be a process. Sidgwick allows that a version of intuitionism according to which we 
have immediate insight into the rightness of certain actions is proposing a method (Sidgwick, 
1907, p. 4). Nor is Sidgwick to be understood as suggesting that only actions matter in ethics, 
and not, say, the feelings or the characters of agents. Indeed he elsewhere allows that the 
common-sense conception of virtue includes the emotions (Sidgwick, 1907, pp. 222-3) and 
that ethics should construct ideals of character (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 393). But discussion of 
such topics is significant only in so far as it is related to the primary question of ethics – 
how we should act, that is, what we have overall reason to do. Like Aristotle, Sidgwick sees 
philosophical ethics as essentially practical (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 1; 4).4
4 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103b26-9.
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The definition of method here leaves it open whether Sidgwick is including ethical theories, 
which advocate certain basic normative principles, as among the ‘rational procedures’ he 
has in mind. It appears not. Consider the view that God has implanted in us knowledge of 
certain apparently non-utilitarian common-sense rules, such as the rule that we should 
keep promises, because these rules are the best way to promote the utilitarian end of 
general happiness. According to Sidgwick, this view constitutes a rejection of the method of 
utilitarianism, though not of the utilitarian principle (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 85). Ethics, however, 
as Sidgwick points out, is ‘sometimes considered as an investigation of the true … rational 
precepts of Conduct’ (Sidgwick, 1907, pp. 2-3), and he himself implies that we are interested 
in the principles that determine which conduct is ultimately reasonable (Sidgwick, 1907, pp. 
5–6; see 14). In other words, philosophical ethics is an inquiry into what grounds or justifies 
our actions and any decision-procedure we adopt, and so we might wonder why Sidgwick 
emphasizes methods rather than ultimate principles (Jerry Schneewind plausibly suggests that 
Sidgwick was influenced by analogies between scientific and ethical methods.) Sidgwick’s book 
should perhaps have been titled The Ultimate Principles of Ethics, those principles each being a 
different statement of our ultimate reasons for action; and if it had been so titled some of the 
unclarities introduced by his focusing on methods might have been avoided.
Sidgwick says that, by adopting some plausible assumption or other, one can connect almost 
any method with almost any ultimate principle. But he limits his own discussion to those 
methods ‘logically connected with the different ultimate reasons widely accepted’ (Sidgwick, 
1907, p. 78). In other words, he is looking for certain commonly alleged ultimate reasons for 
action (such as the promotion of happiness), and the decision-making procedure that most 
naturally rests on each such reason. For example, egoistic hedonism consists in the acceptance 
of the agent’s own happiness as ultimate reason or end, and its method will be the attempt by 
the agent to maximize her own happiness. But since method and end can come apart – as in 
the case of Sidgwick’s own utilitarianism – one might wonder why Sidgwick appears to require 
that, before any ultimate reason can be given a place in his discussion, its related method 
must be present in common-sense morality. Imagine that common-sense morality made no 
room for utilitarian decision-making. The utilitarian principle could still capture what justifies 
the common-sense method or decision-procedure. Further, his emphasis on method over 
principle can lead to philosophical distortion. The focus on method may explain, for example, 
why Sidgwick is so ready to find utilitarianism within common-sense morality, because people 
sometimes decide what to do by trying to work out what would do the most good from the 
impartial point of view. This is evidence merely of a principle of beneficence, alongside others, 
and that is a far cry from utilitarianism as usually understood, according to which this is the 
only ethical principle.
The distinction between what has become known as the ‘criterion’ of morality – what it is that 
makes actions right or wrong – and decision-procedures has become clearer since Sidgwick’s 
time, though there is no doubt that it is at work in some of his arguments. But I do think that 
his decision to focus on just three ‘methods’ – that is, three broadly ethical theories – egoism, 
intuitionism (what we might call ‘deontology’), and utilitarianism – is reasonable. These are 
the three positions which have come to the forefront in the history of western ethics since 
Socrates, though of course egoism went largely into retreat in the twentieth century, two 
reasons for that being perhaps G.E. Moore’s somewhat unpersuasive but widely accepted 
objections along with Victorian distaste for the position (distaste also felt by Sidgwick, who 
describes the view as ‘despicable’ in earlier editions of the Methods, and merely ‘ignoble’ in the 
sixth and seventh). The debate in normative ethics, then, is between rational or normative 
egoism, deontology, and utilitarianism (or perhaps more broadly ‘consequentialism’).
As I have said, Sidgwick began by elucidating egoism, focusing in particular on its conception 
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of well-being and arguing for hedonism over ‘perfectionism’. What he says about hedonism 
is brilliantly insightful, but in fact he could have largely left open the question of what 
well-being consists in, except in so far as it is claimed to involve virtue – another issue 
dissected beautifully by him in 2.5. When it comes to ‘dogmatic’ intuitionism – his somewhat 
questionable name for first-order deontology – his focus is very much more on the meat of 
the theory. Indeed his two-hundred page discussion of that view in book 3 is almost certainly 
the best elucidation of that position in the history of philosophy, and very sadly neglected, 
especially by most of its current adherents, who believe Sidgwick is too boring and too 
utilitarian to read (in fact, as anyone who reads him seriously will soon realize, he is neither!). 
Before we get to that, however, let us briefly look at intuitionism in general.
According to Sidgwick, intuition is a doxastic faculty (Sidgwick, 1907, pp. 4-5; 28; 275), nothing 
more, or less, than a capacity for forming beliefs of a certain kind, with the possibility thereby 
of acquiring knowledge. These beliefs, because of their apparent source in intuition, may be 
called ‘intuitions’, and Sidgwick feels himself entitled to assume their existence, though not 
their truth (Sidgwick, 1907, pp. 210-12):
I wish therefore to say expressly, that by calling any affirmation as to the rightness 
or wrongness of actions ‘intuitive’, I do not mean to prejudge the question as to 
its ultimate validity, when philosophically considered: I only mean that its truth 
is apparently known immediately, and not as the result of reasoning. I admit the 
possibility that any such ‘intuition’ may turn out to have an element of error, which 
subsequent reflection and comparison may enable us to correct; just as many apparent 
perceptions through the organ of vision are found to be partially illusory and 
misleading: indeed the sequel will show that I hold this to be to an important extent the 
case with moral intuitions commonly so called. (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 211; see 34n2)
To this extent, then, Sidgwick’s intuitionism is cognitivist. Intuitions for him are not to be 
understood as, say, certain sentiments or attitudes, but as non-inferential (or ‘immediate’: 
Sidgwick, 1907, p. 98) rational beliefs which present themselves to the subject as true (and 
hence as potentially false) -- that is, as apparently self-evident (see e.g. Sidgwick, 1907, p. 338). 
Each person has to make up her own mind about whether she has any such beliefs, and at this 
point Sidgwick is characteristically cautious, noting that, in his experience, people seem likely 
to identify as moral intuitions non-cognitive states such as mere impulses to, or unspecific 
preferences for, action, or non-intuitive cognitive states, such as conclusions from rapid or 
semi-conscious processes of reasoning or familiar and unreflectively held opinions. The fact 
that Sidgwick denies the status of intuition to the latter shows that mere non-inferentiality 
is insufficient for a belief to be an intuition: it must also present itself as self-evident to the 
subject. If, as soon as the subject holds her customary belief up to the light it seems not true to 
her, then that belief was and is not a moral intuition.
Some find talk of a faculty of intuition mysterious,5 and may seek to undermine the idea 
through some developmental or evolutionary account (Sidgwick, 1907, pp. 212-14). Sidgwick 
refuses to allow that mere knowledge of the causal history of certain apparent cognitions 
provides any ground for distrusting them. All of our cognitive faculties have such a history, 
and hence so do all of our beliefs (including the beliefs of those who criticize intuitions). 
And the subject-matter of ethical judgements is such that they cannot be inconsistent with 
5 See e.g.Mackie, 1977, pp. 38-9.
2. Intuitionism
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any merely descriptive psychological or physical claims. Nor, even if our capacity for moral 
cognition had been present from the start, would that give it any special claim to correctness. 
None of this is to deny, of course, that some more specific causal account of the origin of 
certain beliefs might not increase the probability of their being mistaken.
In the nineteenth century, intuitionists were often seen in opposition to so-called inductivists. 
Having presented a broad conception of intuition as ‘immediate [i.e. non-inferential] 
judgement as to what ought to be done or aimed at’, Sidgwick is careful to situate his 
intuitionism in the context of contemporary debate (Sidgwick, 1907, pp. 97-8), noting quite 
correctly that the parties in the debate were commonly talking at cross purposes, since each 
was claiming to know different things. The inductivists claimed inductive knowledge of the 
pleasantness of certain actions, whereas intuitionists focused on the rightness (or wrongness) 
of those actions. Rational or normative hedonism itself cannot be known inductively. It must 
be either grasped intuitively, or inferred from other premises at least one of which must 
include a normative intuition.
What we see here is a standard argument for foundationalism in epistemology. Someone 
inclined towards a non-foundationalist approach, such as some form of coherentism, may well 
accept Sidgwick’s negative argument against inductivism (that induction alone cannot ground 
an ethical theory), but deny that foundationalism is the most plausible alternative. Rather, it 
might be claimed, for example, that hedonism provides the most consistent and coherent fit 
with other beliefs we have about goodness, rightness, or the world in general. Sidgwick’s own 
relationship with coherentism is a complex one, as we shall shortly see.
Sidgwick outlines three forms of intuitionism (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 102). The first is 
‘perceptional’ intuitionism, according to which each person should do what they think right 
in each case as it arises. Sidgwick plausibly rejects this view, on the basis that most people 
find their own particular intuitions open to doubt, non-comprehensive, inconsistent over 
time, and indeed often in conflict with those of others, and will want to appeal to some 
general rules or moral theory to support their particular judgements. The second form, as I 
have mentioned, is ‘dogmatic’ intuitionism. According to the dogmatic intuitionist, general 
moral rules are implicit in common-sense moral thought, and the task of the philosopher is to 
elucidate and systematize them as far as possible. Dogmatic intuitionism is not, then, entirely 
unreflective; indeed it is the result of reflection on the dogmata – the beliefs – of common 
sense. But Sidgwick no doubt felt the name appropriate partly because he believed the view to 
be insufficiently reflective, and hence unable to provide a coherent underpinning for common-
sense morality itself, an underpinning which would enable the agent to know exactly which 
obligations she was under in each situation in which she found herself. What is particularly 
objectionable to Sidgwick about dogmatic intuitionism, then, is not its starting from common-
sense morality, but its readiness to end there also without having removed the indefiniteness 
which is, he thought, as inappropriate in ethics as in a legal system.
That brings us to Sidgwick’s preferred view: ‘philosophical’ intuitionism. Here Sidgwick is 
seeking ‘one or more principles more absolutely and undeniably true and evident, from which 
the current rules might be deduced, either just as they are commonly received or with slight 
modifications and rectifications’. He goes on:
[W]e conceive it as the aim of a philosopher, as such, to do somewhat more than define 
and formulate the common moral opinions of mankind. His function is to tell men 
what they ought to think, rather than what they do think: he is expected to transcend 
Common Sense in his premises, and is allowed a certain divergence from Common 
Sense in his conclusions. It is true that the limits of this deviation are firmly, though 
indefinitely, fixed: the truth of a philosopher’s premises will always be tested by the 
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acceptability of his conclusions: if in any important point he be found in flagrant 
conflict with common opinion, his method is likely to be declared invalid. Still, though 
he is expected to establish and concatenate at least the main part of the commonly 
accepted moral rules, he is not necessarily bound to take them as the basis on which 
his own system is constructed. Rather, we should expect that the history of Moral 
Philosophy – so far at least as those whom we may call orthodox thinkers are concerned 
– would be a history of attempts to enunciate, in full breadth and clearness, those 
primary intuitions of Reason, by the scientific application of which the common moral 
thought of mankind may be at once systematised and corrected. (Sidgwick, 1907, pp. 
373-4)
Sidgwick’s readiness to assess his own views by the lights of the common-sense morality 
he is so doubtful about represents, I suggest, an unwillingness entirely to surrender the 
methodology of Aristotelian dialectic, in which one’s own philosophical conclusions must 
be tested against what is commonly thought. If he had done so, his theory would certainly 
have been more radical; but it would also have been epistemically purer and hence, I suggest, 
more systematic. Since Sidgwick nowhere explains exactly how much epistemic weight to 
give to common-sense morality – that is, how far a philosopher’s conclusions may diverge 
from that morality – he is leaving it open for a dogmatic intuitionist to use the many cases in 
which utilitarian conclusions are violently at odds with common-sense morality as an internal 
argument against Sidgwick’s own arguments for utilitarianism, as well as unclear how we are 
to decide between two theories, one of which may have more self-evidence on its side but is 
less consistent than the other with common-sense morality.
But Sidgwick has good advice for the philosophical intuitionist, pure or impure, on how to 
proceed. He offers four tests which any allegedly self-evident intuition must pass if it is to 
be judged of the ‘highest certainty’ (Sidgwick, 1907, pp. 338-42). The first three are relatively 
straightforward:
(I) Clarity. ‘The terms of the proposition must be clear and precise.’ 
(II) Reflection. ‘The self-evidence of the proposition must be ascertained by careful reflection.’
(III) Consistency. ‘The propositions accepted as self-evident must be mutually consistent.’
The fourth is more tricky, and stated indirectly:
(IV) Non-dissensus.
Since it is implied in the very notion of Truth that it is essentially the same for all 
minds, the denial by another of a proposition that I have affirmed has a tendency to 
impair my confidence in its validity.... And it will be easily seen that the absence of 
such disagreement must remain an indispensable negative condition of the certainty of 
our beliefs. For if I find any of my judgments, intuitive or inferential, in direct conflict 
with a judgment of some other mind, there must be error somewhere: and if I have no 
more reason to suspect error in the other mind than in my own, reflective comparison 
between the two judgments necessarily reduces me temporarily to a state of neutrality. 
And though the total result in my mind is not exactly suspense of judgment, but an 
alternation and conflict between positive affirmation by one act of thought and the 
neutrality that is the result of another, it is obviously something very different from 
scientific certitude.
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We will come back to the fourth condition later. But let me now consider Sidgwick’s discussion 
of dogmatic intuitionism in the light of his three conditions.
Towards the end of book 3, after his long survey of common-sense morality, Sidgwick 
undertakes to bring together the various threads of his argument. He begins by reminding 
us of his general aim (Sidgwick, 1907, pp. 337-8): to decide whether common sense can 
provide the basis for ‘clear and precise principles commanding universal acceptance’, on the 
understanding that such principles may be arrived at only through philosophical refinement 
of common-sense morality itself. These principles, in so far as they are self-evident, must of 
course be non-derivative and ultimate (Sidgwick, 1907, pp. 350-51).
Sidgwick draws a general connection between the clarity and non-dissensus conditions, 
arguing that attempting to make a common-sense principle precise will lead one into 
disagreement about it. In other words, even if one becomes clear in one’s own mind about 
some complex principle – such as the principle, say, that one should keep a promise made 
to a living person, in full knowledge of its risks, to do something morally acceptable, and so 
on – one will find epistemic peers who disagree with one about that principle once refined. 
Common-sense moral principles are either too vague to meet the clarity condition, or, if they 
meet that condition, fail to meet the non-dissensus condition.
But there are problems with Sidgwick’s critique. His clarity principle is too demanding: 
he requires an acceptable ethical principle to be so precise that it can cover any plausible 
eventuality without the need for any judgement on the part of the person acting on it. 
Sidgwick holds a view of ethics as aiming at the level of precision appropriate to a natural 
science, and this explains a good deal of his antipathy towards common-sense morality. 
Sidgwick ignores or plays down the notion of practical wisdom as a capacity to judge correctly 
in particular cases, perhaps in the light of general ‘prima facie’ or pro tanto principles. 
This conception of principled judgement plays an essential role in many central versions of 
dogmatic intuitionism, from Aristotle to Whewell (and of course on to Ross and others who 
wrote after Sidgwick). 
Is Sidgwick’s own utilitarian principle in a better position than pluralistic intuitionism? 
Judgement is involved in accepting utilitarianism to start with, but it will also be involved 
in assessing the implications of the principle in particular cases. Consider some apparently 
simple case in which I have to decide between two delicious desserts. Sidgwick himself, in 
his discussion of empirical hedonism in 2.2-3, brings out how difficult such a decision might 
be. I shall have to recall earlier experiences with each kind of dessert, analyse the quality 
of each of those on offer, and then make a judgement based on the evidence before me. It is 
not clear why such judgements are any easier than trying to decide, for example, what form 
my expression of gratitude to some benefactor should take. Judgement is inescapable. What 
matters is how best to ensure that one’s judgements are correct.
Of course, pluralistic intuitionists should not be against system, and most are not. Consider, for 
example, Aristotle’s discussion of how to rank the different claims on us of those differently 
related to us, as relatives, citizens, and so on, in Nicomachean Ethics 9.2, or Ross’s list of prima 
facie duties. But we have to remember that, however much systematizing we do, the context 
of human decision-making is sufficiently complex and unpredictable that any plausible ethical 
theory has to allow some room for individual judgement about particular cases.
What is Sidgwick’s own preferred alternative to common-sense morality? Sidgwick accepts:
Benevolence: One ought to aim at the universal good.
He does not, however, go for straight utilitarianism, accepting:
3. Dogmatic 
Intuitionism 
and Sidgwick’s 
Dualism
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Prudence: One ought to aim at one’s good on the whole.
This combination, of course, is his version of the ‘dualism of practical reason’, which leads 
him to despair, as he cannot find a principled solution to problem cases in which my own 
good and the universal good come apart. But if Sidgwick had recognized the importance of 
practical judgement, he could have allowed for a more plausible form of the dualism, in which 
each agent has reason to aim at her own good and reason to aim at the universal good, the 
circumstances she finds herself in determining which reason, in those circumstances, has 
greater weight.
Now return to W.D. Ross, who says:
If, so far as I can see, I could bring equal amounts of good into being by fulfilling my 
promise and by helping some one to whom I had made no promise, I should not hesitate 
to regard the former as my duty… [and] normally promise-keeping … should come 
before benevolence.6
Ross, then, appears committed to the following principle:
Promise: Any agent has ultimate reason to keep promises.
I suspect that many people, perhaps the majority, would accept Promise, and this leaves 
us with a philosophical stand-off between deontologists on the hand and utilitarians or 
consequentialists on the other (and, if I am allowed a third hand, rational egoists as well).
Remember Sidgwick’s fourth condition – non-dissensus – which requires us to suspend 
judgement on any fundamental ethical proposition if we find that some epistemic peer 
disagrees (or, even worse, might disagree) with it. This condition strikes me as highly credible, 
and its implications might seem deeply worrying, since I see no plausible way to show that 
many of those who disagree with me in ethics are not (at least!) my epistemic peers. Is 
normative philosophical ethics, then, left in complete chaos?
Not entirely. First, there is enough consensus on some principles for us even perhaps to say 
that we know them. Consider, for example:
Own Pain: Any agent has a reason to minimize (undeserved) suffering in their own life.
I find it hard to see how any sane person could disagree with this principle. Certainly all the 
sane people I have met seem to act in accordance with it. But note that it really doesn’t take 
us very far, practically. It is just one pro tanto reason, and cannot be said to be our only reason 
(unless we should also accept that all of us should commit suicide as soon and as painlessly as 
possible). Not even the following principle will pass the non-dissensus test:
Another’s Pain. Any agent has a reason to minimize the suffering of another.
Egoists will disagree with this, and though I think the many egoists in the history of 
philosophy to be mistaken, I cannot find any way to make them all my epistemic inferiors.
Where, then, does this leave philosophical methodology in ethics? In my book Reasons and 
6 Ross, 1930, pp. 18-19.
4. Disagreement 
and its 
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the Good, I suggested that there are at least three strategies worth considering: resignation, 
impartiality, and debate. The first would involve one’s refraining from any kind of 
philosophical debate about normative theory. This strategy, however, seems excessively 
pessimistic about the prospects for convergence on the truth in ethics and resulting ethical 
progress. The example of Own Pain suggests that truth is available, and there are at least some 
signs of apparent ethical progress, such as the recognition of racism, sexism, and speciesism.
So, on the assumption that progress in ethics is possible, one might seek to engage in impartial 
consideration of and debate concerning the various current normative theories. There is 
more to be said for this strategy than for resignation, and it is certainly likely to be part of 
the best overall philosophical package. But the fact remains that one will usually persist in 
one’s attachment to the normative principles that strike one as plausible, and one is thus in an 
especially good position to spell out those principles and display their advantages to others.
So this leaves us with the final strategy, in which debate between the advocates of the different 
normative theories continues. But carried out between those who have suspended judgement 
as to the correctness or otherwise of the view which they themselves find attractive, such 
debate would be less adversarial and more constructive than much in philosophy at present. 
This would have several significant advantages. First, each participant would be more likely 
to notice the faults in her own position and the advantages in those of others. Second, 
philosophers would see that there is often greater epistemic benefit in discussing issues with 
those of radically different views than with some clique of one’s own. Third, the aim of debate 
would be not the victory of one’s own position but convergence on some truth, which might 
well be a conglomeration of various elements from several existing ethical theories. Ethical 
enquiry must be informed by a spirit of impartiality, in which those who propose normative 
principles are prepared both to hold up those principles to the light of rational reflection 
and the arguments of others, actual or imagined, and to look enthusiastically at the views of 
others, in search of enlightenment rather than dialectical victory. Critical argument, of course, 
would continue to be the mainstay of moral philosophical discussion, but if it were freed of its 
unjustified dogmatism there would be a greater likelihood of convergence on the truth.7
Contemporary philosophy seems to me analogous in some ways to the following. Imagine a 
group of equally experienced cavers, lost underground in the darkness, and wanting to get 
out as soon as possible. They share ideas, and it turns out that they all disagree on the best 
strategy. Only one of them, at best, can be right about the way to go. Now imagine that each 
decides to spend the time she has available trying hard to persuade her colleagues to agree 
with her, focusing only on what she sees as the weaknesses of their views and the strengths of 
her own. If I were lost, I would much prefer to be in a group whose members, though prepared 
to state their own views as well as possible, were also ready seriously to look for flaws in 
their own view and advantages in the views of others. Do we, or do we not, seriously want 
to find our way out of the cave? If so, then we should change the way we currently do moral 
philosophy.
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ON THE IDEA OF A ‘METHOD’ IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY
The Methods of Ethics is the title of one of the most important works in the history of moral 
philosophy, written by Henry Sidgwick. The influence of this work is such that, when talking 
about ‘method’ in moral philosophy, reference is generally made to one of the two things that 
Sidgwick meant with that word. The two different but connected meanings, that unfortunately 
Sidgwick fails to clearly distinguish, are the following: On the one hand, ‘method’ stands for 
a procedure that must be followed in order to reach moral knowledge, or any surrogate for 
knowledge that can be offered in an expressivist context (Sugarman and Sulmasy, 2010); on 
the other hand, it refers to a normative criterion for reaching conclusions as to the rightness 
or wrongness of human conduct, or to the goodness or badness of some trait of character or 
state of affairs (Baron, Pettit and Slote, 1997). In the first meaning, the issue of method belongs 
with moral epistemology, in the second it is part of normative ethics. 
In this paper I will argue: a) that what Sidgwick says on the epistemic side, in one of its 
possible interpretations, is basically sound and b) that what he says on the normative side, 
while important and influent, is open to relevant criticism, both in his identification of the 
options in the ‘normative menu’, and in the specific characterisation of the main adversary 
of what he calls ‘the method of utilitarianism’. The limits of Sidgwick’s treatment – I will 
eventually suggest – have had a huge impact on contemporary normative discussion.
Sidgwick famously distinguished three methods of ethics: egoistic hedonism, intuitionism, 
and universalistic hedonism or utilitarianism. These three – to which, according to Sidgwick, 
all other methods are reducible – are the names of three normative theories, or at least can 
be so conceived and are often in fact conceived. However, as already mentioned, the notion 
of a method also has an epistemic significance. In fact, following earlier representatives of the 
utilitarian tradition, such as John Stuart Mill, Sidgwick presents the two hedonistic methods 
as based on the empirical or a posteriori strategy of establishing specific moral conclusions 
by calculating consequences in terms of the pleasure produced, and the intuitional method as 
based on the a priori strategy of grasping fundamental normative axioms and deriving from 
them particular moral conclusions. 
In Sidgwick’s use, the two meanings are interrelated in a complex way, because the main 
result of his book is to show the substantial convergence or conciliation of intuitionism and 
utilitarianism, both at a normative and at an epistemic level. On the one hand, while ‘dogmatic 
intuitionism’ cannot receive a philosophical vindication, utilitarianism offers a philosophical 
systematization of the morality of common sense, inasmuch as the latter is “unconsciously 
1.
2.
62
MASSIMO REICHLIN
utilitarian”; on the other hand, Sidgwick’s critique of the empiricist epistemology of earlier 
utilitarians leads him to ground utilitarianism in the really self-evident first principles he 
establishes, and thus to present it as nothing but “the final form into which intuitionism 
tends to pass, when the demand for really self-evident first principles is rigorously pressed” 
(Sidgwick, 1907, p. 388). In short, the upshot of Sidgwick’s work is the convergence of 
utilitarianism and philosophical intuitionism. When in 1930 Charles Broad first noted the 
ambiguity of the term ‘intuitionism’ in Sidgwick’s treatment (Broad, 1930, p. 206), and 
proposed to use Bentham’s word ‘deontology’ to denote the normative system based on a 
priori principles, he was in a sense making a perfectly appropriate point; however, he was also 
somehow obscuring the intrinsic connection between the two elements which is a relevant 
feature of Sidgwick’s view. Intuitionism is the normative view accepting standards of right and 
wrong that are based on a priori knowledge – and in the end, for all the remaining differences, 
the same holds for utilitarianism as well1.
I will be comparatively brief on the epistemic aspect of the discussion. The nature of 
Sidgwick’s epistemic approach has been the object of a complex discussion, and I can’t get 
very much into this scholarly debate in this context (Singer, 1974; Deigh, 2007; Skelton, 
2010). However, it seems to me that Sidgwick was basically right in rejecting the empiricist 
method of his utilitarian predecessors, and in showing that normative thinking cannot 
proceed without making appeal to intuition at some point; for it is clear that fundamental 
ethical concepts, such as ‘right’ or ‘ought’, cannot be reduced to any physical or psychological 
facts, such as desiring or preferring. As Sidgwick says, moral judgments “cannot legitimately 
be interpreted as judgments respecting the present or future existence of human feelings 
or any facts of the sensible world” (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 25). Moreover, Sidgwick was also 
unconditionally right in claiming that moral philosophy must take its start from reviewing 
the ordinary moral convictions of humanity, and then move forward by attempting to extract 
from them some principles or axioms that can help remove inconsistencies and systematize 
the sometimes chaotic beliefs of common sense. In fact, it is far more likely that we stumble 
into some true moral principle by starting from our ordinary experience of what it is to be 
under a moral obligation than by applying our rational tools to moral thinking conceived of in 
a practical vacuum. 
Of course, Sidgwick declared that moral philosophy must do more than simply reformulate 
common moral beliefs: it must transcend common sense in order to tell human beings 
what they ought to think, instead of merely clarifying what they already think. However, a) 
Sidgwick clearly grants some initial authority to the rules of common sense. In fact, he views 
the “current rules” as constraining the work of philosophical intuitionism, since the self-
evident moral principles must be such that those rules can be deduced from them, “either 
just as they are commonly received or with slight modifications and rectifications” (Sidgwick, 
1907, p. 102); b) he accepts that “the truth of a philosopher’s premises will always be tested by 
the acceptability of his conclusions: if in any important point he be found in flagrant conflict 
with common opinion, his method is likely to be declared invalid” (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 373); c) 
he declares that his fundamental axioms of Justice, Prudence and Benevolence are themselves 
part of that morality of common sense, along with other principles whose self-evidence is 
illusory; d) he declares that the fact that it sustains the general validity of current moral 
1  At one point Sidgwick calls the normative view that excludes the consideration of consequences “the narrower 
sense” of ‘intuitional’, distinguishing it from the “the wider sense”, that indicates the epistemic view affirming self-
evident normative principles (Sidgwick, 1996, p. 102). 
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judgments is part of the “proof” of utilitarianism. 
The method here presupposed is, therefore, a complex blending of foundationalist and 
coherentist elements (Brink, 1994; Phillips, 2011, pp. 65-76): philosophical ethics takes its start 
from common morality, transcends it by establishing the axioms that correct and systematize 
the rules of common sense, but then, in the last resort, is tested against common beliefs; “a 
certain divergence from Common Sense” (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 373) is allowed in the conclusions, 
but the subversion of ordinary moral thinking would be epistemically suspect. This method 
does show some similarity with contemporary proposals of “wide reflective equilibrium” 
(Daniels, 1979; Scanlon, 2014), even though the discussion is open on this point. In any case, 
while moral philosophy cannot simply reiterate and perhaps systematize what may in fact 
turn out to be our sheer prejudices, it cannot aim at rebuilding our moral system ex novo, 
either on the basis of conceptual or linguistic intuitions concerning the notions of morality or 
rationality. Some commentators have claimed that Sidgwick should be regarded as “a modest 
[i.e. not dogmatic] foundationalist” (de Lazari-Radek and Singer, 2014, p. 111), and that this 
position is not far from those conceptions of wide reflective equilibrium, such as Daniels’ 
or Scanlon’s, that allow for the (fallible) recognition of objective moral truths, and do not 
confine the goal of the moral enterprise to the search for intersubjectively constructed moral 
principles. This may be right, but still, to say that, at the end of the inquiry, “we will be able 
to demonstrate that none, or virtually none, of our existing moral judgments are credible” 
(de Lazari-Radek and Singer, 2014, p. 113) misinterprets Sidgwick’s epistemic approach, and 
strikes me as highly implausible and perhaps impossible. It is one thing to say that no single 
judgment is excluded from possible revision; quite another to say that all our present beliefs 
may be wrong or false. In fact, we construct our moral judgments, such as the one that we 
ought to maximise overall welfare or to give to each his or her due, starting from ordinary 
beliefs, such as that pleasure is good or that each person has equal worth. We can surely test 
any such ordinary belief against others, and perhaps discard some of them as inconsistent 
with our whole body of beliefs; however, should we declare all our ordinary beliefs incredible, 
we would simply lack any place where to start from in order to construct the judgments 
and principles of our moral theory. In so far as his moral epistemology was hybrid between 
foundationalism and coherentism, I assume that this is also what Sidgwick would say, and, 
therefore, that he would dismiss the attempt to reject all our current judgments and “replace 
them with the judgments that follow from the [soundest] moral theory” (de Lazari-Radek and 
Singer, 2014, p. 113).
An a posteriori confirmation of this claim is the fact that attempts to ground straightforwardly 
foundationalist systems of morality bracketing all substantive beliefs, such as those 
embarked on by Richard Hare or Richard Brandt, have been shown to presuppose at some 
point substantive (and possibly non universally valid) moral intuitions2; in general, any 
‘foundationalist’ definition of the space of morals, presuming to bring out criteria of normative 
judgment without presupposing any particular moral beliefs, inevitably smuggles in some 
moral content, which is taken for granted as a substitute of full-blown moral intuitions. So, as 
far as the epistemic dimension of ‘method’ is concerned, it seems to me that there is nothing 
better that we can do than, in Sidgwick’s wake, to embark on a phenomenology of our moral 
experience, and try to extract from it some more general principles which we can use to partly 
correct or refine our beliefs with a view to making them more consistent and systematically 
connected. This is not to say, of course, that Sidgwick was right, either in precisely stating 
the really self-evident axioms of ethics, or in the consequentialist-friendly interpretation he 
2  For comments on Hare’s project, in particular, see Mackie, 1977.
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gave of them; nor does this mean that he was charitable and fair in his critique of attempts 
to systematise the rules of common sense morality within a non-consequentialist framework 
(Shaver, 2014; Hurka, 2014; Phillips, 2011, p. 100-3). But this is already part of the normative 
issue.
Sidgwick talked of egoism, intuitionism and utilitarianism as different ‘methods’ of ethics; 
and it could be objected that talk of different ethical ‘theories’ might have been much clearer 
and more appropriate. However, contrary to what it is sometimes implied, the three methods 
discussed by Sidgwick are not ethical theories. As a matter of fact, Sidgwick himself defines 
a method as “any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 
‘ought’ – or what it is ‘right’ for them – to do, or to seek to realise by voluntary action” 
(Sidgwick, 1907, p. 1). This is not exactly the same as a philosophical theory, for, in Sidgwick’s 
use, the latter would involve systematically justifying one procedure as the one and only right 
method, or demonstrating the final harmonization of the different methods, and providing 
a complete solution of the chief ethical difficulties and controversies (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 13). 
Moreover, in Sidgwick’s view, an ethical theory does also encompass the establishment of 
ethical first principles, that is, a statement and justification of the ultimate reason for action. 
He clearly distinguishes method from principle (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 85), when he writes that 
the view requiring to follow the non-utilitarian rules of common sense in order to promote 
general happiness rejects the method of utilitarianism, but not its principle; and he clearly says 
that it is not his “primary aim to establish such principles” (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 14), but to focus 
on the methods used by common sense (Schneewind, 1977, pp. 191-3).
Sidgwick’s basic purpose – at least in his official declarations – is therefore not to establish 
or defend an ethical theory. His declared aim is only to diminish the confusion that he finds 
apparent in ordinary ethical thinking, which uses a variety of methods, without being aware 
of their partial clash or of the fact that inconsistent principles are used at different times. He 
just wants to “expound as clearly and as fully as my limits will allow the different methods of 
ethics that I find implicit in our common moral reasoning; to point out their mutual relations, 
and, where they seem to conflict, to define the issue as much as possible” (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 
14). In particular, his main goal is to critically discuss the morality of common sense, and to 
reject “the attempt to elevate it into a system of Intuitional Ethics” (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 361); he 
does not want to provide a systematic foundation or complete discussion of utilitarian ethical 
theory, following his initial declaration according to which his volume “contains neither the 
exposition of a system, nor a natural or critical history of systems” (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 12; 
cf. 78). From this point of view, Sidgwick’s attitude is modest and cautious; nonetheless, it is 
also ambitious in aiming at the identification of the fundamental alternatives among which 
humans must choose when trying to establish the reasonableness of their conduct and to 
reach a systematic account of morality. And we must investigate whether the alternatives are 
appropriately defined and adequately reflect ordinary moral experience.
My main claim, as far as the normative side of the discussion is concerned, is that the way in 
which Sidgwick treats the relationship between methods and principles has several unhappy 
consequences. First, it leads him to unduly limit the options in the ‘ethical menu’; second, it 
limits his exploration of non-consequentialist views to the systems of rational intuitionists, 
such as Whewell – and even in this case, without appropriately rendering justice to them3; 
third, it implicitly reduces all other plausible rivals of utilitarianism to this pattern. As a 
3  On Sidgwick’s uncharitable treatment of Whewell, see Cremaschi, 2008 and 2011.
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consequence, the legacy that The Methods left to the twentieth-century ethical debate is a blunt 
and unsatisfactory alternative between a seriously undermined form of pluralistic rational 
intuitionism and an admittedly sophisticated form of utilitarianism; an alternative from which 
contemporary ethical theory still struggles to be released. Roger Crisp is right, in other words, 
in claiming that “his emphasis on method over principle can lead to philosophical distortion” 
and that Sidgwick’s book would have gained clarity by centering on The Ultimate Principles of 
Ethics (Crisp, 2015a, pp. 21-2). 
The fundamental move that Sidgwick makes in Methods, I.1.4 is to derive his three methods 
from the review of what he considers the two ultimate ends that are “strongly and widely 
supported” (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 9) by the common sense of mankind, namely, happiness and 
perfection: the first generates the two hedonistic methods, while the latter is connected to the 
intuitional method as “a special form” of it. It is surprising, in an otherwise scrupulous writer 
as Sidgwick, to see that this connection is pretty much assumed without argument4: from the 
few lines that he devotes to this point, we get the idea that respecting the intuitional duties 
of common sense morality is the means to reach the complete realisation of virtue, which 
in turn is “the most valuable element of human Excellence” (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 11). As noted 
by two contemporary admirers, this seems to mean that “In obeying these rules, we achieve 
the goal of our own moral perfection or excellence” (de Lazari-Radek and Singer, 2014, p. 
16). This interpretation is confirmed by the following observation: “If a man accepts any end 
as ultimate and paramount, he accepts implicitly as his ‘method of ethics’ whatever process 
of reasoning enables him to determine the actions most conducive to this end” (Sidgwick, 
1907, p. 8). The connection so established between the respect of intuitional rules and the 
end of perfection, therefore, seems to imply that respecting such rules is rational so long as 
it produces the desired end of moral virtue. In this way, however, a teleological account is 
presupposed, and an implicit stress on maximisation is also introduced: in fact, according to 
Sidgwick, the “natural methods rationalised” (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 12) are those indicating the 
actions most conducive to a certain end.
A few comments are here in order. For one thing, it is not clear that respecting those duties 
is sufficient, or sometimes even strictly necessary, to achieve human perfection. In fact, it 
is part of common sense to say that human perfection sometimes requires supererogatory 
action, which goes beyond the accomplishment of standard duties. In the second place, it 
is also unclear that morality is in itself sufficient for human perfection, which may include 
intellectual, artistic and other capacities well beyond rule-abidance. Thirdly, linking the 
intuitional method to the end of perfection does not seem to do justice to the distinction, 
accepted by Sidgwick himself (Sidgwick, 1907, I.1.2.), between the views of ethics as the 
search for the rational precepts of conduct, and as the inquiry into the nature of the ultimate 
good of human life. The first account presupposes that the rightness of conduct does not 
necessarily depend on its conducing to some end, for it can also be inherent in the action 
itself: for example, talking in contemporary terms, some conduct may be made inherently 
right by the fact that it expresses acknowledgment of some fundamental right of other people, 
even though it does not foster anyone’s perfection, or other desired end. It is a fact, however, 
that, starting from its very first presentation, the “intuitional method” is always linked by 
Sidgwick to the search for a goal, albeit one different from happiness. Fourthly, establishing 
the connection in this way also seems to exclude the possibility to connect the ultimate goal 
4  This perhaps being an example of what Thomas Hurka has called a general truth, i.e., that “the more important a 
topic is, the less time Sidgwick spent on it, and what he said about it was then often far from clear” (Hurka, 2014, p. 
151).
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of Perfection with a different method, for example the one based on the exemplary power 
of embodied virtue. This has the unhappy consequence of excluding from consideration 
Aristotelian virtue ethics and of juxtaposing it to Clarke’s or Price’s strictly ‘deontological’ 
systems as members of the same ‘philosophical family’.
On the whole, the notion of a ‘method’, as presented in Sidgwick’s work, seems compromised 
from the start with a teleological view, according to which the general feature of a normative 
criterion is to foster the accomplishment of some specified goal. Sidgwick does not accept 
that ‘right’ means ‘conducive to a desired end’ (Sidgwick, 1907, pp. 25-7) – as Moore will do in 
the Principia – but he sees moral value as a goal that can be produced, and therefore equates 
‘rightness’ and ‘rational conduct’ with conduciveness to a rationally approved end. Since the 
rules of the “intuitional method” are basically conceived as means to the end of perfection, 
this method is not understood as having a quite different point from the teleological one, but 
as a sort of partial deviation from the archetype.
This conclusion may seem too hasty, for at Methods, I.6.1 Sidgwick speaks of three different 
“ultimate reasons for acting or abstaining” (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 78): happiness, excellence or 
perfection, and duty. He declares that duty, not perfection, is the ultimate reason to which 
the intuitional rules refer; moreover, later in that chapter, he also observes that “almost 
any method may be connected with almost any ultimate reason by means of some – often 
plausible – assumption” (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 83). Therefore, Sidgwick’s view seems to be that 
the intuitional method can be linked to two different ultimate goods, namely, perfection and 
the accomplishment of duty. And assuming, as he does, the priority of method over ultimate 
reason justifies his treating perfectionism as a variety of intuitionism. This would show both 
that Sidgwick is not presupposing a teleological account of rightness and that he was in fact 
justified in not acknowledging perfectionism as a distinct account. 
There are reasons, however, to be sceptical of this conclusion. The first reason concerns 
perfectionism. While it is true that following intuitional rules of unconditional duty can be 
a way to pursue moral virtue, it seems that perfectionism is better conceived of as a non-
hedonist and non-consequentialist form of teleology: that is, as a form of moral thinking 
affirming the centrality of expressing certain attitudes, as typically displayed by virtuous 
agents5. This is not necessarily equivalent to respecting unconditional rules of morality. In 
fact, according to this theory, acting rightly has more to do with expressing certain traits 
of character in our relationships with others than with observing rules — which also means 
that very often there will be more than one possibility of acting rightly, contrary to what 
Sidgwick assumes. Moreover, in contrast to a strictly deontological moral outlook, theories 
based on character assume that being a virtuous agent is also, not irrelevantly, to know 
when a rule should be broken or suspended. Finally, as already mentioned, these theories 
insist that seeking perfection can often involve going beyond the call of duty. A second 
reason for scepticism concerns the introduction of duty as an ultimate reason parallel to 
happiness and perfection, a move that seems insufficient to account for the reasonableness 
of the intuitional method. For one thing, this strategy presents the notion of duty as self-
standing, that is, as something in itself justifying: and this claim is difficult to justify outside 
a specifically Kantian framework. Moreover, assuming duty as the ultimate ground of action 
is too unspecific to characterise the intuitional method: also in the utilitarian system, in fact, 
we can fairly say that doing what maximises happiness is a duty. However, in this case duty 
5  I am not convinced, on this point, by Crisp’s arguments as to the reducibility of virtue ethics to non-principle-based 
deontology, as far as the notion of right and wrong action is concerned: see Crisp, 2015b.
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can be further explained with reference to the idea of happiness, just as, in a perfectionist 
view, the promotion of perfection can be offered as the ultimate reason for accomplishing 
duties. However, in the case of intuitionism, reference to duty as the ultimate reason of the 
intuitional method leads to the uninspiring and almost tautological view according to which, 
as commented by Crisp “the reason I should keep my promise […] is that promises should be 
kept” (Crisp, 2015a, p. 26). So, even though the intuitional method does not treat moral rules 
as means to the end of moral virtue, the ultimate reason why we should follow those rules is in 
no way truly explained. 
This strengthens the conclusion according to which a major shortcoming of Sidgwick’s 
enterprise is to have limited the discussion to the methods, without extending it to ethical 
principles and theories; for to rationalise conduct is not only to provide a method for reaching 
practical conclusions, but also to provide an ultimate reason to follow that method. Discussing 
the intuitional systems, Sidgwick does not provide any such reason, but the mere idea of 
duty; this is why inscribing the rules of the morality of common sense into the utilitarian 
framework, with its insistence on the ultimate good of happiness, seems to provide the needed 
rationale for following them (so long as they foster the accomplishment of that end). But 
Sidgwick fails to see that the intuitional method can also be inscribed in a different overall 
scheme, providing a different ultimate reason to follow the ordinary rules. And the search 
for this alternative rationale for what was later termed a ‘deontological’ view of ethics has 
often eluded ensuing commentators, so that the ordinary rules of morality have appeared, 
in Sidgwick’s words, as “an accidental aggregate of precepts, which stands in need of some 
rational synthesis” (Sidgwick, 1907, p. 102), or, in McNaughton’s phrase, as “an unconnected 
heap of duties” (McNaughton, 1996). 
The influence of Sidgwick’s book on twentieth-century ethics has been much deeper than that 
of any other writer, including Mill and Moore. But his insistence on methods over principles, 
and his failure to explore several other possibilities in ethical theory have been damaging for 
the ensuing discussion. Leaving aside egoism, Sidgwick’s dichotomy between the two methods 
– a dichotomy, of course, which he presumed to have resolved – was later on accepted as the 
basic dichotomy between ethical theories; and the whole point of normative ethics has often 
been whether to accept some form of utilitarianism or some version of rational intuitionism, 
most notably in Ross’ version. It was in the context of discussing Sidgwick’s view, in fact, that 
Charles Broad introduced the notion of deontology to characterise the normative element of 
the ‘intuitional method’. And, as it has been noted by several commentators (Louden, 1996; 
Shaver, 2011; Sørensen, 2008; Timmermann, 2015), Sidgwick’s treatment of deontology as 
a sort of deviation from the ordinary ‘teleological’ conception – a deviation with an inbuilt 
slight look of irrationality – exerted a relevant influence in the formation of the notion. 
Suffice it to recall that, in introducing the distinction between teleology and deontology, 
Broad writes that, while the teleologist deems arbitrary to exclude any part of its foreseen 
consequences, the deontologist assumes that the rightness or wrongness of an action is 
“completely determined by certain characteristics of a certain restricted part of its total 
intended consequences” (Broad, 1930, p. 212). So, what is specific about deontology turns out 
to be the (somewhat arbitrary) decision to exclude from consideration the many more remote 
consequences that an act may have, and to concentrate on its immediate consequences, indeed 
on that restricted part of its immediate consequences which bear on the definition of the act: 
thus, according to Broad, deontology “defines the kind of action under consideration by one 
or a few characteristics of its immediate consequences; and it claims to see that these suffice to 
make all such actions right (or wrong), and that the more remote consequences and the other 
characteristics of the consequences will always be irrelevant to the rightness (or wrongness) 
7.
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of the action” (Broad, 1930, p. 214)6.
It is apparent that Broad’s notion of deontology is styled on Sidgwick’s characterisation of the 
intuitional method as a departure from the ‘basic’ teleological account. And Broad even adds 
that, while a monistic deontology is a theoretical possibility, in fact deontological theories 
have tended to be pluralistic; the suggestion being, not even implicitly, that deontological 
theories lack any principle of unification of their several duties, and that this is a reason of 
weakness, as compared to teleological ones. In fact, “No one has produced a plausible monistic 
deontological theory; whilst universalistic hedonism is a fairly plausible form of monistic 
teleological theory. And this fact has often made people prefer teleological theories, since 
monism in such matters is more satisfactory to the intellect than pluralism” (Broad, 1930, p. 
215).
Sidgwick’s discussion of moral epistemology has provided twentieth-century ethics 
with a viable and fruitful method for reflecting on morals and gaining moral knowledge. 
But the translation of Sidgwick’s discussion on ‘methods’ into the present discussion on 
ethical theories has caused an overemphasis on judgments of rightness and wrongness in 
contemporary normative theory, and the standardisation of a conception of right action as 
‘the best, or most reasonable, thing to do’ or ‘the act achieving the most possible value’. This 
conception obviously leads to the so called ‘paradox of deontology’ and biases the discussion 
in favour of consequentialism. 
In order to retrieve a plausible view of deontology – or any other label one wishes to attach 
to a normative theory departing from consequentialism – it is vital not to concentrate on 
‘methods’, but on theories, and particularly on what Sidgwick called “ultimate reasons” for 
moral action. If ethics mainly has to do with causing effects in the world, trying to make it 
a better place, than consequentialism is the most plausible candidate to the role of the best 
theory. A sensible non-consequentialist view must start from a different general account, 
according to which ethics has to do with committing oneself to reflectively endorsed 
principles, through which we define our relationships with others. In such an account, the 
notions of moral integrity, self-respect and respect for others will be prominent, and the focus 
will not be on the method for reaching specific normative conclusions, but on the cultivation 
of a character based on a continuous review of one’s intentions and reasons for action and 
a consistent application of appropriate moral principles. The accomplishment of this task, 
however, is, for a large part, still waiting to be carried out.
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In this paper I outline the main features of the phenomenological approach, focusing on the central 
themes of intentionality, embodiment, empathy, intersubjectivity, sociality and the life-world. I argue 
that phenomenology is primarily a philosophy of intentional explication that identifies the a priori, 
structural correlations between subjectivity and all forms of constituted objectivities apprehended 
in their horizonal contexts. Intentional description reveals the structurally necessary, meaning-
informing interactions between embodied subjectivity (already caught in the nexus of intersubjectivity) 
in the context of embeddedness in the temporal, historical, and cultural life-world. I shall defend 
phenomenology as a holistic approach that rightfully defends the role of subjectivity in the constitution 
of objectivity and recognizes the inherent limitations of all forms of naturalism, objectivism and 
scientism.
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WHAT IS THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH?
Phenomenology is arguably the most influential and most widespread (in terms of 
geographical reach, especially in the non-anglophone world) philosophical movement of the 
twentieth century; and, as a method or approach, it continues to be extremely influential in 
the twenty-first century, especially in philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences, in the 
medical humanities (especially philosophy of psychiatry), and in intercultural philosophy, 
and any discussions involving intentionality, consciousness, embodiment, affectivity, mood, 
empathy, social relations, and embeddedness in cultural tradition. Phenomenology is a flexible 
approach and there is not one universally accepted method, nevertheless it has distinctive 
features which I shall try to outline in this paper. 
Phenomenology first emerged as the term for a scientific discipline, initially in the writings 
of Lambert, Kant and Hegel (Moran, 2000), but then was established as a specific method of 
doing philosophy by Franz Brentano in his Descriptive Psychology lectures (Brentano, 1995a) 
and by Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investigations (Husserl, 2001). In Germany, in the nineteen 
twenties, phenomenology interacted vigorously with contemporary competing philosophical 
movements, including the Vienna Circle, German Neo-Kantianism, Life-philosophy (Simmel), 
Hermeneutics (Dilthey), with the nascent Critical Theory of the first Frankfurt School 
(Horkheimer, Adorno), and also with Marxism (Arendt, Marcuse, Tran Duc Thao). Later 
phenomenology was brought into dialogue with Neo-Hegelianism (Kojève, Hyppolite, Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty), structuralism and poststructuralism (Foucault, Derrida), and with philosophy 
of language (Reinach pioneered speech acts, Mulligan, 1987), e.g. the work of J. L. Austin and 
John Searle (Searle, 1983). 
Phenomenology explores its main themes – intentionality, intuition, eidetic insight 
(Wesensschau), perception, embodiment, empathy, intersubjectivity, sociality, historicity, 
and the life-world – in an original and, judging by the amount of attention given to 
classical phenomenology by contemporary analytic philosophers, still relevant manner 
(Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012). These themes have largely been recovered and revisited in 
contemporary philosophy of mind (Dahlstrom 2015), philosophy of action, philosophy of the 
cognitive sciences, among other areas (Dennett, 1987; Noë, 2005; Hopp, 2011). Furthermore, 
phenomenology is currently valued not just for its original and still relevant discussions of 
the first-person perspective, embodiment, emotions and moods, intersubjectivity, historicity, 
etc., but also for its trenchant critique of various one-sided standpoints that have dominated 
much contemporary philosophy, e.g., naturalism (Zahavi 2004, 2010, 2013; Moran 2008, 
2013a), objectivism, and scientism (Georgi, 2009). The phenomenological tradition is currently 
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in the process of being re-invigorated through its engagement with the complex issues of 
intercultural hermeneutics (Waldenfels, 2007; Lau, 2016). 
Both as a strict method – Husserl’s “philosophy as rigorous science” (Philosophie als strenge 
Wissenschaft, Husserl, 2002) and, more generally, as a theoretical approach, phenomenology 
is now well established not only within theoretical philosophy but also in various forms of 
applied philosophy and in disciplines, such as sociology (Alfred Schütz, Harold Garfinkel), 
psychology (Aron Gurwitsch), neurology (Francisco Varela, see Petitot & Varela 1999), 
psychiatry and psychotherapy (Karl Jaspers, Ludwig Binswanger, Erwin Straus (1966), Amadeo 
Giorgi (1997), Eugene T. Gendlin, Thomas Fuchs, Louis A. Sass, see Durt et al., 2017), and, more 
recently, as a method of qualitative analysis in the social and health sciences (Jonathan A. 
Smith et al., 2009) and in the medical humanities.
Phenomenology, first and foremost, as it evolved throughout the twentieth century and into 
the twenty-first, is best understood as a tradition and an outlook or approach rather than as 
a strict method. Despite Husserl’s best efforts to stipulate its methodological rigor (Husserl, 
2014), each classical phenomenologist (e.g. Scheler, Heidegger, Stein, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty) 
has developed his or her own distinctive approach. As an established philosophical tradition, 
phenomenology has bequeathed a rich corpus of texts that are now philosophical classics, e.g. 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations (Husserl, 2001) Heidegger’s Being and Time (Heidegger, 2012), 
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (Sartre, 1979), Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012), to name but a few, that are currently being rediscovered, especially 
in the Anglo-American tradition (Szanto, 2012), by philosophers, such as: Hubert L. Dreyfus 
(1991), Charles Taylor, Sean Dorrance Kelly (2000), Alva Noë, Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson 
(2007), John McDowell, Robert Brandom, among many others. 
Phenomenology is also – and this distinguishes it from contemporary philosophy of mind-- 
consciously reflective about what traditionality, or ‘life in tradition’, involves. Hence Husserl, 
Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Waldenfels, and others, have played close attention to how 
subjective and cultural life are interwoven in a layered and sedimented manner, how 
traditions are handed on, distorted, emptied out of significance and reborn in the ebb and flow 
of collective social and historical intentionality. It is not just that all humans live in history, 
and tell their historical narratives, their orientation to existence is such as to be intrinsically 
historical. Some phenomenologists have been drawn toward Hegel’s or Dilthey’s discussions of 
historical evolution and development, but phenomenology tends to look more at how humans 
live temporally in an historical tradition. As Heidegger puts it in Being and Time, Being historical 
or ‘historicality’ or ‘historicity’ (Geschichtlichkeit) is an a priori condition of being human 
(Heidegger, 1962). Or, as Merleau-Ponty famously put it, human being is “an historical idea, 
not a natural species” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012). Human existence then has to be understood in 
terms of its overall temporal and historical dimensions. At the same time, Husserl’s reduction 
is an attempt to break with the natural flow of this historicity (Husserl, 1970, p. 151).There 
is, so to speak, even such a thing as the ‘historical way’ to the reduction, that Husserl speaks 
about in 1937 and which he regarded as more primary than the way outlined in Ideas I (Moran, 
2013b). Furthermore, as Husserl explored, all cultures live within horizons of familiarity and 
strangeness. Every life-world has dimensions of “home-world” and “alien-world” (Steinbock, 
1995); everyone lives within horizons which lay out structures of normality and abnormality, 
harmony and surprise, yet these structural dimensions of experience rarely are foregrounded 
in intentional explication.
2. Phenomenology 
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Phenomenology essentially is intentional description, i.e. it aims to describe every kind 
of object or ‘objectual’ situation or state of affairs, in terms of its correlation with an 
apprehending subjectivity. In this sense, phenomenology is a philosophy of correlation. Full 
explanation requires taking the subjective point-of-view into consideration. In his Crisis of 
European Sciences Husserl claimed his real philosophical breakthrough came in 1898 when he 
realized that there was a “universal a priori of correlation between experienced object and 
manners of givenness” (Husserl, 1970, p. 166 n.). Every object must be understood not solely as 
it is ‘in itself’ but in necessary relation to the subjective acts that disclose it. Anything that is – 
whatever its meaning and to whatever region it belongs – is “an index of a subjective system of 
correlations”, Husserl, 1970, p. 165). Husserl writes:
The correlation between world (the world of which we always speak) and its subjective 
manners of givenness never evoked philosophical wonder (that is, prior to the first 
breakthrough of “transcendental phenomenology” in the Logical Investigations), in spite 
of the fact that it had made itself felt even in pre-Socratic philosophy and among the 
Sophists – though here only as a motive for skeptical argumentation. This correlation 
never aroused a philosophical interest of its own which could have made it the object of 
an appropriate scientific attitude. (Husserl, 1970, p. 165)
According to this a priori correlation, the manner in which entities in the world present 
themselves is always related to the subjective way of apprehending these entities. As Husserl 
puts it in his 1917 Inaugural Address to Freiburg University entitled “Pure Phenomenology: Its 
Method and Field of Investigation”:
To every object there correspond an ideally closed system of truths that are true of 
it and, on the other hand, an ideal system of possible cognitive processes by virtue 
of which the object and the truths about it would be given to any cognitive subject. 
(Moran & Mooney, 2002, p. 125)
Phenomenology then is a form of correlationism, although this is not to condemn it, as 
Quentin Meillassoux attempts to do in his recent attack on correlationism (Meillassoux, 2009). 
Correlationism aims to give a fuller account of ontology by including the subjective dimension, 
hence phenomenological ontology. 
Phenomenology, broadly speaking, involves the careful, unprejudiced description of conscious, 
lived experiences (Husserl’s Erlebnisse), precisely according to the manner that they are 
experienced, without the imposition of external explanatory frameworks, whether these 
be drawn from the natural or social sciences, from religion, or even from common sense or 
ordinary language use. In Being and Time, Heidegger defines phenomenology as “to let that 
which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself” 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 58). This formulation is close to that found in Husserl’s Crisis of European 
Sciences: “to take the conscious life, completely without prejudice, just as what it quite 
immediately gives itself, as itself, to be” (Husserl, 1970, p. 233). In this sense, phenomenology 
seeks to remain descriptively true to what conscious experience – understood in the widest 
possible sense – reveals itself to be to the disciplined observer. For Merleau-Ponty, the 
practice of phenomenological seeing is meant to disrupt the everyday. It aims at “disclosure 
of the world” (révélation du monde). In his Phenomenology of Perception (1945), he writes: “true 
philosophy entails learning to see the world anew” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. lxxxv). 
The key to the methodology is the manner of this observation – which is not introspection (as 
it is often portrayed) but rather methodical reflective analysis that is seeking for invariants 
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and essential features structuring the flow of experience. Husserl often made somewhat 
grandiose claims about phenomenology as the “science of sciences”, and an ultimate 
presuppositionless science, and these claims can easily be challenged, but his overall vision of 
a foundational science that explored the entire life of consciousness uncovering its essential 
structures has an enduring appeal. This Husserl writes in his Lectures on Passive Synthesis:
But if one has learned to see phenomenologically and has learned to grasp the essence 
of intentional analysis, if one has—expressed in the form of the Goethian myth—found 
the way to the mother of knowledge, to its realm of pure consciousness in which all 
being arises constitutively and from which all knowledge as knowledge of beings has to 
fashion its ultimate comprehensible clarification, then one will initially make the quite 
astounding discovery that those types of lived experience are not a matter of arbitrary 
special features of an accidental life of consciousness, but rather that terms like 
“perception,” “memory,” “expectation,” etc., express universal, essential structures, 
that is, strictly necessary structures of every conceivable stream of consciousness, thus, 
so to speak, formal structures of a life of consciousness as such whose profound study 
and exact conceptual circumscription, whose systematic graduated levels of foundation 
and genetic development is the first great task of a transcendental phenomenology. It 
is precisely nothing less that the science of the essential shapes [Wesensgestaltungen] of 
consciousness as such, as the science of maternal origins. (Husserl, 2001a, pp. 365-6).
This is Husserlian phenomenology in a nutshell: “the science of the essential shapes 
[Wesensgestaltungen] of consciousness as such”. 
Husserl is uncovering the formal structures of any consciousness whatsoever and thereby 
the various manners of givenness (Gegebenheit – what Heidegger called “the magic word” of 
phenomenology) through which the world is manifest to consciousness. Husserl is here self-
consciously radicalizing Kant’s project of a critique of pure reason. For Husserl, if one can 
uncover the essential a priori structures of subjectivity (in its fullest sense – the whole of mental 
life or ‘life of spirit’ (Geistesleben), as he terms it), the source of all knowledge about the world, 
actual, possible, impossible, and so on, will be revealed. Husserl sought to uncover the essential 
nature of subjectivity itself, from its deepest layer of originary time-consciousness, up through 
the layers of embodied sensuous, perceptual and emotional life, to the very core of the self in its 
relations with other selves and to the horizoning, shared world. Husserl’s structural account of 
inner awareness of temporality (Husserl, 1990) is still a vital source for philosophical reflection.
Phenomenology has advocated both the ideal of a completely presuppositionless starting point 
for philosophical reflection and also the idea that all experiences are interpreted in terms 
of one’s linguistic, cultural and intentional horizons. Husserlian phenomenology, ab initio, 
claimed to be “presuppositionless” (voraussetzunglos: Husserl, 2001, vol. 1, p. 177). Thus he 
writes even in his Amsterdam Lectures of 1928:
We will refrain from any traditional prejudgments, even the most universally obvious 
ones of traditional logic, which already have perhaps taken from Nature unnoticed 
elements of meaning. We will hold ourselves resolutely to what phenomenological 
reflection presents to us as consciousness and object of consciousness, and purely 
to what comes to actual, evident self-givenness. In other words, we will interrogate 
exclusively the phenomenological experience, clearly and quite concretely thinking 
into a reflective experience of consciousness, without interest in determining 
concretely occurring facts. (Husserl, 1997)
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Husserl remained committed to presuppositionless as a methodological principle. On the other 
hand, Heidegger’s development of hermeneutical philosophy, brought interpretation and 
‘pre-judgment’ (Vorurteil) to the heart of the phenomenological discussion of understanding 
(Verstehen). Indeed, Husserl, too, in his late work, although he retained the goal of final 
‘clarification’ (Klärung) did recognise the embeddedness of human being within their cultures 
and the manner in which their horizons were determined by their cultural embeddedness. 
As an example of how themes can return in different form (and without recognition 
of its Vorwelt), consider the phenomenon that, after several centuries of discussion of 
presupposition, prejudgement (Vorurteil), hermeneutics, conflict of interpretation, and 
so on, ‘implicit bias’ has now emerged in empirical psychology and has been, somewhat 
uncritically, embraced by contemporary analytic philosophy, without reference to the 
longer tradition. One wonders how Hans-Georg Gadamer’s assertion that all understanding 
is misunderstanding, and Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of suspicion (Gadamer 1984) might sit 
with those enthusiastically detecting and claiming to neutralise if not eliminate implicit bias. 
Phenomenology begins from the recognition of intentionality: our subjective comportment 
and conscious behavior is essentially both meaning-apprehending and meaning-making, 
overall making sense of the world. Husserl speaks of Sinngebung, ‘sense-giving’, ‘sense-
bestowal’; ‘sense-explication’ (Sinnauslegung), captured in ‘reflexion’ (Besinnung). Furthermore, 
phenomenology maintains that intentionality is all pervasive: all aspects of live involve a 
coming together of subjective attitude and objective meaning. Husserl calls intentionality 
(Intentionalität) – elsewhere described as ‘directedness’ (Gerichtetsein) or ‘aboutness’ (Meinung) 
– the “principal theme” (Hauptthema) of phenomenology (Husserl, 2014, p. 161). Intentionality 
was reinserted into modern philosophy (recovered by the Scholastics) by Franz Brentano in 
his 1874 Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint (Brentano, 1995). In his effort to define the 
domain of psychological science, Brentano proposed that intentionality was the defining 
characteristic of all and only mental phenomena (Moran, 1996). Initially, Brentano conceived 
of intentionality rather narrowly as a relation between a mental act and its ‘internal’ object 
(dreaming about winning the race is an act of dreaming that is directed at a peculiar object 
winning the race, in this case a complex state-of affairs). Husserl expanded this insight to 
make intentionality the meaning-endowing character of all lived experiences. Furthermore, 
Husserl treated intentionality not narrowly as a relation between a mental act and its object, 
and especially not as a kind of representation of the outer world in the inner mind (Drummond 
2012; 1992; 1990), but as expressing the fundamental ways embodied subjects, interacting 
with other subjects, apprehend the world as senseful and respond actively generating further 
commitments of sense. Intentionality is essentially a claim about the sensefulness of experience 
based on the irreducible, essential interrelatedness between signifying consciousness and 
the surrounding world of significance. This interpretative activity need not be explicitly 
linguistic. In this regard, Husserl distinguishes between ‘sense’ (Sinn) (e.g. of non-linguistic 
perceptions) and ‘meaning’ (Bedeutung) that is expressed in language. Our embodied sensings, 
perceptions, feelings, moods, emotions, imaginings, thoughts, already have ‘sense’ prior to 
verbal articulation and may in fact be consciously experienced in an embodied manner. Our 
perceptual vista simply unfolds for us as we turn our eyes around to view the landscape; 
our hearing immediately experiences being in the midst of a noisy scene with car engines, 
slamming doors, human voices, barking dogs, or whatever. Even ‘white noise’ has a certain 
experiential significance – and is experienced as uncomfortable, distressing, and so on. All 
experiencing is experiencing of something and as something. We feel the day to be gloomy and 
we lack energy and enthusiasm. These are all forms of sense-disclosure.
Furthermore, experiences occur against a backdrop of previously meaningful experiences, 
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in what Husserl calls the ‘harmoniousness’ (Einstimmigkeit) of our experience, which in turn 
motivates certain expectations of continuity, how the future situation will pan out, and so on. 
We have the sense of the world unfolding, going on, outside us and within us. Aron Gurwitsch 
especially developed Husserl’s account of the theme and its ‘thematic field’:
What is given in genuine sense experience presents itself as a member of a system, 
becoming what it phenomenally is by its relatedness to the system, by the role which it 
plays in it, by its significance for it. (Gurwitsch, 1966, p. 348)
Husserl’s and Gurwitsch’s accounts of perception had a major impact on Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception (1945; Merleau-Ponty, 2012), which is still extraordinarily 
influential in contemporary philosophy of mind.
Intentionality is widely discussed in analytic philosophy (Dennett, 1987; Searle, 1983) also, 
but phenomenology generally opposes immanent, representationalist, causal, and naturalist 
accounts of intentionality (Dreyfus 2000, 2007), and instead approach conscious acts and 
states as conferring ‘sense’ (Sinn), ‘meaning’, or ‘significance’ (Bedeutung, Meinung), in part 
constituted through embodied ‘comportment’ (Verhalten) and intersubjective ‘interaction’ 
(Ineinandersein), inhabiting a pre-given world already charged with significance (Dreyfus 
1991; 2007a). Human beings cast a web of sense over their experiences, so even disturbed, 
pathological subjects imbue their fantasies and paranoid thoughts with senseful plausibility 
(Gendlin 1962). Indeed, for Husserl, so long as subjectivity exists, the idea of complete disorder, 
chaos, and senselessness (Unsinn), pure discordance, is literally unthinkable since, at the very 
least, the subjective flow of egoic consciousness will continue (Husserl 2014).
Husserl has a tiered or nested account of how intentional states are founded and interrelated. 
Perception is the primal or ‘originary’ form of intuiting, whereas memory and imagination 
are reproductive modifications of perception. Memory is a form of ‘calling to mind’ or ‘re-
presenting’ (Vergegenwärtigung) that no longer has the distinctive bodily presence that 
characterizes perception. Imagining is yet another form of presenting which posits an object 
somewhat detached from perceptual surroundings. Furthermore, genuine representing 
or mental envisaging is, for phenomenology, just one peculiar intentional mode. Pictorial 
representing has its own structural character that is founded on the more direct perceptual 
intentionality. Empty or ‘signitive’ intendings, for Husserl, constitute the largest class of 
our conscious acts, and have a particular relevance in mathematics and scientific discourse 
where signs are manipulated in an empty way but ultimately, for Husserl must be grounded in 
fulfilled intuitions. 
For Husserl, not just the modes of the intentional stance but, correlatively, the objects of 
intention are multiple. For instance, one can perceive objects and their properties, but also 
one can perceive actions, processes, relations, and complexes or events that Husserl calls 
“states of affairs” (Sachverhalte, Husserl 2001, vol. 2, 155). Perceptions found perceptual 
statements. Perceptual statements and judgments are, in turn, complex multi-layered acts –
linguistic utterances select aspects of the overall perceived state of affairs (I can say that I see 
the blackbird, the blackbird flying, that the bird is startled, etc.) but never reproduce the intuitive 
fullness of the actual sensuous perception itself. In this regard, as Merleau-Ponty insists, 
perception is richer than thought; and conceptual judgements at best one-sidedly articulate 
what is implicit in our incredibly rich perceptions. 
Furthermore, Husserl recognized that all objects that occupy space are apprehended in 
‘profiles’ or ‘adumbrations’ (Abschattungen), and their essence is never exhausted by these 
profiles. An object is always further determinable and portends ever new contexts in which 
these prefigured experiences can be fulfilled. Physical objects present with an ‘excess’ 
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(Überschuss), whereby their determinate features are supplemented with a horizon of 
indeterminacy of features that can be explored in further perceptions (Hopp, 2011). In Ideas 
I (Husserl 2014), Husserl speaks of “modes of indeterminate suggestion and non-intuitive co-
presence” (Husserl 2014, 183) that are wrapped up in the experience. Husserl writes:
No matter how completely we may perceive a thing, it is never given in perception 
with the characteristics that qualify it and make it up as a sensible thing from all sides 
at once. … Every aspect, every continuity of single adumbrations, regardless how far 
this continuity may extend, offers us only sides. And to our mind this is not just a 
mere statement of fact: It is inconceivable that external perception would exhaust the 
sensible-material content of its perceived object; it is inconceivable that a perceptual 
object could be given in the entirety of its sensibly intuited features, literally, from all 
sides at once in a self-contained perception. (Husserl, 2001a, pp. 39–40)
Perception, for Husserl, anchors us to the world. Perception is the primal or ‘originary’ form 
of intuiting, accompanied by the firm conviction of things (Husserl’s Urglaube) being present 
thus and so. Perceptual objects are given to apprehension with full ‘bodily presence’ (Husserl: 
leibhaftig; Merleau-Ponty: en chair et os). Husserl writes:
[Perception] is what originally makes us conscious of the realities existing for us and 
“the” world as actually existing. To cancel out all such perception, actual and possible, 
means, for our total life of consciousness, to cancel out the world as objective sense and 
as reality accepted by us; it means to remove from all thought about the world (in every 
signification of this word) the original basis of sense and legitimacy. (Husserl, 1974, p. 26)
The perceived object is directly presented as a whole, even if it is really presented as 
possessing an indefinite number of further profiles that can be brought into view. 
Perception is also truth-giving, truth-grasping. It has a ‘filled’ character that provides the 
intuitive basis for our sense of truth. Husserl conceives of the structure of intentionality as 
essentially a dynamic movement of empty intentions towards fulfillment. Actual perception 
is the paradigm case of fulfilled intuition (albeit that the object always presents in profiles or 
shadings, Abschattungen). There are different degrees of fulfillment. Husserl also connects 
intentionality with the manner that objectivities have ‘self-givenness’ (Selbstgegebenheit) in 
experience, a phenomenon he often calls ‘self-evidence’ (Evidenz), and which he strongly 
distinguished from psychological feelings of certainty. Husserl sees intentionality and 
evidence as essentially correlated:
The concept of any intentionality whatever - any life-process of consciousness-of 
something or other - and the concept of evidence, the intentionality that is the giving 
of something-itself [Selbstgebung] are essentially correlative. (Husserl, 1969, p. 160)
Perfect evidence, for Husserl, involves the grasping of the object in full givenness and with 
the clarity and distinctness appropriate to it. For Husserl, intentionality is related to the self-
givenness of experiences and self-givenness has the remarkable character of manifestness or 
what Husserl calls ‘phenomenality’. Thus he writes:
… one can say of every mental process that in it something is appearing to the 
particular I insofar as the I is somehow conscious of it. Accordingly, phenomenality 
[die Phänomenalität], as a characteristic that specifically belongs to appearing and to the 
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thing that appears, would, if understood in this broadened sense of the term, be the 
fundamental characteristic of the mental. (Husserl, 1997)
For Husserl, a physical object, apprehended phenomenologically, supports a potentially 
indefinite number of possible modes of access to it. Hence Husserl speaks of the intended 
object as “an idea in the Kantian sense” (Husserl, 2014, p. 284). Intentional objects already 
contain the possible modes of approach to them as a series of lawfully related noemata 
(Drummond & Embree, 1992). The aspectual shapes or modes of approach to the object can 
be visualized as ‘windows’ or avenues of approach to the object, set up in an essentially pre-
determined way. Thus, in the Amsterdam Lectures, Husserl describes the noema of a house in a 
house-perception as opening onto an infinite horizon of other possible profiles of the house:
The question immediately arises as to how come it is evident that this pointing-ahead 
belongs to the phenomenon-in-consciousness? How come this horizon-consciousness 
refers us in fact to further actually unexperienced traits of the same <phenomenon>? 
Certainly, this is already an interpretation which goes beyond the moment of 
experiencing, which we have called the “horizon-consciousness,” which is, indeed, as 
is easily determined, completely non-intuitive and thus in and of itself empty. (Husserl, 
1997, pp. 226-227)
In his mature works, Husserl expands his earlier analyses of the specific features of 
intentional objects to consider the non-objectual intentionality of horizons, fringes, 
that manifest themselves in the temporal flow of a unified “nexus of consciousness” 
(Bewusstseinszusammenhang, Husserl, 1969, p. 159) and ultimately form the life-world 
(Lebenswelt) that is ‘always already there’ but can never be objectified. In Ideas I Husserl defines 
the ‘horizon’ as “‘what is co-given’ but not genuinely” (Husserl, 2014, p. 77) and, in Experience 
and Judgment, he speaks of “the horizon of typical pre-acquaintance in which every object is 
pregiven” (Husserl, 1973, p. 150). Husserl believed he has made a genuine breakthrough with 
his concept of horizonal-intentionality (Horizont-Intentionalität), originally inspired by William 
James. Husserl’s ‘horizon-intentionality’ is later taken up by Gurwitsch and Merleau-Ponty to 
explicate the complex manners experiences are framed by temporal and other horizons that 
have their own kind of significance. 
Intentionality covers the whole of conscious life; everything is an achievement or 
accomplishment of intentional consciousness: “… nothing exists for me otherwise than by 
virtue of the actual and potential performance of my own consciousness [Bewusstseinsleistung]” 
(Husserl, 1969, p. 234). Life is intentional, ‘accomplishing’ life with its potentially infinite horizons 
of intentional implication, uniting together into the collective experience known as spirit. As 
Husserl writes in the Crisis:
… conscious life is through and through an intentionally accomplishing life [intentional 
leistendes Leben] through which the life-world … in part attains anew and in part has 
already attained its meaning and validity. All real mundane objectivity is constituted 
accomplishment in this sense, including that of men and animals (Husserl, 1970, p. 204).
The Husserlian account of lived experiences is extraordinarily rich. For phenomenology, 
not just perceptions and judgments (the traditional focus of epistemology) but also feelings, 
emotions (Vendrell Ferran 2008, 2015), acts of willing, moods, have a peculiar manifestness of 
their own which contributes to the manner in which consciousness engages with the world. 
For Husserl, intentional experiences form a seamless unity in the flow of consciousness but 
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nevertheless, there is a structural order of experiences. 
Husserl’s account of intentionality was further radicalized by Heidegger and by Merleau-
Ponty’s analyses of embodied, habitual and practical intentionality, focusing especially on pre-
theoretical, habitual, practical behavior in an environment of already-given significance. 
Phenomenologists have seen the significance of moods as being ways in which the world is 
disclosed and also the manner in which one is disclosed to oneself. Thus Stephan Strasser 
claims that moods are “the primordial phenomenological characteristic of self-experiencing 
life” (Strasser, 1997, p. 121). Heidegger, in Being and Time, made significant contributions 
with his analyses of ‘fundamental moods’ (Grundstimmungen), disposition or ‘state-of-mind’ 
(Befindlichkeit), and the experience of ‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit), finding oneself always 
thrown into a situation. Heidegger (1962) discussed fundamental moods such as anxiety 
(Angst) which he distinguished from fear, a relationship to something in particular, but has 
as its object one’s whole being-in-the-world. One’s whole being is experienced as groundless 
and unsupported. Similarly Aurel Kolnai (2004) developed an analysis of disgust, and Sartre 
develops this with his account of vertigo or nausea – where one experiences one’s own 
absolute freedom. Vertigo is not so much the fear of falling as the fear of jumping. One’s inner 
freedom is limitless and, in this sense, truly terrifying, opening up before one like a chasm. 
Sartre’s phenomenological accounts of the experience of freedom have enduring value (Sartre 
1979).
Part of the enduring appeal of phenomenology is that it respects the centrality and 
ineliminability of the first-person point of view, the first and primary standpoint from which 
humans encounter the world. Phenomenology argues that the objective view --what Merleau-
Ponty calls, in his 1945 Phenomenology of Perception, “the view from nowhere” (la vue de nulle 
part, Merleau-Ponty, 2012)—is achieved only by abstracting from the original first-person 
stance with which humans engage the world.
All knowing requires the engagement of subjectivity and is the achievement of a first-person.
This is why Husserl stresses his so called ‘Cartesian’ way of practicing phenomenology, 
which Husserl articulated especially in the Cartesian Meditations, lectures given in Paris 
in 1929 (Husserl, 1960). Subsequently, in the Crisis, Husserl identified at least three ‘ways’ 
of performing the reduction: the “Cartesian way” (Husserl, 1970, p. 154), the “way from 
psychology” (Weg von der Psychologie, Husserl, 1970, p. 208), and the way from the pregiven 
life-world (Husserl, 1970, p. 136). Husserl admires Descartes’ attempt to overthrow the existing 
sciences and set forth the indubitable grounds for a first philosophy that will be “a science 
grounded on an absolute foundation” (Husserl, 1960, p. 1). Husserl also agrees with Descartes 
that the practice of philosophy must be a first-personal affair, and that the meditator must 
accept only his or her own existence as having an absolute indubitability. For Husserl, 
Descartes has uncovered the fundamental fact that all being is relative to consciousness and 
that the transcendental ego has absolute being (Husserl, 1967, p. 69). There is an undeniable 
priority to my self-experience. Phenomenology attends to whatever has immediate ‘self-
givenness’ in the realm of self-conscious intuitive experience. One can turn the focus of 
one’s attention away from matters in the world to what is given in the stream of one’s own 
first-personal conscious experiencing. One can attend to the various manners of givenness of 
whatever is encountered within that stream of experiencing. 
This requires the meditating self or ego to come to understand the essential nature of the self 
in general, and thereby modifying its own nature to include the possibility of other different 
natures (other egos). Husserl thought that this insight into the essence of egohood or selfhood 
belonged exclusively to conscious experiences of the form of the cogito and offered a unique 
starting point for gaining what he considered to be apodictic knowledge. Note, however, that 
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Husserl has no interest in what is uniquely subjective and idiosyncratic to my experiencing – 
he is interested in the essential form of self-experiencing as such. Of course, Husserl’s embrace 
of Cartesianism is now seen as just one strand in his complex layered set of approaches. 
Husserl in later years sought to embed this phenomenology of self-experience into a wider 
phenomenology of the experience of alterity.
As Husserl’s phenomenology developed, he increasingly emphasised that we are incarnate, that 
is to say, embodied, situated, finite human beings, already in the world and for whom the world 
has a given, taken-for-granted, ‘natural’ status. Husserl himself speaks of the ‘phenomenology 
of embodiment’ (Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit). Similarly, he attended to the en-worlded 
nature of our experience. Much of Husserl’s puzzlement came from trying to figure out how it 
is that the lived world comes to have this taken-for-grantedness, self-givenness and obviousness in 
the natural attitude.
Phenomenology is interested not just in the first-person, but in the second-person, in the 
alter ego, both singular and plural, and the constitution of various forms of ‘I-Thou’ relations 
(Husserl speaks of the ‘Ich-Du-Beziehung’) and ‘we-intentionality’ (Wir-Intentionalität) in 
what is now known as social or collective intentionality. Indeed, some of the most fruitful 
discussions concerning the formation of the ‘we’ and ‘we-world’ (Wir-Welt), as Husserl calls it, 
have emerged in recent social philosophy in dialogue with phenomenology (Moran & Szanto, 
2015). Phenomenology is, as Husserl put it, a science of subjectivity, but it also a science of 
subjectivity embodied and embedded and involved in the intersubjective constitution of 
objectivity and of the world. 
Phenomenologists can begin from their own experience, but they are open to understanding 
other people’s experiences, as they are experienced (examples can be found in real life, in 
literature, or, simply, through the process of imaginative variation, a procedure Husserl 
himself practiced). In other words, close attention must be paid to the subject’s own account 
of their experiences, emotions, and how they form their general sense of matters that affect 
them. Phenomenology is replete with descriptive analyses of affective life, feelings, emotions, 
moods, existential concerns, and various dimensions of lived embodiment and more generally 
‘being-in-the-world’ (In-der-Welt-Sein, Heidegger, 1962; être-au-monde, Merleau-Ponty, 2012).
One of phenomenology’s greatest and most useful discoveries is that of the ‘natural attitude’ 
(die natürliche Einstellung)—a term that Husserl uses from as early as 1906-7, but which 
emerges in print in Ideas I (Husserl, 2014, p. 48). In order to focus on the manner of experiencing, 
it necessarily involves interrupting natural, straight-forward experiencing. According to 
Husserl, in our everyday practices and routines, we are in a certain attitude (he calls it ‘the 
natural attitude’) towards things and towards the world, and somehow this is a state of self-
forgetfulness. The world presents itself as simply there, given, available to us. Husserl’s insight 
(inspired in part by Avenarius’ discussion of non-dualistic experiential life in Der menschliche 
Weltbegriff) is that the ordinary, natural world that surrounds us on all sides, in which we live 
and move and have our being, is actually itself the correlate of a very powerful yet also quite 
specific and particular attitude: the natural attitude. In his 1935 Vienna Lecture Husserl defines 
an attitude as “a habitually fixed style of willing life (Stil des Willenlebens) comprising directions 
of the will or interests that are prescribed by this style, comprising the ultimate ends, the 
cultural accomplishments whose total style is thereby determined” (Husserl, 1970, p. 280). In 
his Kant Society lecture in 1974, he describes the natural attitude:
The natural attitude is the form in which the total life of humanity is realized in 
running its natural, practical course. It was the only form from millennium to 
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millennium, until out of science and philosophy there developed unique motivations 
for a revolution. (Husserl, 1974, 20)
Disrupting the natural attitude and undermining its hold on us will be central to Husserl’s 
practice of the phenomenological method. It is important also to emphasize that the scientific 
worldview which is now entwined with the natural worldview does not necessarily provide us 
with a grasp of reality and truth in the fullest sense. 
In order to lay bare the intentional constitution of the natural attitude, phenomenologists 
apply the procedure of ‘suspension’, ‘bracketing’, or phenomenological reduction, to strip 
away the presuppositions embedded in the natural attitude. Husserl’s procedure of epoché 
(a term he introduced in Ideas I to stand for the set of operations that excludes the naive, 
natural, objective attitude to the world) is an explicit radicalisation and modification of 
Cartesian doubt. Husserl interpreted Descartes as attempting a universal world-negation, 
whereas he himself sought not negation but rather neutralisation of worldly commitments. 
Breaking with the ‘natural attitude’ to prepare the mind for the scientific attitude is also part 
of Descartes’ programme. Husserl says that his phenomenological epoché differs from Cartesian 
doubt (Husserl, 2014), in that he interprets the actual, historical Cartesian doubt as a kind 
of dogmatic scepticism, involving the dogmatic denial of the existence of the world, rather 
than as the more Pyrrhonian scepticism, which keeps existential judgements in suspense and 
remains uncommitted. Husserl wants to uncover the “genuine sense of the necessary regress 
to the ego” (Husserl, 1960, p. 6). His method is a treating of assumptions as mere “acceptance-
phenomena”, “inhibiting”, “putting out of play” (Husserl, 1960, p. 20). In Ideas I, for instance, 
Husserl speaks of epoché as rigorous ‘exclusion’ (Ausschaltung) and an ‘abstention’ (Enthaltung) 
from the methods and propositions of the philosophical tradition (Husserl, 2014, p. 52). The 
epoché and the associated ‘phenomenological reductions’ are meant to allow the nature of 
the experiences to become manifest without distortion and to lead back (Latin: re-ducere) to 
the apprehension of the essential (‘eidetic’) structures, contents, and objects and how they 
interconnect with other forms of consciousness.
Husserl borrowed the epoché from the Greek sceptics – and it is noteworthy in the quotation 
above from the Crisis that Husserl speaks of the correlation between world and subjectivity 
as already arising under the mode of skepticism about knowledge already in the ancient 
Greeks. Indeed, Husserl thinks ancient Greek philosophers – a “few Greek eccentrics” (ein 
Paar griechischen Sonderlingen, Husserl, 1970, p. 289), as he puts it in the Vienna Lecture– were 
responsible for an entirely new attitude that broke with the prevailing mytho-poeic way of 
seeing the cosmos and led to the ‘break into’ (Einbruch) of the theoretical attitude which is the 
source of Western science (the only truly unbounded or infinite science). Heidegger, however, 
does not make explicit use of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, whereas Husserl thought 
it as essential to the point of claiming that anyone who misunderstood the importance of the 
reduction could not be doing phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty accepted a modified version of 
the phenomenological reduction. He famously said that the lesson of Husserl’s reduction was 
that it could not be carried out to completion because it ran up against the indissoluble life-
world – this “rupture can teach us nothing but the unmovitated springing forth of the world” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. lxxvii).
Husserl’s ‘bracketing’ is a complex procedure, demanding perpetual vigilance. In one sense, 
what it brings to light is the extraordinary web of assumptions and practical beliefs that 
make up what he calls ‘the natural attitude’. It has not been universally adopted within 
phenomenology, nevertheless, something like this bracketing and suspension is necessary to 
allow phenomena to come into view and be apprehended in the least distorted manner.
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Husserl is notorious for his conception that all “sense and being” (Sinn und Sein, Hua I 117; 
Seinssinn, I 118) is constituted by the transcendental ego. Nevertheless, the philosophical 
idea of the ‘transcendental ego’ can be rehabilitated and given a reasonably plausible 
reconstruction. For Husserl, the ego is a dynamic entity, a self that grows and develops, 
sediments properties that become convictions, and has a history. When a decision is made, 
this is not just a passing episode but becomes a permanent possession (even if it is later 
renounced). Husserl characterises the ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental’ ego as an “Ego-pole” (Ichpol, 
Husserl, 1960, p. 68) or centre of experiences, including all actions and affections, as the 
“substrate of habitualities” (Husserl, 1960, p. 69). The ego is not an empty ‘pole’ that sends 
and receives conscious ‘rays’, it is a concrete living self, an individual, an “abiding personal 
ego” (als stehendes und bleibendes personales Ich, Husserl, 1960, pp. 66-67), a monad. It collects 
its experiences together into an enduring unity through the performance of various complex 
syntheses and becomes a self, with convictions, values, an outlook, a history: “The ego 
constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of a history” (Husserl, 1960, p. 75). The 
transcendental ego, moreover, necessarily functions within the open field of all possible egos – 
transcendental intersubjectivity (akin to the open field of language which is an intersubjective 
network that is activated in each speaker). Husserl writes:
But each soul also stands in community [Vergemeinschaftung] with others which are 
intentionally interrelated, that is, in a purely intentional, internally and essentially 
closed nexus [Zusammenhang], that of intersubjectivity. (Husserl, 1970, p. 238)
Merleau-Ponty correctly emphasized this point – transcendental subjectivity is already 
an intersubjectivity, but that is not to say that this statement resolves the extremely 
difficult problems concerning the constitution of the transcendental ego. Indeed, many 
phenomenologists, beginning with Heidegger, abandoned the essentially Kantian language 
of transcendental subjectivity in favor of discussion of the conditions of the possibility of 
historical human existence. However, I believe much can still be learned from the mature 
Husserl’s meditations on transcendental subjectivity especially in relation to the constitution 
of its environing world.
Classical phenomenology has many detailed analyses of the structures of conscious life and 
of the ‘life-world’ – the ordinary, everyday, pre-scientific world that we all inhabit and which 
provides a unified backdrop for all our intentional activities across history. The mature 
Husserl thus enlarged the scope of phenomenology by suggesting new approaches that 
moved beyond the exploration of subjectivity, specifically, in the Crisis, “by inquiring back 
from the life-world”, which is, of course, also the accepted, social and communal world that is, 
in Heidegger’s words, “always already there” (immer schon da). It is precisely the experience 
of intersubjectivity and the concept of a horizonal world as backdrop to all experience 
that requires a new kind of phenomenology of collective cultural experience. Heidegger’s 
distinction between inauthentic and authentic selfhood, and especially his discussion of ‘the 
one’, das Man, anyone, also contributes to the understanding of a kind of participatory stance 
that is anonymous and not personally defined in which we stand in the world. The life-world is 
an extra-ordinary and enduring innovation. Hans-Georg Gadamer has written:
In Husserl’s later work the magic word Lebenswelt (lifeworld) appears—one of those 
rare and wonderful artificial words (it does not appear before Husserl) that have found 
their way into the general linguistic consciousness, thus attesting to the fact that 
they bring an unrecognized or forgotten truth to language. So the word “Lebenswelt” 
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has reminded us of all the presuppositions that underlie all scientific knowledge. 
(Gadamer, 1998, p. 55)
Many twentieth-century European philosophers—including Jan Patočka (2016), Jürgen 
Habermas (1987), and Hans Blumenberg (1986) – have taken over Husserl’s conception of 
the life-world. The life-world is a world of cumulative tradition acquired through what 
Husserl calls sedimentation (Sedimentierung, Husserl, 1970, p. 362), according to which 
certain earlier experiences become passively enfolded in our on-going experience, just 
as language retains earlier meanings in its etymologies. As Husserl says in the “Origin of 
Geometry”, “cultural structures, appear on the scene in the form of tradition; they claim, 
so to speak, to be ‘sedimentations’ (Sedimentierungen) of a truth-meaning that can be made 
originally self-evident” (Husserl, 1970, p. 367). Indeed, Husserl speaks of ‘sedimentation’ as 
“traditionalization” (Husserl, 1970, p. 52). There never has been such an investigation of 
the ‘life-world’ as “subsoil” (Untergrund) for all forms of theoretical truth (Husserl, 1970, p. 
124). This science of the life-world would be descriptive of the life-world in its own terms, 
bracketing conceptions intruding from the natural and cultural sciences. In this sense, Husserl 
speaks of an “ontology of the life-world” (Ontologie der Lebenswelt, see Crisis § 51). In the Kant 
Society lecture Husserl speaks of the results of the phenomenological method as follows:
The world took on an infinite wideness as soon as the actual life-world, the world in 
the “how” of the givenness of mental process [die wirkliche Lebenswelt, die Welt im Wie der 
Erlebnisgegebenheit], was observed. It took on the whole range of the manifold subjective 
appearances, modes of consciousness, modes of possible position-taking; for it was, for 
the subject, never given otherwise than in this subjective milieu, and in purely intuitive 
description of the subjectively given there was no in-itself that is not given in subjective 
modes of the for-me or for-us, and the in-itself itself appears as a characteristic in this 
context and has to undergo therein its clarification of sense. (Husserl, 1974, p. 11). 
Husserl contrasts the practically experienced life-world with the world as given in objective 
science. He writes in Ideas II:
In ordinary life [im gewöhnlichen Leben] we have nothing whatever to do with nature-
objects [Naturobjekten]. What we take as things are pictures, statues, gardens, houses, 
tables, clothes, tools, etc. They are value-objects [Wertobjekte] of various kinds, use-
objects [Gebrauchsobjekte], practical objects. They are not objects which can be found in 
natural science. [Es sind keine naturwissenschaftlichen Objekte] (Husserl, 1989, p. 29) 
Husserl in fact thinks the concept of an objective ‘world in itself’ that is considered 
independent of all subjectivity is a peculiar theoretical construction – useful in the sciences 
but one-sided in terms of metaphysics:
The contrast between the subjectivity of the life-world and the “objective,” the “true” 
world, lies in the fact that the latter is a theoretical-logical substruction [Substruktion], 
the substruction of something that is in principle not perceivable, in principle not 
experienceable in its own proper being, whereas the subjective, in the life-world [das 
lebensweltlich Subjektive], is distinguished in all respects precisely by its being actually 
experienceable. (Husserl, 1970, p. 127)
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Phenomenology as a descriptive practice opposes any form of analysis that reduces the unified 
nexus of conscious flowing life to a collection of isolated and atomistic mental experiences. 
Lived experiences are the starting point – but these cannot be narrowly thought of as, for 
example, stimuli (Quine’s ‘noises and scratches’) or as sense data. Experience is a multi-modal 
sensory intertwining and interweaving, not just of the different senses (touch, sight, hearing 
smell, taste) and our bodily proprioception, but also as experience filtered by mood and 
inflected by emotion and various cognitive attitudes. Phenomenology has always recognized 
that perception is a multimodal, embodied achievement, an intertwining of various sense 
modalities (sight, touch) and of bodily proprioceptive movements (called ‘kinaestheses’ in the 
psychological terminology of the time), such as eye movements, hand movements, movements 
of the body (to get nearer, get a better grip, look more closely), involving looking over the 
object, pointing, grasping, moving around the object, and so on. The body is in the world as the 
“heart is in the organism”, Merleau-Ponty declares (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 209). Embodied 
perception brings the visible, tangible, spatial and material world alive. There is a very fine 
attunement between lived body and world. Moreover, disorders of the embodied relation to 
the world involve a significant modification of the way the world appears, as in pathological 
cases such as the case of the brain damaged former soldier Schneider, discussed by Merleau-
Ponty (2012, pp. 105-140). More recently, for example, Louis A. Sass and Elizabeth Pienkos 
(2013), who have studied delusion from the phenomenological perspective, have identified 
necessary structural features of delusions, e.g., mutations of time, space, causality, self-
experience, or sense of reality, that challenge accounts of delusion as a belief mode or doxastic 
state. They discuss the delusional mood which involves feelings of strangeness and tension, 
and a sense of tantalizing yet ineffable meaning. This simply illustrates how phenomenology 
is being used in descriptions of embodied experience in a wide range of settings. 
Phenomenology, moreover, recognises that persons are in part constituted through their feelings, 
emotions and moods. Moods ‘colour’ emotions (Husserl, Stein) can intensify, weaken, extent, 
curtail emotions. One’s world is filtered through emotions and moods (Scheler, Heidegger). 
Emotions are not just felt by and expressed in the body (e.g. facial expressions, smiling) but the 
whole body is inhabited emotionally: e.g. the whole body can be tense; a way of walking can be 
nervous, one’s social world can be experienced as anxiety-filled, and so on. 
Phenomenology is also very useful for explorings the notions of foreground, background 
and horizon in experiences. The philosophical discussion of the intentional greatly benefits 
from being broadened to the discussion of overall being-in-the-world. There is always in 
any experience a combination of present and absent moments, to see the front side is at the 
same time to have an empty intending apprehension of the rear side of an object in the form 
of a determinable indeterminacy. Furthermore, as Heidegger emphasizes, what one sees is 
constrained by one’s background assumptions and by the overall context of the ‘environment’ 
(Umwelt) and life-world. A craftsperson can identify the appropriate tools for a particular 
task and immediately sees what needs to be done. The gardener identifies some plants as 
flowers and others as weeds, not based on botanical classification but based on their usefulness 
and appropriateness in the context of gardening (itself a cultural and historically inflected 
practice). This is what Heidegger means when he says we first encounter objects in a practical 
way as ‘ready-to-hand’ (zuhanden) rather than merely as ‘present-at-hand’ (vorhanden), objects 
merely theoretically apprehended, shorn of their context of usefulness (Heidegger, 1962; 
Dreyfus, 1991). For Heidegger, humans are already embedded (‘immer schon da’) in a pre-
formed, and largely intuitively-apprehended, historical and cultural world. Moreover, they are 
oriented primarily to the future, and the past is always implicitly interpreted in terms of this 
future project. Human beings live in an Umwelt with which one interacts, very much like one 
“lays down a path in walking” as Francisco Varela put it. Or like the manner in which a spider 
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generates its web from the silk thread produced within its own body from the spinnerets in its 
abdomen. Against Kant, who denied the experience of the totality of the world as such, Husserl 
defends the consciousness of world as a genuine phenomenon:
I am continually conscious of individual things in the world, as things that interest me, 
move me, disturb me, etc., but in doing this I always have consciousness of the world 
itself, as that in which I myself am, although it is not there as is a thing, does not affect 
me as things do, is not, in a sense similar to things, an object of my dealings. If I were 
not conscious of the world as world, without its being capable of becoming objective 
in the manner of an [individual] object, how could I survey the world reflectively 
and put knowledge of the world into play, thus lifting myself above the simple, 
straightforwardly directed life that always has to do with things? (Husserl, 1970, p. 251)
One of the challenges of phenomenology is how to express its descriptive findings. The 
ability to make fine discriminations must be matched with an equal ability to translate these 
discriminations into appropriately fine-grained linguistic communication (for a critique of 
phenomenology as lacking analytic rigor, see Searle, 2005). Husserl himself recognized this 
problem but did not address it centrally at least until some of his later writings, for instance 
his essay “On the Origin of Geometry” (Husserl, 1970), where he accorded to written language 
an enormously important role in fixing the meanings of ideal objectivities such as occur in 
mathematics so that they can be accessed as the same over and over again. For Heidegger, 
however, the issue of language became inescapable and marked a major turning in his 
conception of phenomenology and its possibilities. Subsequent phenomenology (Jacques 
Derrida, for instance, in so far as his work is motivated by phenomenology and continues 
to work within the phenomenological epoché, as he himself has attested) has had to grapple 
with the complexity of the relationship between language and experience in ways that have 
frequently challenged many of Husserl’s assumptions.
Phenomenology is an enduring resource for philosophers interested in the first-person 
perspective, the subjective experience of embodied living, perceiving, and knowing, the 
affective life with its disclosive moods, the existential experience of temporality and the 
complex co-intentionalities involved in sociality, empathy and intersubjective communal life.
Phenomenology still has much to contribute in the understanding of life-world, the experience 
of the other, and the complex phenomena of interculturality.
REFERENCES
Blumenberg, H. (1986). Lebenszeit und Weltzeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp;
Brentano, F. (1995). Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. [1874]. Trans. A.C. Rancurello, D.B. 
Terrell, and L.L. McAlister. London: Routledge;
Brentano, F. (1995a). Descriptive Psychology. Ed. by R.M. Chisholm and W. Baumgartner. Trans. B. 
Müller. London: Routledge;
Dahlstrom, D. O., Elpidorou, A., & Hopp, W., Eds. (2015). Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: 
Conceptual and Empirical Approaches. New York & London: Routledge;
Dennett, D. (1987). The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press;
Durt, Ch., Fuchs, Th., & Tewes, Ch., Eds. (2017). Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture. Investigating 
the Constitution of the Shared World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press;
Dreyfus, H. L. (2007a). The Return of the Myth of the Mental. Inquiry, 50, 4, 352-365;
Dreyfus, H. L. (2007). Intelligence without Representation Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Mental 
Representation: The Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation, Phenomenology and 
the Cognitive Sciences, 1, 367-383;
88
DERMOT MORAN
Dreyfus, H. L. (2000). A Merleau-Pontyian Critique of Husserl’s and Searle’s Representationalist 
Accounts of Action. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 100 (1), 287-302;
Dreyfus, H. L. (1991). Being-in-the-World. A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division One. 
Cambridge: MIT Press;
Drummond, J.J. (2012). Intentionality without Representationalism. In D. Zahavi (Ed.). The 
Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology. Oxford: Oxford University Press;
Drummond, J.J. (1990). Husserlian Intentionality and Non-foundational Realism: Noema and Object. 
Drodrecht: Springer;
Drummond J. J., & Embree, L. E., Eds. (1992). The Phenomenology of the Noema. Dordrecht: 
Springer;
Gadamer, H.-G. (1998). The Ideal of Practical Philosophy. In H.- G. Gadamer, Praise of Theory: 
Speeches and Essays (pp. 50-61). Trans. Chris Dawson. New Haven: Yale University Press;
Gadamer, H.-G. (1984). The Hermeneutics of Suspicion. Man and World. 17, 3-4, 313-323;
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2012). The Phenomenological Mind. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge;
Gendlin, E. T. (1962). Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning: A Philosophical and Psychological 
Approach to the Subjective. Evanston: Northwestern University Press;
Giorgi, A. (2009). The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in psychology: A modified Husserlian 
approach. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press;
Giorgi, A. (1997). The Theory, Practice, and Evaluation of the Phenomenological Method as a 
Qualitative Research Procedure. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 28 (2), 235-260;
Gurwitsch, A. (1996). Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press;
Habermas, J. (1987). The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume Two: Lifeworld and System: A 
Critique of Functionalist Reason. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. Cambridge: Polity;
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell;
Hopp, W. (2011). Perception and Knowledge: A Phenomenological Account. Cambridge & New York: 
Cambridge University Press;
Husserl, E. (2014). Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book. 
General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Indianapolis: Hackett;
Husserl, E. (2002). ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science’, trans. Marcus Brainard, The New Yearbook 
for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 2, 249-295;
Husserl, E. (2001a). Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental 
Logic. Trans. Anthony J. Steinbock. Husserl Collected Works Volume IX. Dordrecht: Kluwer;
Husserl, E. (2001). Logical Investigations, 2 Vols. Trans. J.N. Findlay. Ed. with a New Introduction 
by Dermot Moran and New Preface by Michael Dummett. London & New York: Routledge;
Husserl, E. (1997). Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with 
Heidegger (1927-31), The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article, The Amsterdam Lectures “Phenomenology 
and Anthropology” and Husserl’s Marginal Note in Being and Time, and Kant on the Problem of 
Metaphysics. Trans. T. Sheehan and R.E. Palmer. Collected Works VI. Dordrecht: Kluwer;
Husserl, E. (1990). On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Trans. J.B. Brough. 
Collected Works IV. Dordrecht: Kluwer;
Husserl, Edmund (1989). Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy. Second Book. Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. 
Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers;
Husserl, E. (1974). Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy. Trans. T. E. Klein and W. E. 
Pohl. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 5, 9-56;
Husserl, E. (1973). Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic. Revised and Edited 
by L. Landgrebe. Trans. J.S. Churchill and K. Ameriks. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul;
89
WHAT IS THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH?
Husserl, E. (1970). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An 
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Trans. D. Carr. Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press;
Husserl, E. (1969). Formal and Transcendental Logic. Trans. D. Cairns. The Hague: Nijhoff;
Husserl, E. (1960). Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Trans. D. Cairns. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff;
Kelly, S. D. (2000).The Relevance of Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Language and Mind. Studies 
in Philosophy. London: Routledge;
Kolnai, A. (2004). On Disgust. Ed. Carolyn Korsemeyer an Barry Smith. Chicago: Open Court;
Lau, K.-Y. (2016). Phenomenology and Intercultural Understanding. Toward a New Cultural Flesh. 
Contributions to Phenomenology 87. Dordrecht: Springer;
Meillassoux, Q. (2009). After Finitude. London: Continuum;
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). The Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Donald A. Landes. London: 
Routledge;
Moran, D., & Szanto, Th. Eds. (2015). Discovering the We: The Phenomenology of Sociality. London & 
New York: Routledge;
Moran, D. (2014). ‘What Does Heidegger Mean by the Transcendence of Dasein?’ International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 22 (4), 491-514;
Moran, D. (2013). Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano 
to the Present. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 21 (3), 317-358;
Moran, D. (2013a). “Let’s Look at It Objectively”: Why Phenomenology Cannot be Naturalized. 
Phenomenology and Naturalism, Philosophy Supplementary Volume 72, 89-115;
Moran, D. (2013b). From the Natural Attitude to the Life-World. In L. Embree & T. Nenon 
(Eds.), Husserl’s Ideen. Contributions to Phenomenology 66 (pp. 105-124). Dordrecht: Springer, 
2013;
Moran, D. (2008). Husserl’s Transcendental Philosophy and the Critique of Naturalism. 
Continental Philosophy Review, 41, 4, 401-425;
Moran, D. (2000a). Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and Brentano’s Accounts of Intentionality’. 
Inquiry 43 (1), 39-65;
Moran, D. (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. London & New York: Routledge;
Moran, D. (1996). Brentano’s Thesis. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 70, 1-27;
Moran, D., & Mooney, T., Eds. (2002). The Phenomenology Reader. London & New York: Routledge;
Mulligan, K., Ed. (1987). Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist 
Phenomenology. Reidel;
Noë, A. (2005). Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press;
Patočka, J. (2016). The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press;
Petitot, J., & Varela, F. J., et al., Eds., (1999). Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press;
Pfänder, Alexander (1967). Phenomenology of Willing and Other Phaenomenologica. Trans. Herbert 
Spiegelberg. Evanston: Northwestern University Press;
Salice, A. (2009). Urteile und Sachverhalte. Ein Vergleich zwischen Alexius Meinong und Adolf Reinach. 
München: Philosophia Verlag;
Salice, A., & Schmid, H.-B., Eds. (2016). The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality. Dordrecht: 
Springer;
Sartre, J.-P. (1979). Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Barnes. London: Routledge;
Sass, L. A., & Pienkos, E. (2013), Delusion: The Phenomenological Approach. In K.W.M. Fulford, 
& M. Davies, et al. (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press;
90
DERMOT MORAN
Schmid, H.-B. (2009). Plural Action. Essays in Philosophy and Social Science. Contributions to 
Phenomenology Vol. 58. Dordrecht: Springer;
Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality. New York: Oxford University Press;
Searle, J. R. (2005). The Phenomenological Illusion. In M. E. Reicher & J. C. Marek (Eds.). 
Experience and Analysis. Erfahrung und Analyse. Proceedings of the 27th International 
Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg, Austria, August 8-14, 2004 (pp. 317-336). Vienna, 2005;
Smith, J.A., Flowers, P., & Larkin, M. (2009). Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis: 
Understanding Method and Application. London: Sage;
Steinbock, A. (1995). Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press;
Strasser, S. (1977). Phenomenology of Feeling: An Essay on the Phenomena of the Heart. Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press;
Straus, E. W. (1966). The Upright Posture. In Phenomenological Psychology. New York: Basic 
Books, 137-165;
Szanto, Th. (2014). Social Phenomenology: Husserl, Intersubjectivity, and Collective 
Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 22 (2), 296-301;
Szanto, Th. (2012). Bewusstsein, Intentionalität und Mentale Repräsentation. Husserl und die 
Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. Berlin-New York: De Gruyter;
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press;
Vendrell Ferran, I. (2015). The Emotions in Early Phenomenology. Studia Phaenomenolgica. 15, 
349-374;
Vendrell Ferran, I. (2008). Die Emotionen. Gefühle in der realistischen Phänomenologie. Berlin: 
Akademie;
Waldenfels, B. (2007). The Question of the Other. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press / New 
York: SUNY Press;
Zahavi, D. (2013). Naturalized Phenomenology: A desideratum or a category mistake?. In 
H. Carel & D. Meacham (Eds.). Phenomenology and Naturalism. Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplement, No. 72 (p. 23-42). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
Zahavi, D. (2010). Naturalized Phenomenology. In S. Gallagher & D. Schmicking (Eds.). Handbook 
of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (pp. 2-19). Dordrecht: Springer;
Zahavi, D. (2004). Phenomenology and the Project of Naturalization. Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences, 3, 331-347.

Phenomenology and Mind, n. 15 - 2018, pp. 92-102
DOI: 10.13128/Phe_Mi-24974
Web: www.fupress.net/index.php/pam
© The Author(s) 2018
CC BY 4.0 Firenze University Press
ISSN 2280-7853 (print) - ISSN 2239-4028 (on line)
TWO WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING 
PERSONS: A HUSSERLIAN 
DISTINCTION
abstract
This paper clarifies the distinction that Edmund Husserl makes between two different ways of 
understanding other persons, their actions and motivations: the experiential or empirical way, on the 
one hand, and the genuinely or authentically intuitive way, on the other hand. The paper argues that 
Husserl’s discussion of self-understanding clarifies his concept of the intuitive understanding of others 
and allows us to explicate what is involved in it: not just the grasping of the other’s actual motivations of 
action but also the grasping of her motivational possibilities. The paper ends by discussing the dynamic 
character of the personal subject.
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Husserl’s mature ethics is personalistic in the sense that it ties the categorical imperative 
to individual persons (Hua37, 162, 246; Hua27, 31, 45; cf. Melle 2007; Hart 2006; Trincia 2007; 
Donohoe 2010; Siles i Borràs 2011; Beyer 2012; Heinämaa 2014; Crespo 2015). More precisely, 
Husserl defines the imperative, not in relation to types of actions or acts, but in relation to 
whole persons, their personal capacities1 of acting, valuing and thinking and their ways of 
being motivated. In his late lectures on ethics, he formulates the imperative as follows: “Do 
from now on and without hesitation always the best, your best, grasp it in norm-cognition and 
will it in norm-conscious volition” (Hua37, 253, emphasis added). He explains:
What I must is determined by the ‘I can’, and what I can differs from what any other can 
[...] My best is, more precisely, determined by my past and my present, and my future 
is not totally without preference. My whole life lies in front of me, and in front of me 
lies the surrounding world that extends itself around me. What I can accomplish there 
operates as the basis for my deliberation, and the best that I can accomplish there now 
and in the future is my obligation [Gesolltes], the obligation of an individual (Hua37, 
252–253; cf. 162; Hua4, 268/280).2
In the second volume of Ideas, Husserl gives murder and theft as examples of practical 
possibilities that are relevant in moral and ethical considerations, and he distinguishes two 
ways of considering such actions. Only one of these ways touches upon the person as an 
individual and belongs to ethics.
On the one hand, I can represent myself as committing an act of murder or a theft, but, on the 
other hand, such a representation is inauthentic if it lacks intuitive evidence concerning my 
1  In paragraph §59 of the second volume of his Ideas, Husserl defines the person as a system of spiritual faculties and 
abilities (Vermögen) of the form “I can” (Hua4, 253–257/266–269). He develops this conception in his working notes 
and manuscripts on intersubjectivity published in the three volumes of his completed works, Husserliana XII–XV. In 
the following I will call these volumes “the Intersubjectivity Volumes” and distinguish between the first (Hua13), the 
second (Hua14) and the third (Hua15). 
2  In the second volume of Ideas, we read: “A human being, however, has an individual kind [Art], and each human 
being has a different one. According to the universal [dem allgemeinen nach], she is a human being, but her kind 
as her character, her person, is a unity, constituted in her course of life as a subject of position-takings, a unity of 
multifarious motivations based upon multifarious presuppositions” (Hua4, 274/286–287, translation modified; cf. Hua 
4, 270–271/283–284, 278–279/290–292, 297/311; Hua15, 118).
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personality as a subject of actions, motivated by experiences and experienced objectivities. I 
can imaginatively represent myself as killing somebody or taking his or her possessions, but 
in so far as the motivations for such actions contradict my personality, my personal ways of 
being motivated and being able to become motivated, the reflection is abstract and proceeds 
in isolation from my motivational grounds and does not concern me as a person. Such 
possibilities are merely verbal or imaginary constructions and not my genuine possibilities 
of action. What is lacking is “the original [ursprünglich] consciousness of being able to do this 
action or of having the power for this action” (Hua4, 265/277).
In this context, Husserl points out that even in case of fictitious action self-consciousness 
is always “an originary [originär], non-neutralized consciousness” (Hua4, 265/277). More 
precisely, the consciousness of who I am, that is how I let myself be motivated, is not 
neutralized in the phantasizing self-inspection but, on the contrary, guides my imaginative 
variation of my behavior, my past deeds and my forthcoming actions and all other practical 
possibilities.
This means that our possibilities of conducting ethical lives or shaping our lives as ethical 
subjects depend on our capacities of understanding ourselves and others as persons, that is 
as subjects of motivated actions. More concretely, our possibilities of living ethical lives and 
judging ethically depend on our understanding of persons, their lived environments, their 
abilities and faculties and practical possibilities, their ways of acting and being motivated.
We find these concepts – the concepts of person, motivation and understanding – developed 
by Husserl in the second volume of Ideas and related manuscripts. In this paper, I confine 
myself to the task of explicating Husserl’s concept of understanding persons as he uses it in 
these texts.
In the second volume of Ideas and in his working notes on intersubjectivity, Husserl 
distinguishes between two different ways of understanding persons, their actions and 
motivations: an experiential or empirical(-inductive) way, on the one hand, and the genuinely 
or authentically intuitive way, on the other hand.3
In paragraph §60 of the second volume of Ideas, Husserl asks: “What is happening when the 
character [Charakterartung] of a person suddenly lights up for us through some one or other of 
his glances, positions, or expressions; when we, so to say, ‘gaze into an abyss;’ when the ‘soul’ 
of the person suddenly ‘opens itself up;’ when we ‘fathom wondrous depths;’ etc.? What sort of 
‘understanding’ is that?” (Hua4, 273/286).
The metaphors of depth and abyss are repeated in many other contexts that deal with the task 
of understanding ourselves and others.4 In the later work The Crisis, Husserl cites Heraclitus’s 
3  In the first Intersubjectivity Volume (Hua13), Husserl uses the term “empathetic reflection”.
4  Husserl uses the metaphors of surface and depth for two purposes, one constitutional-analytic and the other 
motivational-descriptive. In the analysis of the constitution of the ego as a person, these two senses combine. By 
the constitutional-analytical context, I mean Husserl’s discussion of the constitution of sense and his analyses of 
the dependency-relations and layers between different senses. This involves descriptions of levels of constitution as 
differing in depth and being in relations of one-sided and/or mutual dependency (e.g. Hua6, 96–97/94, 118/116, 121–
123/118–120). By the motivational-descriptive context I mean Husserl’s discussion of motivations, that is the ways in 
which experiences are motivated by other experiences and what Husserl takes to be the kernel or core of personhood 
(the ego). Here the point is that we are motivated by our previous and present experiences and also by our perceptions 
and understanding of others. Husserl makes clear that whatever has motivational power over us must be experienced 
by us in one way or other: “What [...] does not stand over against me in my lived experiences, in my representing, 
thinking and acting, as the represented, perceived, remembered, thought etc., does not ‘determine’ me as a spirit. And 
what is not intentionally included in my lived experiences, even if unattended or implicit, does not motivate me, not 
even unconsciously” (Hua4, 231/243, cf. 185–186/195). Husserl does not reject the idea of unconsciousness but sets out 
to redefine the concept by horizontality, anonymity, association, striving and drives (e.g. Hua6, 240; Hua4, 222; Hua11, 
1. Empirical 
Understanding of 
Others
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famous statement: “You will never find the boundaries of the soul, even if you follow every 
road; so deep is its ground,” and he elaborates on this by characterizing the abyssal depth of 
the human soul as follows: “Indeed, every ‘ground’ that is reached points to further grounds, 
every horizon opened up awakens new horizons, and yet the endless whole, in its infinity of 
flowing movement, is oriented toward the unity of one meaning” (Hua6, 173/170).
So, in Husserl’s descriptions of the personal self and its motivational structures, the metaphors 
of wells and sources parallel and also substitute the epistemologically motivated metaphors of 
solid grounds. Whereas the former suggests stability and firmness, the latter suggests dynamic 
movement and transformation. I will argue that we must take seriously this switch in Husserl’s 
formulations and rethink the person and relation to its egoic kernel or core as essentially 
dynamic and developing.
But how can such endless totalities be understood? In his manuscripts, Husserl’s answer comes 
in two steps. These are sometimes presented as two aspects of one and the same process (e.g. 
Beyer 2012, Rinofner-Kreidl 2018), but I think that Husserl is actually describing two different 
ways or attitudes in which we can study the other person. On the one hand, we can study 
the other person – human or non-human – empirically as a psychophysical unity, but on the 
other hand, we can also study her as an ego with a comprehensive and dynamic ego-life. Both 
considerations have an empirical indication as their starting point (cf. Hua4, 276/288; Hua13, 
444–445), but they proceed differently from this common point of origin, with two different 
thematic foci and two different sets of thematic positings, one focused on thingly objects and 
their causal and functional relations and the other focused on meanings and expressions and 
their mutual relations.5
So, an empirical apperception of the other, an experience of the other, is indispensable for 
both approaches, but whereas the former approach, the empirical, continues proceeding on 
this level, the latter approach, the intuitive-spiritual one, involves a change of attitude which 
eventually opens a dimension of depth. My experience of the other – of her behavior, glance, 
position or gesture – gives me, so to say, an “access” to her ego-life or refers me to this life. 
However, in order to study the other’s ego-life as such, as a life of an ego with its peculiar 
motivational nexuses and dynamic and open-ended structure, I must bracket the indicating 
reality, the behavior, and focus on the indicated alien ego-life. More precisely, my experiences 
of her ways of behaving function as indications of her ego-life, but when I have discovered this 
“access,” I have to suspend it and take as my theme her motivated life as such (Hua13, 445). 
In the latter case I study the alien life as a variation of my own ego-life: It is given to me in 
empathy as an unrealizable modification of my own I-live, I-suffer, I-do, I-sense, I-feel, I-have-
such-and-such-appearances, I-decide (Hua13, 455).
In the second volume of his Ideas, Husserl uses the term “intuition” in quotation marks 
(“Intuition”) to characterize the empirical understanding of others, and its holistic character, 
but he points out that a better term for this type of understanding would be “premonition” 
(Vorahnung) or “pre-seeing without seeing” (Hua 4, 286/273–274). The premonition of the 
other person is a special kind of ability to anticipate (and predict) the other’s behaviors and 
actions on the basis of our prior experience, including our experience of her as an individual 
and of other human beings in general (Hua4, 274/287). Such empirical understanding 
resembles genuine intuitive understanding (Anschauung) in that it is comprehensive and 
154; cf. Bernet 1996; Mishara 1990; Depraz 2001; Bernet 2006; Smith 2010).
5  The fifth Cartesian Meditation makes clear that an indicative phenomenon is merely needed as a starting point 
of, or “access point” to, empathetic exchange. In order for a proper empathetic experience to be constituted, the 
experiencing subject has to capture the body over there as expressing the inner life of another subject and not merely 
as indicating someone’s existence (Hua1, 150/121, 151/124).
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holistic. But it is not genuine insight since the actual motivational relations crucial to the 
other person remain obscure to me; they are not brought to full intuition (Hua4, 273/286) or 
clear insight by me (Hua4, 274/286), even if the general outline of the other’s motivational 
nexuses is disclosed to me.
So, what is at issue is a “presentiment”, rather than a proper insight: “a pre-seeing without 
seeing, an obscure, more specifically symbolic, often ungraspably empty, premonition 
(Vorauserfassen)” (Hua4, 274/286).
The emptiness of this type of understanding means that the actual (wirkliche) motivational 
connections and nexuses of the other person’s life are given to us merely as a goal in 
anticipation. They are determinate, however, in the sense that we can follow a clearly directed 
tendency and acquire a chain of actual (experiential) intuitions (Rinofner-Kreidl 2018). In so 
far as we have experiences of other people in general and of this person in particular, we can 
first grasp emptily the complex unity of the person’s life, and then in the course of our own 
continuous experience of her we can fulfill this empty intending in insightful intuition, by 
means of the analysis of the actual nexuses of her motivational life, action and behavior (Hua4, 
275/287). Husserl writes:
[T]his (…) premonition ought not to be confused with actual intuition. What we have 
here is the success of a more precisely determining apperception, which, like any 
apperception, offers a guiding line for the confirmation, in the course of experience, of 
the intentional nexuses, often extremely complex (Hua4, 275/187).
This type of understanding is processual and synthetizing; it proceeds step by step and by links 
and chains of experiences with mutual references. It consists of (i) an empty intention of the 
motivational nexuses that characterize and make up the other person’s life, (ii) a guiding line 
(Leitfaden) based on experience of other people and this one in different situations, and (iii) the 
intuitive fulfilling of the intention by analysis of actual motivational nexuses. 
We do not, and cannot, anticipate exactly, but we see the direction or know the “arsenal” of 
the other person’s responses.
Husserl argues that even if empirical understanding of others often is mixed or confused 
with genuine intuitive understanding, these two modes of understanding must be kept 
conceptually separate.
[N]ot every judgment about the other is based solely on the, as it were, external style 
of his life, abstracted out of experience, for which I would not have to penetrate 
[eindringen] into the interior of her motivations and to represent [vorstellen] them in 
a fully lively way [voll lebendig]. I learn, however, to peer into the interiority of the 
other and to come to know inwardly the person herself, the motivational subject, 
which is precisely what bursts into view when I represent the other ego in the way it is 
motivated (Hua4, 273/285–286, translation modified).
Genuine or authentic understanding6 is not a series of apperceptions but is a form of reflection 
that concerns the motivational structure of an alien ego-life and the ego as an inexhaustible 
source of activity. The actions of the other, when considered in this way, are not given to me 
6  In the first Intersubjectivity Volume, Husserl calls “authentic empathy” the genuine or authentic form of 
understanding of others in intuition.
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as mental properties belonging or attached to some psychic or spiritual substrate; the whole 
model of substance is inadequate here. Rather the other ego is given as another spring or 
source of originary activity. In the first Intersubjectivity Volume, Husserl explains:
The relation between the self and its acts is specific; to be sure, it resembles the relation 
that a real substrate has to its features, thing and properties etc., but on the other hand 
it is very different. The self is not ‘substance’ in this sense, it is not an identical concrete 
that includes acts and states in itself as its features, that could provide an explication. 
Neither is the soul, the stream of the ego-life, such a substance [...] The self is no 
substratum, no ‘carrier’, but the self, a spring [Quellpunkt] [...” (Hua13, 457)
In genuine understanding, the other is not posited as a psycho-physical reality but is posited 
as an ego with an ego-life, with her own ego-activities and passivities. To be sure, her ego-
life is beyond my originary, direct intuitive reach, but, Husserl argues, I can go into a specific 
phantasizing as-if mode of reflection and thus accompany the other in her actions and 
motivations. I can co-act with her, co-suffer her inclinations and co-decide with her, and so 
intuitively understand what she does and why she does so:
I not only empathize with his thinking, his feeling, and his action, but I must also 
follow him in them, his motivations becoming my quasi-motives, ones which, however, 
motivate with insight in the mode of intuitive fulfilling in empathy. I co-share in his 
temptations, I co-participate in his fallacies; in the “co-” there lies an inner co-living of 
motivating factors (…) that carry their necessity with them (Hua4, 275/287, translation 
modified).
In the Intersubjectivity Volumes, Husserl explains the nature of this quasi-life in greater 
detail, and points to a specific duplication of the self that it involves. He does this by comparing 
empathy to the relation that we have to our own past: We can return to our past life and go 
though our own motivations and actions in the past environment in an as-if mode. When we 
do this, we live in two different ways: we act in the present by inserting ourselves in the past 
and thus we, at the same time, as-if-feel, as-if-decide and as-if-operate in the past. Husserl’s 
point about authentic empathy is that it has the same structure as this self-inspection: we 
can insert ourselves in the lives of others in the same way as we can insert ourselves in our 
own past lives. The first option is based on recollective de-presentation, and the latter on 
empathetic de-presentation: 
Empathy as act is of course not living-in-my-past, but [it] is something similar: it is 
living-in-a-present or rather living-a-present-ego-life but in the modus of quasi-life, 
so that the self to which I empathize is not mine. And at the same time I am the actual, 
non-modified self that, transferring herself into the other, is living ‘as if’ [gleichsam] in 
the other (Hua13, 456; cf. Hua1, 145/115–116; Hua6, 189/186). 
The as-if mode allows a special form of reflection: like non-modified feelings, decisions, and 
actions, also quasi-feelings, quasi-decision, and quasi-actions can be reflectively studied and 
evaluated. The other self is thus thematized in reflection as an alien ego-life, but it is not 
objectified in apperception:
[I]t allows a reflexion, a reflexion in respect to me, the non-modified, the empathizing 
self, and another reflexion in respect to the emphasized [other self] (Hua13, 456).
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Husserl’s explications of self-knowledge and self-understanding further illuminate the task of 
understanding others. The illumination comes from two arguments that we find in Husserl’s 
exposition. 
First, he distinguishes between two types of self-comprehension: mere empirical self-
apperception that concerns myself as a unity of actual experiences and genuine self-
understanding that also includes my possibilities of change and becoming over and above what 
I am and have been.
Second, Husserl argues that our understanding of alien motives is based on our self-
understanding. In Ideas, he states: “[t]he underlying basis upon which is built the 
comprehensive motivated spiritual life of the other, and in conformity to which that life 
runs its course in an individual typical way, present themselves as ‘variations’ of my own” 
(Hua4, 275/288). In the first Intersubjectivity Volume, he writes: “Genuine empathy [...] is a 
modification of my own I-am and I-live, I-suffer-it, I-do-that, I-sense, I-feel, I-have-such-and-
such-appearances, I-decide” (Hua13, 455). Thus, there is a crucial connection and analogy 
between self-understanding and the understanding of others.
We saw above that by introducing the concept of quasi-life, Husserl is able to argue that that 
the proper, genuine understanding of others does not have to remain at the level of empirical 
apperception of their observed deeds and behaviors in comparison to other similar actions and 
similar actors.
But the parallel between self-understanding and the understanding of others suggest more 
than mere quasi-life. Since self-understanding essentially covers my possibilities of living and 
not just my actual life and its actual moments – experiences, motivations and actions –, also 
reflection on others can extend beyond the actual. Thus, it is not enough to study the other’s 
actual motivations and deeds in the as-if-mode; we must also reflect on her possibilities of 
acting and being motivated, and so perform an eidetic reflection that is analogous to the one 
that we can perform in our own case. In the first Intersubjectivity Volume Husserl states: “The 
absolute self-experience (non-experiential, non-apperceptive) is the self-experience of the 
experiencing self. To it corresponds the absolute empathetic knowledge” (Hua13, 445).
The question then becomes how these foreign possibilities can be given in any intuitive way. 
I believe that we find an answer to this question by combining (i) Husserl’s remarks about the 
quasi-motivations by which I can accompany the other’s actual motivations and decisions 
for action and (ii) his discussion of the imaginary variation that allows me to study my own 
possibilities of being motivated.
My account here is based on the textual material that we find in the second volume of 
Husserl’s Ideas and in his intersubjectivity manuscripts but the framing of my discussion is in 
Husserl’s argument that ethical life is a life for the best possible in a person’s life. This argument 
strongly suggests that reflection on human persons, on their actions and motivations, can 
and must – like self-reflection – extend beyond actualities and proceed in the sphere of 
possibilities. In Husserl’s introductory lectures to ethics from the 1920s, we read:
[R]ather the moral self, the self of permanent and unceasing self-cultivation 
[Selbsterziehung], is the self that wants to make itself better, wants to change himself (as 
self) so that it can eo ipso [by this change] be only goodwilling as an ethical self (Hua37, 
162).
Mere empirical self-understanding is not sufficient for ethical self-shaping, nor for the 
proper understanding of other persons as open developing wholes. What is needed is an 
understanding of the motivational possibilities of the person in question.
Husserl describes a man who is known for his good heart but who in hurry acts without 
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clear understanding of the condition of a person who appeals him for help. We tend to say: 
“He would have been charitable (…) if he had clearly understood the need of the one who 
appealed to him for help”. But this is far from proper consideration of the man in question, his 
character, for it is based on a superficial (contingent) truth about him, lacking consideration of 
his personal capacities, possibilities and potentialities. What is needed is a critical examination 
of the motives which are in operation as well as their alternatives, and all the intentional 
implications of these motives. The question is not just how he acts or would act in this or that 
situation, or who he is and has been thus far; the question is also about his possibilities of 
becoming other than he is and has been (Hua4, 252/264, 266/278).
In paragraph §60b in the second volume of Ideas, Husserl distinguished between empirical 
self-knowledge that is founded on the positing of the world and the self in the world, on the 
one hand, and the understanding of the motivational possibilities of oneself as a person, on the 
other hand. The former concerns the self as a posited unity of the manifold of position-taking 
acts and habitualities and faculties of acting; and the latter concerns the possibilities of the self 
and its capabilities of becoming, developing and changing.
Empirical self-consciousness is not limited to mere actualities. On the basis of my experience 
and knowledge of myself, I can also imagine myself in various situations and ask how 
my inclinations, affections and capabilities would direct my actions in these phantasized 
circumstances. This kind of knowledge is not confined to my actual deeds or performed 
actions and it is not a mere abstraction from them, but it also includes reflections on possible 
actions. But what remains constant, what is not varied, is the self as a subject of experiences 
and interests that is imaginatively inserted in different situations (Hua4, 265–266/278). Thus, 
this kind of self-comprehension is empirical in the sense that it is founded on the positing of 
the self as an already constituted unity of experiences and does not question or neutralize this 
posited whole. Husserl explains:
If I now phantasize, if I settle myself (as the one I am) into a phantasized actuality or 
into the world given in the neutrality modification, into the familiar world transformed 
in phantasy some way or other, then I am judging how such and such motives (more 
precisely: the quasi-motives of this phantasized environment) would affect me; how I, 
as the one I am, would act and could act, how I could, and how I could not, judge, value, 
and will. In that way I judge, or I can judge, empirically, on the basis of my experiential 
knowledge of myself, with respect to myself, with respect to the ego constituted for me in 
empirical apperception as experiential ego (Hua4, 265–266/278, emphasis added).
But there is another mode of self-reflection that is not, and cannot be, based on previous 
experiences of oneself since it concerns oneself in the constant process of becoming and 
developing. Husserl states:
Thus, the substrata of motivation, the orientations and the powers of the motives are 
different. How do I come to know them? I do so, as the one I am, by means of phantasizing 
presentification of possible situations, in which I ‘reflect’ on what kind of sensuous or 
spiritual stimulation would affect me [...] Upon reflection I could [...] say that I, as I used to 
be, [...] would not have been able to do something or other. But at present I can act in that 
way and would do so. When I say this, I am not basing myself on experience but on the 
fact that I can test my motives at the very outset (Hua4, 267/279–280).
In this context, Husserl emphasizes that the unity of a person is fundamentally different from 
the unity of a thing (Hua4, 266/278–279, 274/286–287). Unlike a thing, a person can change in 
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radical ways without losing her identity as the ego subject of the original faculties and powers 
(Urvermögen) of willing, valuing, and thinking. The whole complex of motivations can change 
as well as their directions and powers (Hua4, 254–255/267, cf. Hua27, 30–32; Husserl [1923] 
1997, 207–208). Latent motivations can emerge and potent motivations may retreat (Hua4, 
252/264; cf. Hua6, 240/237–238).
The difference between persons and things includes three crucial and related structural 
features.
First, the thing is predictable; it cannot really surprise us by disclosing completely unexpected 
aspects. Husserl writes: “In the apprehension of a thing there is nothing that, in principle, is 
new. If there were, then it would already be the start of the constitution of a new stratum of 
unity” (Hua4, 266/278). The person, on the contrary, can always act and react differently than 
expected without losing her identity – not just in the other’s eyes but also in her own.
Second, things come in kinds but persons are given to us as unique individuals. Husserl 
explains: “Each thing is of a certain kind. If one knows the kind, the rest can be dispensed 
with” (Hua4, 274/286). The person, on the contrary, is an individual ego of intentional 
activities and passivities and of position takings and can actively change the course of her 
own life (Hua4, 277–278/289–290). Even more: the ego, and only the ego, is the unit that is 
absolutely individuated (Hua4, 299–302/313–316; cf. Heinämaa 2018).
Finally, a person is a dynamically developing unity (Hua4, 251–253/263–265; cf. Hua3, 132–
141/184–193). In the third volume of Ideas, Husserl emphasizes the fact that persons as 
spiritual units differ from things primarily in that their moments and states are non-recurring 
(Hua5, 17, cf. 44). Moreover, Husserl’s concepts of motivation and willing imply the idea of 
a motivational change, that is the idea that we can be motivated to abandon, not just our 
formed ways of acting, but also our former ways of being motivated to act and thus become 
different in our motivational nexuses. Thus, position in a historical setting or membership 
in a community – professional, social, or natural – does not limit or exhaust the person’s 
possibilities of change and development. Husserl explains:
Originally, I am actually not a unity of associative and active experiences (if experience 
means the same as it does in the case of the thing). I am the subject of my life, and the 
subject develops in living [...] The ego does not originally stem from experience – in 
the sense of an associative apperception in which are constituted unities of manifolds 
of a nexus – but from life (it is what it is not for the ego, but it is itself the ego) (Hua4, 
252/264, translation modified).
I have argued that if knowledge of self and understanding of others is to serve ethical 
reflections, and ethical self-shaping and ethical judgment of others, it must not be confined to 
the actual but must involve reflection on the other’s possibilities. It concerns the other not just 
as an actual agent in apperception, anticipation and extrapolation but also as a possible agent.
Understanding of the other person means that I – the one who aims at understanding – live 
through her life in the modality of as-if, I live through her actions and motivations in the 
quasi-mode. But for ethical reflection to be possible, quasi-life must cover not just the other’s 
actual, past and present, actions and motivations but also her possibilities of becoming 
different and renewing herself. The analogy is not just between myself as I am and have 
become at the present and the other as an actual person but is between two individual 
essences: myself as I can be, as I can act and be motivated, and the other as she can be.
4. Summary
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The aim of this paper is to show how Phenomenology is a radical and at the same time 
complex (anti-reductionist) Empiricism. To this end, I will underline similarities and 
differences between Phenomenological Empiricism and other forms of Empiricism. I will 
consider in particular two important kinds of empiricism: Classical Empiricism and Logical 
Empiricism. A third and very important type of empiricism is the so-called Neutral Empiricism 
(that of James, Mach and also, I believe, Bergson). This paper will be limited in scope to the 
examination of the first two kinds of empiricism.1 
First of all, two preliminary questions. What do we mean by the expression “radical 
empiricism”? And in what ways can Phenomenology be considered a radical (even if 
sophisticated) kind of empiricism? 
In a radical empiricism it all begins and ends in the field of Experience. Husserl says:
It must always be borne in mind here that whatever physical things are – the only physical 
things about which we can make statements, the only ones about the being or non-
being, the being-thus or being-otherwise of which we can disagree and make rational 
decisions – they are as experienceable physical things. It is experience alone that prescribes 
their sense; and, since we are speaking of physical things in fact, it is actual experience 
alone which does so in its definitely ordered experiential concatenations.2 
In a radical empiricism, being misled or deceiving oneself also falls within the range of 
phenomena.
As Husserl says:
I may be deceived as to the existence of the object of perception, but not as to the fact 
that I do perceived it as determined in this or that way, that my percept’s target is not 
some totally different object, a pine-tree, e.g., instead of a cockchafer. The self-evidence 
in characterizing description (or in identification and distinction of intentional objects) 
has, no doubt, its understandable limits, but it is true and genuine self-evidence.3 
1  For the relationships between phenomenology and neutral pragmatism see Lanfredini (2017). 
2  See Husserl, 1983, p. 86.
3  Husserl, 2001, p. 297.
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Husserl’s position, however, should not be confused with the Cartesian videre videor. According 
to Descartes, I could be deceived about what I see, but not about the fact that I am seeing it 
now. More radically, according to the so called static version of phenomenological empiricism, 
it is inappropriate to talk about deception not only from a noetic point of view (seeing 
something) but also from a noematic point of view (what I see). 
I think that, against the so-called West Cost Interpretation4 (and in favour of Gurwitsch5), 
Husserl never proposed a realistic design of intentionality in a metaphysical sense. The 
principle by which objects that are not intended are not given is a principle of phenomenology 
with no exceptions. In a descriptive context this refers us back to the impossibility of making 
an object-based analysis without connecting it with some form of experience. In other 
words, in the phenomenological object there is always contained (from an ontological point 
of view) the reference to a state of consciousness: the red I detect necessarily leads back to 
a determined sensation of redness; the chair I see necessarily leads back to a determined 
perception of that chair; the thought property necessarily leads back to a determined modality 
of thought, and so on. 
Any phenomenon, in order to be such (that is, to become manifest) necessarily leads back to 
an intentional Erlebnis. The necessity, contained in the structure of the phenomenon, of the 
reference to a state of consciousness allows the limit of Phenomenological Ontology to be 
defined. 
This is one of the main differences with respect to Hume’s empiricism. The phenomenological 
notion of data includes directness but not simplicity, even in fundamental elements such 
as sensations. The phenomenological notion of data goes beyond the amorphous and 
undiversified notion of idea to embrace a bi-polar concept of experience composed by a noetic 
pole and a noematic pole. According to Hume, and also Berkeley and Locke, a distinction 
between feeling and felt property, hyletic data and objectual data does not exist. According to 
Husserl, on the contrary, this distinction is absolutely fundamental. 
The fact that for Husserl (contra Hume) the intended object may not effectively be contained 
within the state of consciousness (the singer’s song, says Husserl, is distinct from the act 
of singing), while still being essentially bound to it (there can be no song whose singer can 
dispense with the act of singing), entails a distinction between two ontological dimensions: the 
dimension relating to subjective or noetic object (states of consciousness) and the dimension 
relating to real, objectual, or intended object. 
These environments delimit two distinct but not separated regions: the first region, the 
noetic, which consists of adequate, non-perspectival objects (those given in a complete 
manner and “without residues”, so to speak - eg. seeing a red spot, hearing the sound of violin, 
imaginings the god Jupiter); the second region, the noematic, which consists of objects that 
are inadequate, incomplete, essential perspectival and unilateral (eg. the red spot that is 
seen, the sound of the violin, the imagined god Jupiter). This distinction isolates domains of 
objects which, although ontologically distinct, are nevertheless connected by an essential and 
necessary relationship of unilateral foundation6. In this sense, phenomenological analysis (at 
least from a static point of view) is technically correlative.
In Husserl’s opinion, Hume had passed right through phenomenology with his eyes closed. The 
first blindness consists in its denial of transcendence. Phenomenological transcendence is not 
4  See Føllesdal, 1969, 1982; Dreyfus, 1979, McCulloch, 2003.
5  See Gurwitsch, 1967.
6  See Husserl, 2001, §16.
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an absolute but a relative one: that is, relative to the state of consciousness that constitutes it. 
The expression “phenomenological transcendence” consists of two essential conditions: first, 
the intended object is not effectively contained within the act which intends it; and second, 
the intended object refers in an essential manner to an act that intends it. 
The first condition confirms the reality of the object, the second denies its absolute, or 
metaphysical, reality. So, existence is not a property of the object in itself, but a property of 
the act that intends the object: when we say that an object exists we are in reality asserting 
that the object is understood as existing; that is, we are using a specific modality, a thetic 
or positioning character. In perception, as in memory, unlike in fantasy or in imagination, 
the object appears as existing. Conceived in this way, “authentic” perception, so to speak, 
is no different from hallucination, as far as content or description are concerned. Indeed, 
hallucinatory perception benefits from a positioning character just as much as other 
perceptions do, and as a consequence the hallucinated object appears to us in flesh and blood 
just like any other perceived object (contrary, for example, to what is maintained in Searle).7
The “reality” of the authentic object of perception lies in a sort of operative and contextual 
attitude. So, the materiality of things depends upon the circumstances and the context in 
which they are placed. If we consider a thing by itself, distinguishing between something and 
its phantom – i.e. its pale, empty, and ghostly counterpart – becomes virtually impossible. 
The ghost of a certain thing has all the essential features that render that thing exactly what 
it is and nothing else: essential features that are dispersed throughout an extension. In this 
sense, we would see rainbows and blue skies but we could not define them as material things. 
On the other hand, if we consider the thing within a given context, the thing and the ghost 
of that thing cannot be regarded as the same element. Things exist, are real, substantial, and 
causal (these terms are all synonyms) when they behave in a certain way. In this sense, real (or 
material) properties are, ipso facto, functional links: for example, causal links. In order to get to 
know the reality of a given thing, we must be able to predict its behavior under a certain force, 
pressure, when it is smashed up, cooled down, heated up and so on. In the multiplicity of its 
dependence relations the real thing will retain its own identity.
The possibility of the thing in itself turns out, in conclusion, to be decisively denied by Husserl 
exactly as by Hume. An object that cannot be intended in principle is in fact an effective 
absurdity. But Husserl’s criticism is more sophisticated than Hume’s. Husserl admits that a 
thing in itself is not a matter of non-sense, hence of a contradiction. Asserting the existence 
of a thing in itself does not in fact mean violating any formal law (such as seems to happen in 
cases of syntactical nonsense such as “the tree is and” or semantic nonsense such as “round 
square”). 
The hypothetical assumption of something real outside this world is, of course, 
logically possible; obviously it involves no formal contradiction. (…) When that is 
taken into account the formal-logical possibility of realities outside the world, the one 
spatiotemporal world, which is fixed by our actual experience, materially proves to be a 
countersense.8 
On the other hand, the absurdity of the thing in itself cannot be ascribed to material counter-
sense (that violation which we encounter in examples such as “color without extension”). 
7  See Searle, 2012.
8  Husserl, 1983, pp.108-9.
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The absurdity of the thing in itself seems to reside in a third order of reasons, which we could 
call motivational, according to which, in order for an object to be given, it must exhibit a 
rootedness in an actual experience. And this is the case for the thing in itself, which turns out 
to be impossible not because formally nonsensical, nor because it is materially counter-sense, 
but because it does not have in principle a bond of motivational synthesis with an actual 
experience. In the absence of such a chain of connections in experience, the object vanishes. 
A world outside our world is a concrete absurdity. There are two obligations which the 
notion of world must satisfy so as not to fall into concrete absurdity. The first is that any 
given phenomenon must effectively contain within it the reference to an experience. The 
second, which constitutes the foundation of so-called genetic phenomenology, is that any 
phenomenology, in order to be configured as such, must exhibit an original nexus (however 
remote) with an actual experience, with the acknowledgement of an object in flesh and blood. 
The thing in itself violates both these conditions (the first formal, the second material): on the 
one hand it is a thing which in principle severs the intentional nexus (which any object must 
satisfy in order to be declared as such); on the other it negates that rootedness in a concrete 
experience. 
In conclusion: making reference to a world outside our world, hence to the thing in itself, does 
not entail either the violation of the purely material ontological law according to which two 
types which are founded one on the other are in fact separate (as in the case of color and 
extension), nor the violation of the purely formal ontological law by which two disconnected 
species cannot live within the same singularity (as in the case of the square and the round). 
In the thing in itself, we are in fact witnessing the violation of a further, still more 
fundamental law, the law by which the notion of thing necessarily contains the reference 
to lived experience. If we conceive the two objects of object and experience as unconnected 
categories linked by a relationship of unilateral foundation, the expression “thing in itself” 
expresses a counter-sense that is both formal and material. We can talk about constitutive and 
concrete absurdity. The thing in itself is a constitutive (formal) absurdity because it makes 
reference to something that contains the reference to a constitutive function and at the same 
time removes itself from it. Therefore it is not possible, for constitutive-formal reasons, to 
refer coherently to a thing in itself, simply because the thing in itself is not something, or, 
which is the same, it is a non-thing. Although not senseless, the thing in itself is impossible 
since it violates the formal law by which the notion of thing, containing in itself the reference 
to a corresponding intention, cannot at the same time free itself from such a reference. For 
this reason it turns out, though certainly in a different acceptation from syntactical and 
semantic senselessness, to be unthinkable and not merely imperceptible and unimaginable, as 
happens in purely formal and purely material counter-sense.
The thing in itself is at the same time a concrete (material) absurdity because it is not rooted 
in any original and lived experience. Therefore, it is not possible, for material reasons, to refer 
consistently to a thing in itself, because it is not available.
Hume’s second blindness rests in his negation of the essential, eidetic dimension of experience. 
As is well known, Husserl’s theory supports an ideative notion of data, against the empiricist 
theory of abstraction (see in particular the attention theory (Mill), the representational theory 
(Locke, Berkeley) and the theory of distinctio rationis (Hume)). At the same time Husserl claims 
a material and not formal conception of data (contra Cassirer). I think that the ideative notion 
of data not only is not in contradiction with phenomenological empiricism, but completely 
corroborates it. The event, being invariant, requires ideation; for example, invariant to 
variations of lighting conditions, changes in positions, and so on. Data, being invariant, are not 
without structure. Phenomenological ideation has the following characteristics. First, it is not 
4. Form and 
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an abstraction: it does not function by means of exclusion or negation of some characteristics 
for the benefit of another and it is not founded on any recording of similarities (contra Hume 
and Classical Empiricism). Second, it is not a concept: it does not function by means of 
categorization. There is no need of a good theory of concept constitution for a good theory of 
data (contra Kant). Third, it is not formal: it is not a functional but a material process: that is, a 
process founded on specific features of experience (contra Cassirer).
That last statement introduces the second point that I intend to address: the relationships 
between Phenomenological Empiricism and Logical Empiricism, respectively an empiricism 
with and without intuition.9 
A crucial question for Schlick, as well as for Logical empiricism in general, is the total 
insignificance of the concept of content (in particular, intuitive content) for both a theory 
and a practice of knowledge. Besides, it is this thesis (related to a notable distinction between 
Kennen and Erkennen) which marks – on Schlick’s explicit admission – his radical divergence 
from Husserl. 
According to Schlick the content is inexpressible and indescribable: that is, linguistically 
untouchable: “the difference between structure and material, between form and content is, 
roughly speaking, the difference between that which can be expressed and that which cannot 
be expressed”.10
Let’s consider the famous example, in Schlick, of a person who is born blind. This example 
is perfectly analogous to Husserl’s example (contained in The Idea of Phenomenology11) of the 
deaf man. Let’s consider the perception of green and look at the ineffable quality of green 
which makes the essence of the content. This quality is accessible only to beings endowed 
with eyesight and power of color perception; it couldn’t possibly be conveyed to a person born 
blind. Shall we conclude, Schlick asks, that such a person could not understanding any of our 
statements about color, that they must be quite meaningless to him because he can never 
possess the green content? Schlick’s answer to this question is no. We can communicate to the 
person born blind, as we can to a person who can see, the meaning of “green”. Nevertheless 
what we communicate is not the content – the greenness: “since content is incommunicable by 
language, it cannot be conveyed to a seeing man any more or any better than to a blind one”.12 
What can be communicated (or, which is for Schlick the same, expressed) is the fact that 
something exists – which we call green – and that it is something possessing a certain 
structure or belonging to a certain system of internal relationships. 
I can give a particular description of this green leaf lying on my desk by placing the color in 
a certain order. I assert, for instance, that is a bright green, or a rich green, or a bluish green, 
trying to describe the green by compare it to other colors. Evidently it belongs to the intrinsic 
nature of our green that it occupies a definite position in a range of colors and in a scale of 
brightness, and this position is determined by relations of similarity and dissimilarity to the 
other elements, in this case shades, of the whole system. In this sense, quality, every quality, 
has a certain definite logical structure: “in this way every quality (for instance, the qualities of 
sensation: sound, smell, heat, etc., as well as color) is interconnected with all others by internal 
relations which determine its place in the system of qualities”.13 
In such a perspective the difference between a color-blind person and a normal one is 
existentially relevant but philosophically limited. Both are knowing the same thing. And both 
9  I have addressed this issue in more details in Lanfredini, 2003.
10  Schlick, 1938, p. 291.
11  Husserl, 1966.
12  Husserl, 1966, p. 295.
13  Husserl, 1966, p. 294.
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are not knowing the same thing. Both know the structure in which the green is placed and its 
position in the color spectrum. But, according to Schlick, both do not know the content of the 
green. The only difference between the two consists in their ability to enjoy (or not enjoy) the 
green color. This is absolutely important as far as actual life is concerned, but just as absolutely 
irrelevant for the knowledge of color. 
Schlick says:
I can perceive a green leaf; I say that I perceived it if (among other things) the content 
“green” is there, but it would be nonsense to say that I perceive this content.14 
The content, in the sense of intuitive content, is simply there. The verb used by Schlick in this 
regard is “enjoying”, the nearest equivalent to the German “Erleben”. 
Schlick says again:
Here we uncover the great error committed by the philosophy of intuition: the 
confusion of acquaintance (Kennen) with knowledge (Erkennen).15 
So, Schlick claims a sort of epistemological (although not-ontological) eliminativism, very 
similar to that held by Churchland, according to which the qualitative element is irreducibly 
outside of an adequate theory of knowledge. When I look at the blue sky and lose myself 
entirely in the contemplation of it without thinking, then I am enjoying the blue, I am in a 
state of pure intuition. The blue fills my consciousness completely. But that does not mean 
knowing what blue really is. The Meaning of the word “blue” is entirely included in the 
structure of the intuitive content.
In The idea of Phenomenology Husserl’s example is perfectly analogous to Schlick’s, with 
respect to a person born deaf. A person born deaf knows that sounds exist, and sounds make 
harmonies. But he cannot understand how sounds do this, how symphonies are possible. 
He cannot represent a thing of that kind, he cannot perceive it; and perceiving it he can’t 
understand the how. No kind of physical or psychological theory about color can add anything 
to this “pure vision” which, according to Husserl, establishes the sense of color. 
This thesis presents, from a phenomenological point of view, at least two problems. First, the 
necessity of an intuitive content for the determination of the empirical knowledge. Second, 
the necessity of an intuitive content for the configuration of the same structure. 
Without intuition it is not possible to intend determined objects. According to Husserl, 
determination comes with the fulfillment of an empty intention. Without an intuitive act, by 
which I mean, a fulfilled act, it is not appropriate to speak about knowledge. So, if confronted 
with a brilliant green leaf, a sighted person and a blind person share the same thing, an empty 
intention aiming at a “pure something”. 
But in no case can a blind person believe himself to know either the leaf or its particular 
green. Knowing something means necessarily to have a fulfilled act, that is an act equipped 
with an intuitive content. Without a full, intuitive content every determined knowledge is 
impossible. And without a full, intuitive content the structure of green (and the structure of 
colors in general) is inscrutable. According to the phenomenological point of view, intuition 
is a necessary condition for knowing something because it is a necessary condition to have 
14  Schlick, 1974, p. 319.
15  Schlick, 1974, p. 83.
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a determined intention of something. Knowing the structure of something requires a prior 
experience, and not vice-versa.
In fact, the rigorous separation between Schlick and Husserl can be analyzed further. The 
problem, I think, is to establish what we mean by intuitive content, a concept that has a more 
complex structure than Schlick has supposed. But as we have seen, the concept of living 
does not exhaust the notion of intuition. The distinction between experiencing (erleben) the 
content and apprehending (auffassen) or perceiving a property or an object makes Schlick’s 
treatment more complex. We experience (or enjoy, as Schlick says) acoustic sensations, but 
we hearing (we perceive) the singer’s song. So, contrary to what Schlick says (“when I gaze 
at a red surface, the red is part of the content of my consciousness”16), red is not a part of the 
content of my consciousness. Affirming that content is simply there and simply present means 
advocating a simplistic and undifferentiated vision of the concept of intuition. We experience 
content, but we mean objects that go beyond these contents in the strict sense. 
Another clarification: for Schlick, content (in the sense of intuitive content) has nothing to 
do with knowledge. There is still more: “the most fundamental mistake of philosophy of all 
times”17 is to identify knowledge with immediate awareness or with intuition. But Husserl has 
never identified knowledge and intuition, even if he considers intuition as necessary condition 
for knowledge. When I hear a sound or see a color, it is not with these acts of hearing and 
seeing that I come to understand what a sound or a color is. Knowing and having acquaintance 
with are not at all synonymous even for Husserl. According to Schlick, knowledge is a result 
of an act of comparing, recognizing, naming. According to Husserl, knowledge means to 
recognize, to identify the intended object, too. Nevertheless, this does not mean, as Schlick 
suggests, to differentiate two types of knowledge: one conceptual and one intuitive. On the 
contrary, knowledge is the result of an integration between two components. This is exactly 
the reasoning which makes it possible to in phenomenological terms to distinguish between 
discrimination of something (the result of a simple act of perception) and identification of 
something as such and such (the result of the conjunction of a meaning act and a perceptive 
act). This important distinction does not seem present in Schlick’s perspective. 
Husserl’s analysis is more subtle in comparison with that of Schlick. In fact, he distinguishes 
sensation from perception on the one hand, and perception from conceptual elaboration 
on the other. Perception, for Husserl, is not a judgment; it is not knowing something. The 
distinction marks the important difference between an epistemic conception and a non-
epistemic conception of perception. Husserl accepts the second one; in this sense he corrects 
Kant’s famous principle according to which “intuition without conception is blind, and 
conception without intuition is empty”. While the second part of the affirmation is without 
doubt true, the first needs a correction: it is not the concept that allows intuition to see; 
perception has already, in itself, an organization, a structure which does not have any 
reference to conceptualization. 
Then, according to Husserl, it is not necessary that our consciousness experience acquires 
propositional contents. In particular, conscious experiences can represent something in a 
certain way regardless of inferential or propositional content: that is, regardless of beliefs 
and concepts. Conscious experiences are intrinsically related to a qualitative format (qualia). 
Qualitative states are independent of their descriptive value, so that we can have a conscious 
experience without having a description of something.
16  Schlick, 1938, p. 102.
17  Schlick, 1938, p. 318.
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There is in fact an important distinction between perceptual discrimination (non-
propositional) and perceptual identification (propositional).
Against the so called tracking theories (TT )18 whose main endeavor is to naturalize the content 
of qualitative states by reducing it to tracking relations holding between the phenomenality 
of consciousness and physical properties of environment, Husserl would endorse the so called 
phenomenal intentionality research program (PIT)19. According to PIT, intentionality is basically 
a matter of phenomenal consciousness: any qualitative state has a phenomenal property 
which expresses a specific and determined qualitative state. Furthermore, it is precisely by 
virtue of this richness of phenomenal properties that it is impossible to think about different 
experiences with different propositional content. The propositional content depends on 
phenomenal properties, and not vice versa. If the qualitative spectrum of our experiences 
were not characterized by a plurality of phenomenal properties, it could not be available to a 
propositional format. 
Accordingly, the experience’s propositional content depends in a strong sense on having a 
plurality of phenomenal properties that characterize the experience in itself.20 
In conclusion, the famous distinction between Kennen and Erkennen is not at all denied by 
Husserl. Certainly for Husserl, as for Schlick, Kennen is not knowledge in a proper sense. 
But knowledge needs the Kennen in order to acquire determined knowledge. So, there is a 
crucial difference between the two perspectives. Schlick declares explicitly that “intuition 
and conceptual knowledge do not both strive for the same goal; they move in opposite 
directions”21 . According to Husserl, in contrast, intuition is an integrating part of the genuine 
process of knowledge. Authentic knowledge cannot function without a qualitative factor. To 
determine and consequently to identify a red object, we must have an experience of “what it 
is like” (using Nagel’s expression) to see something red. We have knowledge when we have an 
acknowledgment. But acknowledgment necessarily implies an act of intuition. 
So, I think that the main element of the deep disagreement between Husserl’s empiricism and 
Schlick’s empiricism resides in a different philosophical conception of the notion of intuition 
(and, thus, in the notion of experience). Schlick speaks about intuition as “an exceptionally 
close relation between subject and object”, something mystical and completely inexpressible 
(the borderline case of this is the relation between consciousness and God). But this is a mere 
caricature of the concept of intuition. Intuition has an internal structure. 
 The second difference between Schlick and Husserl resides in the different value that the two 
attribute to the concept of intuition. For Schlick, intuition is radically outside the dimension 
of knowledge; according to Husserl, in contrast, intuition is an integral part of knowledge. 
Without it, no determined knowledge is possible. In this sense, I think that the content 
empiricism advocated by Husserl is more radical than the formal empiricism advocated by 
Schlick. 
In conclusion, phenomenology is a kind of radical empiricism. But it is not a reductionist 
form of empiricism. Husserl’s position has not assimilated to classical Empiricism for these 
reasons. First, the phenomenological notion of data includes directness and immediacy 
but not simplicity. In Classical Empiricism, consciousness is a place, and the objects are 
immanent data: that is, sensations, ideas, perceptions, and so on. For Husserl, consciousness 
18  Dretske, 1981, 1988, 1996, 2003; Millikan, 2009; Papineau, 1987.
19  Kriegel, 2008, 2013.
20  See Zipoli Caiani, 2019.
21  Schlick, 1938, p. 82.
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is, on the contrary, not a closed place, and the object is not inside consciousness, as in a sack. 
Second, the phenomenological notion of data includes reality, even if relative, or, if you will, 
empirical. The phenomenological notion of reality is functional, relational, operative and not 
substantial in any sense of the word. Third, the phenomenological notion of absolute reality is 
an absurdity (as in Hume), but the argument in Husserl is much more sophisticated and more 
fully articulated. Husserl distinguishes different forms of absurdity: nonsense, counter-sense 
and constitutive-motivational (or concrete) absurdity. A reality in itself reflects the last kind of 
absurdity. Finally, the phenomenological notion of data requires an ideative process that fixes 
an invariant to the variations of different conditions. Husserl’s position is profoundly different 
from Logical empiricism for these reasons: a) the phenomenological notion of intuition is 
more elaborated and sophisticated by comparison with that of Schlick. For example, in Husserl 
an important difference exists between discrimination of something and identification of 
something. Both imply intuition, but in a different sense; b) the phenomenological notion of 
intuition is absolutely essential for knowing something. Without intuitive, qualitative content, 
the empirical knowledge is lacking in determination. Moreover, without intuitive, qualitative 
content we cannot set a structure of something; for instance the structure of color, the 
structure of sound, the structure of physical things, and so on.
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Are values more than measures of our needs and desires or internalized social and cultural rules of 
behaviour, originating in cultures and devoid of any universally accessible objectivity? Is there a place 
for values in a world of facts? If so, how can values preserve their ideality and normativity? If not, how 
can value judgements be true or false? Max Scheler’s Material Axiology is the best answer Classical 
Phenomenology provides to this dilemma. Yet Material Axiology, in particular material ethics of values, 
is largely ignored or looked down upon for being based on unclear presuppositions. This paper tries to 
provide a fresh start by clarifying the bottom-up approach characteristic of phenomenology with an 
exercise in experimental phenomenology in which I will analyse the actual experience of certain aesthetic 
values in emotionally qualified perception.
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What is the Paradox of Axiology? 
There is a puzzle about the very nature of values that makes the possibility of their existence 
seem paradoxical. It rests on an apparent opposition between values and reality, an opposition 
or contrast which philosophy has always registered. For example, it is at the root of Plato’s 
characterization of Goodness as “beyond substance”, as well as of Hume’s dichotomy of facts 
and values and of the Naturalistic Fallacy that Moore cautions against. Even Kant’s purely 
deontological foundation of ethics is best understood as a response to the Paradox of Axiology. 
The Paradox of Axiology has been rephrased, in contemporary metaethics, as the Dilemma 
of Metaethics, that is a dilemma concerning the status of value properties. If they were real 
or natural properties, they would seem to lose their essentially normative character. But, if 
that’s so, then in order to preserve their normative character they would have to be creatures 
of another world. The presently available metaethical accounts of value purport to offer 
solutions to this dilemma.
The Paradox of Axiology is a serious one, albeit a “paradox” only in the weak sense of being 
something “beyond common opinion”. Yet, it teaches us a lot about the very nature of 
values. Moreover, it calls our attention to something that is in fact part of the “whatness” 
of values as they are experienced. The Paradox existed long before its technical metaethical 
conceptualization was introduced. It is constantly “lived” as an tension between the ideal and 
the real. Ideality is an essential feature of values. It is also a paradoxical one, for positive values are 
never as vividly given as they are in the painful recognition of their absence on earth, when 
the corresponding goods are missing, which most of the time (but not necessarily) means 
that the corresponding negative values are realized in their place. Through real injustice we 
come to see what justice is, and that what a just society is, is what most actual societies are not. 
The content of justice is exemplified by what societies could be and ought to be like, or by ideal 
societies.
One of the most popular strategies for explaining this Paradox away is to remove from value 
terms their value content, or matter. I call the result of this move the No-Matter-of-Value 
Thesis. We shall explore it further below. 
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I shall argue for following claims:
C1. The No-Matter-of-Value Thesis makes the Paradox of Axiology unsolvable.
C2. Experimental Phenomenology1 shows that the No-Matter-of-Value Thesis is false.
C3. Experimental Phenomenology provides a foundation to Material Axiology2.
Most past and present conceptualizations of the Paradox are astoundingly silent about value 
experience and the life world, that is, about what appears to be the source of ordinary talk on 
value. So, in most cases, the data needed for any theory of value aiming to solve the Paradox 
are simply ignored.
In the contemporary debate on metaethics the problem is structural. For it depends on a 
methodological feature apparently inherited from the meta-linguistic origins of metaethics, 
namely, the exclusive focus on terms and concepts, as opposed to the corresponding non-
conceptual contents or data. The second-order level of metaethical discussions induces 
authors to address the “nature” or the “status” of value properties in general, most of the time, 
without any intuitive exhibition and analysis of their instances. I’ll call this way of arguing at a 
conceptual level only, without regard for phenomenal contents, a top-down strategy.
Much gets lost, though, concerning the very nature of values when the fact that they are 
qualities that can be experienced independently of their explicit conceptualization is ignored. 
Take ferocity. Infants may be frightened by the ferocious look of a warrior’s mask, yet without 
having at their disposal the concepts of ferocity and of mask. This says something about the 
nature of values. 
Ferocity is a typically “thick” value term. Now, the whole metaethical debate hinges on finding 
a satisfactory solution to the fact-value dichotomy, whether it is understood in Humean or 
Moorean terms. But this dichotomy, as is well known, faces apparent counterexamples in so 
called “thick” value-terms, or value concepts. 
Such terms as “ferocious”, “courageous”, and “cruel” – or, for that matter, “graceful” or 
“vigorous” – denote “thick” concepts, or concepts provided with descriptive content, as opposed 
to “thin” terms such as “right” or “good” which only seem to express normativity apart from 
any descriptive content.
Thick concepts would appear to escape the dichotomy. Edmund Husserl discussed this issue at 
the very beginning of the last century3, long before it became a matter of controversy in the 
Fifties between Philippa Foot and Iris Murdoch on one side, and Richard Hare on the other4.
1 Albertazzi (2013), Husserl (1970a), pp. 203-209.
2 Scheler (1973).
3 Husserl (1970), Vol I, §§14-16; Hans Kelsen dismissed Husserl’s rejection of the dichotomy – much too hastily, I think 
- in his Allgemeine Theorie der Normen (1979), cf. Kelsen (1996).
4 Philippa Foot argues against the arbitrariness attached to the usage of “prescriptive” or “action guiding” words 
such as the names of virtues, or of words like “danger” or “pride” in case there where there is no “internal relation” 
between “commending” or evaluating and the non-evaluative meaning of these words (Foot 1978, pp. 83-104, the 
text was originally a paper delivered at Bedford University in 1958). Iris Murdoch opens up a much wider horizon in 
her criticism of “voluntarism” in value theory, targeting both (Sartrean) existential philosophy, with its reject of any 
rational justification of choices, as well as “linguistic” or Oxford moral philosophy, with its prescriptivism rejecting 
experience, research into the moral meaning of facts, learning, and discouraging of what Murdoch calls attention, 
which she explains thus: “I have used the word ‘attention’, which I borrow from Simone Weil, to express the idea of 
a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality” (Murdoch 1970 p. 33). As for Richard Hare, while his book 
on The Language of Morals (1952) reinforces Hume’s dichotomy as a distinction between descriptive and prescriptive 
language (the language of morals being the latter), the challenge of thick value terms is addressed in his (1981) Moral 
2. Claims
3. The No-Matter-
of-Value Thesis
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Thick value terms can be used to challenge Hume’s claim that one cannot derive an Ought from 
an Is. If, for example, being courageous is a professional quality of a warrior, then a warrior 
ought to be courageous. Or, put in terms of truth makers, there is a quality rich in descriptive 
content – courage – which makes an Is value statement true or false. That quality is the 
referent of such expressions as “Jack is courageous” (which is contingently true or false), and 
“An ideal warrior is courageous” (which is a necessary truth).
The standard move suggested by a top-down approach is to split a thick concept into two 
parts, i.e., a descriptive content and a normative operator, where the descriptive content is 
and has to be a purely “factual” or “natural” content. This was the move first made by Kelsen 
(in response to Husserl) and by Richard Hare (in response to Philippa Foot).
Bernard Williams approvingly sums up this move in a very clear way:
The clearest account, as so often, is given by Hare: a term of this kind involves a 
descriptive complex to which a prescription has been attached, expressive of the values 
of the individual or of the society. … It is essential to this account that the specific or 
‘thick’ character of these terms is given in the descriptive element. The value part is 
expressed, under analysis, by the all-purpose prescriptive term ought5.
On this account, value concepts have no axiological contents. Either they are thin, and 
just prescriptions, or they are thick, and all the content they have is factual. Let’s call this 
statement the No-Matter-of-Value Thesis.
This thesis is, in fact, a consequence of Moore’s thesis of irreducibility, plus Moore’s claim that 
value concepts are non-analyzable. No matter how a thick value concept is analyzed in factual 
terms, there will be a residual value – such as the goodness of being courageous – that resists 
analysis in non-axiological terms. Otherwise, you run afoul of the naturalistic fallacy. 
Now, this thesis is false. The rest of this paper is devoted to arguing against this very popular 
mistake, which I take to be caused by the kind of value blindness that goes along with a top-
down approach.
Suppose you can analyse a thick value term in the way just suggested. So, a ferocious 
expression expresses preparedness to behave in a ferocious way, and a ferocious behaviour is 
such and such a behaviour, e.g., a fierce, wild, violent one. This, of course, sets us on the path 
of an infinite regress, for here ferocity is analysed in terms of other value qualities.
Suppose, then, that ferocity just “supervenes” on a class of animal behaviours which can be 
described in purely “factual”, say, “natural” terms, or that the predicate “is ferocious” can be 
analysed in terms of those animal behaviours plus an “all-purpose prescriptive (negative) term 
ought”. Now, is there any factual or natural property shared by these animal behaviours and, 
say, a ferocious joke, a ferocious ideology, a ferocious question? Is there any natural property 
common to elegant things, such as an elegant dress, an elegant apartment, an elegant gait, or a 
piece of elegant prose? It does not seem that we can find one.
And yet, we are usually able to tell ferocious or elegant things from those which are not. How 
is that possible? An obvious answer is that we do so by employing the concept of ferocity. 
But if the preceding argument is valid, then this concept is not analyzable in terms of factual 
contents plus a prescriptive operator. So, the real question is: What is the source of this 
concept? Given that it cannot be a given matter of fact, should we not then take it to be a given 
Thinking with the two-components theory (see below and footnote 5). 
5 Williams (1985), p. 130. This is the so-called Two Components Theory. (Putnam 2004, p. 41).
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matter of value, as it were? Perhaps its source is, in other words, a non-conceptual or pre-
conceptual axiological content or datum. Should we not then consider, at least as a hypothesis, 
that what a thick concept may more or less aptly capture is the content of a given value as such, 
its ideal and normative “matter”, which we have, so to speak, in front of us and “consult”?
Now, this kind of data or given non-conceptual contents is exactly what a top-down approach 
to value is blind to. 
Our first move, then, is to make explicit the methodological rule of phenomenology as a 
bottom-up approach (in value theory but not in that alone):
(Meth): No theoretical problem about a type of thing S should be addressed without 
recourse to the intuitive presence of some token or instance, s, of S.
(Meth) is just an application of phenomenology’s primary charge, “Back to the things 
themselves”, or the principle of the priority of the given over conceptual construction. (Meth) is the 
means by which the oft-neglected world of everyday experience becomes again the privileged 
object of philosophical inquiry.
Our bottom-up approach can be introduced with a simpler type of case, the sort in which 
perception of value is in some sense “added to” perception in the most literal sense, i.e., 
sensory perception. We shall start with some examples of a type of quality that tradition 
recognizes as being “given to perception”, in aesthesis, that is, aesthetic qualities.
Claim 3 needs the support of experimental argumentation. To that end, some images will be 
shown that exemplify ferocity as a non-conceptual content or a value quality. Experimental 
Phenomenology will help us analyze this quality in terms of a typically tertiary quality, or 
quality of demand. This quality of demand is a global feature of perceptual configurations, 
constraining possible (co)variations of their contents, in all possible worlds in which ferocity 
is instantiated. Such a global quality is there, given in experience, as a matter of value. Its 
normative power, far from being “lost in description” – as if in principle descriptive language 
could not convey ideality – pertains to the qualified object essentially, or in all possible worlds 
in which it exists. 
Material axiology is a generalization of this discovery, according to which value terms do have 
a descriptive axiological content, and a very rich one, which can be analysed by reference to 
objects’ axiological qualities.
Here, in Figure 1, is an example readily available on the internet of a ferocious expression. 
Many things are apparently ferocious, and yet it is quite difficult to find a “natural” or 
“factual” property that might be shared by everything that has a ferocious appearance, 
ranging from a warrior’s mask, certain animal behaviours, or a scene of Artaud’s cruelty 
theatre, to an ideology, or even some jokes. But we rightly distinguish beautiful from ugly 
things, cruelty from mildness. The mask depicted in Figure 1 could not possibly be deemed 
mild or elegant. 
How can we identify cruelty and ferocity? By the concept cruel? But there is evidently no 
factual property shared by cruel jokes and, say, cruel meals! 
 Yet, as Iris Murdoch argues at length, it is always possible to improve one’s understanding of 
thick value concepts, such as impudence or courage. How is that possible, given what I’ve just 
said? 
If we try to resolve the problem by appealing to the mask’s ferocious appearance, a natural 
answer would be that there is in its appearance a matter to be looked at – and felt. A matter 
5. Back to the 
things themselves. 
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of value, though, rather than a matter of fact. I’ve chosen a mask deliberately, for a mask 
is a means of make believe. When wearing such a mask, one can appear ferocious without 
having to be ferocious – regardless of the purpose this disguise may serve, whether it is ritual, 
theatrical, or a matter of carnival farce. A mask is an object under epochè, like any aesthetical 
object. It presents us with a quality which might be instanced in reality – the ferocious 
expression of an actual warrior – but which we grasp, so to speak, in the “abstract”, divorced 
from any genuine exercise of ferocity. 
Figure 1
Let’s briefly practice “contemplation,” or, in Murdoch’s terms, the improvement of our 
insightful understanding of ferociousness. We certainly have a lot of matter to conceptualize, 
matter that is first given to visual-cum-emotional perception. We are “struck” by more and 
more features, which we may or may not be able to adequately capture in words (not just 
any word will do!). We detect a quality of wildness or savageness which suggests, despite the 
evident shape and aspect of a human face, a lack of humanity. We sense hostility, aggressiveness, 
rapaciousness and greed. We are scared by the face’s fury (seen in the eyes) and apparent 
mordacity (visible in the teeth). The grim look of the mask exhibits a power of tearing apart and 
destroying in its sharp and pointed features…
This description serves as a counterexample to the idea that value terms are just action-
guiding terms. When I describe this mask as “ferocious” I am not warning you against any 
menace to your life or integrity, nor am I prescribing you to avoid encounters with it, etc. The 
point also works as a counterexample both to Hare’s prescriptivism and to emotivism. For the 
very same quality might be manifested in an act of cruelty, too. You would no doubt be right 
to fear being killed. And, were that to actually happen, it would be awkward if we then had to 
choose between either (a) admitting that “It was a cruel, a ferocious act” is a value judgment 
while denying the judgment a truth value or (b) admitting that the judgment corresponds 
to the pertinent facts while denying it the status of a value judgment. That awkwardness 
indicates, as is usually the case with thick terms, the untenability of the fact/value distinction. 
So, here a Two-Component Theory à la Hare (ascribing the judgment a descriptive content 
plus a prescriptive force) might help. But again, it would be no help for understanding the 
related case of the mask, despite the fact that the value quality manifested there is exactly the 
same.
Expressive qualities are a subclass of value qualities that typically “present” the agents having 
them as other selves, namely, as subjects (or quasi-subjects) of emotion and action. It is by 
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means of these qualities that we usually take something to be another self. They present us 
with socially relevant properties of encountered agents and their actions.
But, when experienced in a purely aesthetical attitude, expressive qualities can be explored 
in a “detached” way, so that the pertinent emotions can be vividly felt without becoming 
reasons for action (think of thrillers, horror pictures, and so on). Aesthetic experience switches 
off action and at the same time deepens cognition. Figure 2 gives a further example, this 
time presenting a familiar scenario from ordinary life, of the “abstraction” involved in the 
appreciation of aesthetic value.
Figure 2
In comparison with the previous examples, the Halloween Pumpkin is a more “abstract” 
version of a ferocious expression. It is an almost simplified or schematic version of ferocity (an 
“eidos” of it?). You’ll notice nonetheless how well the salient features of apparent ferocity are 
preserved. In fact, a matter of real life and action has become pure play here with the help of 
this “aesthetic” object and our taking on the “right” attitude toward it. In aesthetic experience 
one apprehends the quality without being moved to action, thus taking it up in a dispassionate 
cognitive attitude. In pretense, as in some kinds of plays and games, the motivational power of 
qualities is in the “as if” mode, but you enact corresponding “as if” actions in relation to them.
Aesthetic experience switches off real action and switches on value cognition. This is 
especially true in the case of expressive qualities. A brief foray into the history of 20th century 
visual art will make the point clear.
In the Preface of an old English translation of Vassily Kandinsky’s Punkt und Linie zu Fläche 
(1926) we find a nice anecdote on the meaning of “abstract” painting: 
Upon his return to Munich, one evening there occurred at dusk the magical incident 
of his seeing merely the form and tone values in one of his paintings. While not 
recognizing its subject, he was not only struck by its increased beauty but also by the 
superfluity of the object in painting, in order to feel its spell. It took him fully two years 
to crystallize this miraculous discovery6.
6 Kandinsky (1926), p. 7. The date of this discovery is supposed to be about 1908. Even if Rebay does not report 
this detail, the tradition has it that the picture that struck Kandinsky in this way was not one of his own, but 
rather Monet’s Sheafs in the sun. The (1926) treatise was published sixteen years after his first one, Das Geistige in 
der Kunst (1910), and is based on Kandinsky’s teaching at the Bauhaus in Berlin (1921-24). It’s a nice coincidence 
that while the first treatise, written in Munich, is more or less contemporary with the flourishing of the Munich 
psychologist Theodor Lipps’ studies on empathy and aesthetics and the critical, very productive discussion of them 
within the Phenomenological Circle of Munich, animated by Scheler and attended by two of the most significant 
phenomenologists of aesthetics, Moritz Geiger and Dietrich von Hildebrand, the second one, crystallizing his teaching 
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The quotation conveys all that is needed to appreciate the series of visual experiments 
Kandinsky provides in the appendix of this remarkably valuable work. Let’s examine just two 
examples. So-called “abstract” painting only makes explicit – and does so in a programmatic 
way – what has always been true of painting, regardless of the views the painter or 
mainstream opinion about painting in different epochs. It highlights how visual art, correctly 
enjoyed, lets us see the how, and not only the what, of visible things. Generalized, we could 
say that aesthetic information is about the how and not the what, or that it’s about whatness, 
but only insofar as it can be made apparent independently of whether and where it exists, 
or whether it is really as it appears. Painting is about qualities, even those making up the 
solidity and three-dimensionality of the painting’s subject matter. It is about the gravity and 
seriousness of what is real, as is particularly evident in Cezanne’s use of the canvas. Qualities 
are the real “subject” of even the most figurative and “classic” painting. Geometry itself 
appears as the quality of an orderly world, an intelligible cosmos encompassing the City of 
Humans. That is true, for instance, of certain paintings by Piero della Francesca. 
Once you realize that the visual arts help to free visual perception from the practical tasks 
it serves in ordinary life and to free visual contents from their function of orienting you in 
reality, the supporting role of the “subject” (e.g., a depicted object) in such work is no longer 
necessary for appreciating the “how”, the pure visual content of possible perceptual worlds. 
Indeed, there is no need for a return to Platonism to understand Klee’s dictum that painting 
does not reproduce the visible, but makes even the “invisible” visible.
Klee’s dictum refers to what I’ve called value cognition. By “contemplating” visual art we come 
to “improve our understanding” (as per Murdoch) of expressive qualities. Actually, we come to 
improve our discriminative perception of them. More examples will prove helpful here. 
Figure 3. From V. Kandinsky, Point and Line to Plane 7
years in Berlin, is more or less contemporary to the flourishing of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology in the 1920s 
and the beginning of the 1930s, before the Nazi catastrophe. 
7 Kandinsky (1926), Anhang (Appendix), Diagram 20, (1946) p. 152.
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Figure 4. From V. Kandinsky, Point and Line to Plane 8
The “titles” given by Kandinsky to these drawing are respectively: “9 points in ascent 
(emphasis upon the diagonal d-a through weight)” (Figure 39); and “Diagonal tensions and 
counter-tensions with a point which brings an external construction to inner pulsation” 
(Figure 4) , The first is meant to illustrate the role of the point in visual form and the latter the 
role of the line.
Both configurations feature a striking dynamism, a quality we perceive or feel even if we know 
that the lines or the points on the paper are in fact motionless. Theodor Lipps (1906) describes 
this kind of quality as presenting “the life of lines”, as it were: 
[A] movement, such as stretching out, growing longer, self-restricting, abruptly starting 
and ending, or steady sliding, swinging up and down, bending, stooping, squeezing and 
expanding. All these predicates do not refer to geometrical features of the form, but 
denote activities…10.
We can call the qualities Lipps refers to as dynamic qualities. The drama of the lines and the 
rising of the points in Kandinsky may well be a good (almost) contemporary example of what 
Lipps has in mind11. 
8 Kandinsky (1926), Anhang (Appendix), Diagram 20, (1946) p. 186.
9 Kandinsky rejects customary distinctions of “the graphic” and “the pictorial”, according to which line is the essential 
element of graphics but is “in painting, contrary to its nature and, therefore, forbidden”. Here is his rationale: “This 
is a characteristic example of the existing confusion in concepts: that which can easily be segregated and placed in 
separate categories is mixed together (art, nature), and, on the other hand, the things that belong together (painting 
and graphics) are carefully separated from each other. The line is considered here to be a ‘graphic’ element and not to 
be used for ‘pictorial’ purposes, although an elementary difference between ‘graphics’ and ‘painting’ cannot be found 
and could never be established by the theorists mentioned”. Kandinsky (1946), p. 110.
10 Lipps, T. (1903-06), p. 184. Our translation.
11 Even if the theories of Point and Line to Plane (1926) emerge after Lipps’ Aesthetics, Kandinsky’s “first abstract 
watercolour” was painted about 1908, preceded by a rich series of works where the dedicated study of both expressive 
and dynamic qualities is more than evident. The same is true of other work done within the avant-garde art of the early 
20th century, and especially in Munich, where Kandinsky, with Franz Marc, Paul Jawlensky and others founded, as is 
well known, the Blaue Reiter
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Instituting a pictorial space means literally “abstracting” these pervasive yet silent qualities 
from our concrete surrounding world in order to display them before our eyes, as objects 
whose variations and possibilities offer us a new, infinite domain of exploration12. This is, after 
all, what painters have always done. The frame of a painting manifests the initial “bracketing” 
the painter performs with respect to all the non-aesthetic goals of ordinary perception. It 
separates pictorial space from one’s surrounding actual space.
Yet it is only around the birth of “modern” art that this “bracketing” and this “abstraction”, 
achieved with the aid of aesthetic objects and their means (scores and melodies13, paper and 
drawings, collages, etc.), entered the laboratories of science and gave rise to experimental 
phenomenology14, including, very early on, Gestalt psychology.
What grounds abstract painting is indeed the very same discovery with which Gestalt 
psychology began. Both recognize that perceptual contents, far from being the unorganized 
“multiplicity” or “chaos” (Kant) of sense data postulated by the empiricist tradition, 
are organized by “configural” or structural properties. These properties are given, not 
“constructed”, and are non-conceptual, pre-linguistic, and often multi-modal or amodal in 
nature.
The fact that the two groups of researchers share a common root is something no author could 
better bear witness to than Rudolf Arnheim, the brightest pupil of Max Wertheimer. Arnheim 
was a brilliant young art critic in the roaring 1920s in Berlin, the director of the Italian Istituto 
del Cinema in the 1930s, and the founder of the psychology of visual art in his post-exile 
American academic life15. I quote him at length below not only because he and others of his 
school gave us a language for describing the axiological contents of aesthetical values, but 
also because there are passages in his work that bring the common root of Gestalt Psychology 
and abstract painting to the foreground. Take, for instance, this powerful synthesis of the 
“Kandinskian” analysis of dynamic qualities we’ve just reconstructed:
Visual experience is dynamic. This theme will recur throughout the present book. 
What a person or animal perceives is not only an arrangement of objects, of colors 
and shapes, of movements and sizes. It is, perhaps first of all, an interplay of directed 
tensions. These tensions are not something the observer adds, for reasons of his own, 
to static images. Rather, these tensions are as inherent in any percept as size, shape, 
location, or color. Because they have magnitude and direction, these tensions can be 
described as psychological ‘forces.’16
12 This point of course generalizes across the visual arts, and, mutatis mutandis, the institution of other aesthetical 
spaces, like that of music.
13 As is well known, the notion of “Gestalt” had been introduced into psychology by Christian von Ehrenfels in 1890 
in his essay “On Gestalt qualities”, where, observing that humans can recognize two melodies as identical even when 
no two corresponding notes in them have the same frequency, he argued that these forms must possess a “Gestalt 
quality”—a characteristic that is immediately given, over and above the single tones. Cf. von Ehrenfels C., Über 
“Gestaltqualitäten”. (1890), Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. 1890;14:224–292. (Translated as “On 
‘Gestalt qualities’”. In B. Smith (Ed. & Trans.), (1988), Foundations of Gestalt Theory (pp. 82–117). Munich, Germany/
Vienna, Austria: Philosophia Verlag.)
14 I use this expression, “experimental phenomenology,” to refer to that part of early experimental psychology that 
harboured and outlasted classical Gestalt psychology, on the one hand, and that instigated the powerful approach to 
generalization which led Husserl to the study of the eidetic universe. See De Monticelli (2018).
15 Rudolph Arnheim’s life (1904, Berlin – 2007, Ann Arbor, USA) actually spans the great temporal distance between 
the time of Stumpf, Husserl and Wertheimer and our own. See Arnheim (1954, 1974). The 1974 edition is a revised 
version of the original, published after 20 years of teaching in several New York Universities and Harvard University.
16 ibid., p. 11.
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Perhaps no image could better illustrate the concept of visual force or tension at the heart 
of Kandinsky’s theory of elements (especially as it concerns point and plane) than the one 
reproduced in Figure 5. It exemplifies one of the phenomena to which Arnheim devoted most 
of his research, namely, the “power of centre.”
Figure 5. The Power of the centre
This figure – which is the first presented in his main work, occurring in the section titled 
“Balance”17 – illustrates the first principle of Gestalt theory. The fact that we perceive the 
slightly off-centre position of the “point” on the square plane is evidence for the principle that 
we grasp organized wholes. What we experience in perception is not the association of atomic 
perceptual data, but the immediate givenness of the elements appearing from the start as a 
function of the wholes to which they belong. 
Wagemans and colleagues put the point thus: “The contents of our awareness are by and large 
not additive but possess a characteristic coherence”18. There are several additional principles 
further articulating this notion of coherence that are also illustrated by this simple figure. 
Firstly, there is the principle of figure/ground, according to which the partial contents we 
perceive are experienced as segregated from a background. Secondly, there is the principle 
of unity, the basic organizing factor discussed by Kandinsky, which highlights structural 
features such as the square basic plane with its horizontal and vertical boundaries, its center, 
and its diagonals. Here the invisible center is manifested by the off-center point, and induces a 
dynamic quality within the figure, giving the impression of things being imbalanced.
I defer again to the expertise of Arnheim: 
The disk in Figure 5 is not simply displaced with regard to the center of the square. 
There is something restless about it. It looks as though it had been at the center and 
wished to return, or as though it wants to move away even farther. And the disk’s 
relations to the edges of the square are a similar play of attraction and repulsion19.
The “power of the center” in a sense “requires” the disk to be centred, that is, for the simple 
composition to reach balance. This is the first mention I’ve made so far of that feature of the 
perceived world that Wolfgang Koehler called “requiredness”, a type of “oughtness” which 
turns out to pervade the life world and also indicates for us the “place” that values have in it.
This simple example shows that it is not really a “subjective” – or rather, arbitrary – matter 
17 Ibid. p. 10.
18 Wagemans and colleagues, 2012: 1172–1217. Published online 2012 Jul 30. doi: 10.1037/a0029333, https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3482144/
19 Arnheim (1974), p. 12.
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to perceive what is required in a given context. Requiredness is not reducible to the allegedly 
prescriptive component of a thick value term (like imbalanced or disharmonious). There is of 
course nobody “requiring” the disk to be centred, any more than there is always someone 
commanding a warrior to be courageous or commandig someone giving an argument to 
ensure its validity. Nor are such thick value terms necessarily action guiding. They have plenty 
of descriptive content. But this content consists in qualities of requirednesses or – as it is 
referred to in experimental phenomenology – of “qualities of demand” (Albertazzi 2013). We 
literally perceive the demands that things manifest. 
Similarly, the apparent ascending movement we perceive in Kandinsky’s rising points in 
Figure 3 is also not “merely subjective”. If it is an illusion, it is not correctable, much like those 
so called “illusions” (such as the Muller-Lyer) that once led Gestalt psychologists to radically 
question the causal-physicalistic model of perception. The lightness of the “ascending points” 
is a material value quality, the global quality of a well-organized whole. 
Moore’s greatest intuition – that ideality is irreducible to reality – is tangled up with his worst 
mistake, which was to hold that Goodness or the Good is “a simple, non-analysable object 
of thought”20. Against Moore, we ought to hold instead that “Goodness” is a proxy word for 
“any positive value quality”. That is, it functions as a variable ranging over thick or material 
values. As an attributive adjective applicable to exemplars of various kinds of things (e.g., as 
with the phrase “a good knife”) it is a variable ranging over the positive value qualities of ideal 
exemplars of the relevant kind (e.g., functional value qualities, in the case of this domestic 
tool). As a moral predicate (“morally good”) it is a thick, –not thin, concept, ranging over all 
moral virtues and qualities of an intention, action, or person enabling them to realize the best 
value(s) possible in a given situation, which presupposes that we are capable of perceiving 
what is required in the first place, in short, that we are capable of attention. 
The upshot of this analysis is that, more generally, thin values depend on thick values, and 
it is false that thick values have no descriptive value content, i.e., that value qualities cannot 
be analysed, explained or described. They can, but only in terms of other values, contrary to 
Moore’s ineffability thesis.
Hare and Williams make the complementary mistake of reducing thick value terms to their 
alleged “real-descriptive” content plus a universal or indeterminate commendatory force. 
The No-Matter-of-Value thesis makes material axiology inconceivable.
But I hope to have shown not only that counterexamples to that thesis are conceivable, but also 
that we can see and feel what we conceive in them, thus making it possible for us to describe 
them more or less adequately and supply Material Axiology with its grounding evidence.
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In this paper, I illustrate some (non-exhaustive) ways in which philosophy can tackle gender. 
My aim is not to provide an overview of philosophical work on gender and gender-related 
issues in the past decades,1 but to single out some kinds of approach to gender, whether actual 
or possible, and examine the difficulties or limitations of each. Starting from mainly negative 
critical stances and proceeding towards more positive approaches, I distinguish:
1. the critique of gender through discourse analysis;
2. the critique of gender essentialism;
3. research on how gender concepts work;
4. reflection upon how gender issues relate to issues of intersubjective recognition.
Each of the four main sections of the paper is devoted to outlining one of these kinds of 
approach. Since there are close connections between the first and the second, and between 
the second and the third, these three can be considered as following up or elaborating on 
the preceding one. The third way to tackle gender draws on recent research concerning the 
linguistic expression of categorizations, to which gender categories belong. This research, 
although not specifically about gender, offers a way in to understanding the normativity 
of gender models as well as gender-based discrimination. As to the fourth way, I propose 
considering gendered subjectivity in the context of the dynamics of intersubjective relations, 
framing it in a view of intersubjective recognition as a basic process in human life. Hopefully, 
this kind of approach might shed some new light on the debates on gender and gender-related 
issues. 
Because of the complexity of gender-related issues in contemporary society, and the fact that 
assumptions and expectations about gender are usually tacit, it is not easy to spell out what 
gender is, or even simply what gender (and genders) are commonly held to be. One instrument 
at hand for obtaining some clarity about how we think about the matter is the examination 
of how gender is dealt with in discourse and other social practices. Although one may object 
1 So, I will not comment upon feminist philosophical work done in the various areas of philosophy (such as that 
presented and discussed in Fricker and Hornsby, 2000, and Saul, 2003). I believe, however, that distinguishing between 
kinds of approach to gender as I will be trying to do is indirectly relevant also to that kind of philosophical work.
Introduction
1. Critique of 
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that such a task does not pertain to philosophy, I maintain that it does (in part at least), for 
two reasons. Firstly, let us not forget that at a certain time in the 20th century philosophy was 
described as an activity of clarification (under the influence of Wittgenstein: see e.g. 1922: 
§4.112; 1953: §133) and even though this characterization is now taken to be outdated, I believe 
that it might still be worth consideration as non-exhaustive, alongside more ambitious ones 
(for which see e.g. Williamson 2006, 2007). The idea of philosophy as an activity of clarification 
is traditionally connected to an antimetaphysical attitude, so that what is expected to be 
clarified is philosophical discourse itself, insofar as it expresses unsolvable “philosophical 
perplexities”. In my opinion, however, the idea can quite sensibly be extended to include all 
those issues we find difficult to tackle because of underlying conceptual confusion or lack of 
explicitness. In this sense, though seemingly a matter of applied linguistics, or somewhere 
between linguistics and sociology, discourse analysis (see Fairclough 1995, Wodak and Chilton 
eds 2005) can also be practised in a philosophical spirit, not only because it sometimes 
profits from the use of instruments coming from the philosophy of language such as speech 
acts, presupposition and implicature, but because it throws light upon the contents and 
organization of our ideas.2 Secondly, once our tacit assumptions about some complex and 
controversial issue and their implications are made explicit, the question remains open as 
to whether such assumptions are acceptable or even correct. It seems to me that the critical 
assessment of commonly held assumptions about gender and genders is to a large extent a 
philosophical task, connected to the understanding that human beings have of the human 
condition and one to be pursued by argument. Even if it goes beyond mere clarification, 
this task is at least contiguous to clarification activities, because it is made possible by the 
explicitness that follows from them. We cannot reject an assumption about gender (or criticize 
it or argue against it) unless we are aware of it, and we might not even realize it needs to be 
criticized unless we are aware of the precise role it plays in our discursive and social practices.
Many of the assumptions about gender revealed by analyzing discourse and observing 
social practices have the controversial feature of being “essentialist”, that is, they present 
themselves as concerning “essential” properties of a certain gender-related class of human 
beings. Now on the one hand, were this true, alleged members of the class who do not possess 
such properties should not be counted as real members; on the other, accepting people 
who lack those properties as members of the class amounts to falsifying the claim that the 
properties are essential. But this is not what actually happens. Essentialist assumptions 
bear de facto normative implications, that is, the members of the class of human beings at 
issue, provided they want to be (or cannot avoid being) members of that class, are accepted 
as members, expected to have or develop or acquire the alleged essential properties, and 
negatively evaluated as not “normal”or not “good” members if they do not. Claims about the 
alleged “essence” of a gender thereby become models to which people who are assigned that 
gender have to conform. For example, it is often held to be part of the essence of a gender 
that people belonging to it have certain abilities and typical dispositions, which make them 
suited to certain roles in society, and this can create in them a normative orientation towards 
actually assuming those roles. 
2 Aspects of the use of language that are revealing of gender models are studied in the pioneering work of Robin 
Tolmach Lakoff Language and Woman’s Place (1975). For a use of speech act theory and of presupposition applied to 
gender-related issues, see for example Hornsby (1994); Hornsby and Langton (1998); Langton and West (1999). I have 
used the instruments of pragmatics to make explicit various assumptions about or attitudes towards the feminine 
gender in my research on Italian women magazines (1976) and on books on pregnancy and birth addressed at women 
(1984).
2. Critique 
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A further essentialist assumption is that belonging to a gender is a fact determined by nature 
or even a fact of human nature (and thus part of the essence of human beings). These latter 
assumptions add to the normativity of gender models the compulsion to follow one of them: 
if belonging to a gender is an essential part of being human, then nobody can escape gender 
altogether, which means that every one of us will be subject to one or other of the gender 
models available.
Assumptions about gender and genders can be criticized as empirically false generalizations, 
and they can sometimes be proven to be such. But irrespective of their empirical truth 
or falsity (namely, whether the majority of the members of a gender actually display the 
properties supposed to be “essential” to it), they can (and should) be criticized as essentialist, 
which involves rejecting the idea that they describe the nature or essence of a gender, thereby 
limiting or suspending their normative import. 
In their attempt to look at women’s difference afresh, and therefore not merely as the lack 
of allegedly masculine virtues but as rich in positive contents, some feminist thinkers have 
raised claims about the feminine gender that appeared to have essentialist implications 
(Irigaray 1977; Gilligan 1982).3 Many other feminist thinkers, on the other hand, as well as 
many researchers in linguistics and sociology, have chosen to criticize and reject gender 
essentialism. Indeed, gender models are quite obviously cultural constructions4 and the 
rhetoric of naturalness is, therefore, both false and politically detrimental. But this anti-
essentialist stance is not without problems. 
To cope with the fact that most human beings have unambiguously sexed sets of chromosomes 
and bodies, anti-essentialists have used two strategies, one of which involves introducing the 
sex/gender distinction (see Lorber and Farrell eds 1991), while the other radicalizes anti-
essentialism, considering sexes too as cultural constructions (see, most famously, Butler 1999). 
As we know, the sex/gender distinction assumes that in the opposition between male and 
female, what is natural can distinguished from what is cultural (and therefore, in principle, 
subject to choice). Unfortunately, though, it is empirically difficult, not to say impossible, 
to tell the difference between what people do because of their nature and what they do 
because of education, habit, tradition, and the like. Indeed, what appears to be cultural may 
be analyzed in a “naturalized” way, while what appears to be natural can almost always 
be modified by training or, when appropriate, by the use of technology. The sex/gender 
distinction, then, although at first sight clear and almost commonsense, actually turns out to 
be weak, and this weakness leads anti-essentialists to favour radical solutions, claiming that 
sex is as cultural as gender after all and that the sex/gender distinction does not hold. 
That all difference between human males and females is a matter of performance, however, 
thus belonging to the realm of culture, is not thoroughly convincing. One may wonder, 
for example, whether a woman’s failure to display certain properties belonging to the 
feminine gender (for example, a girl ignoring dolls and playing with cars and trains instead) 
and a woman undergoing surgery to change her sex are to be reasonably considered as 
graded manifestations of the same kind of process. The toughest point in the debate about 
essentialism is, however, reproduction. What about reproductive roles in human beings? 
Firstly, what about the physiological roles that male and female play in reproduction? From 
3 Speculum (Irigaray 1974) is not an essentialist book, but in later works (among which Irigaray 1977) this author 
seems to derive the properties of the feminine subject directly from features of female sex. However, see Braidotti’s 
comments (1991: 248-263). Although Gilligan is often treated as the prototype of essentialist feminism (see for example 
Antony 2012), the interpretation of her work is controversial (see Saul 2003: 216-220).
4 This assumption works quite well as a framework for the investigation of gender identities and relations in social 
and communicative interaction. See for example Kotthoff and Wodak (eds) (1997), Baron and Kotthoff (eds) (2001).
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the biological point of view, human reproduction resembles that of other mammals: male and 
female reproductive roles are not interchangeable nor symmetric, and (for the time being at 
least) the functions played in the reproductive processes by male and female individuals can 
only be partly replaced by technological aids. Secondly, does evolutionary adaptation to male 
and female reproductive roles determine other properties of male and female individuals? 
Perhaps not at all, or perhaps to some extent only. 
Granted, technological progress can turn biological functions into cultural choices. This 
is apparent nowadays in human reproduction, particularly with respect to motherhood: 
thanks to technology, women now have the means to decide whether the sexual intercourse 
they might want to have will be potentially fertile or not, so that conception (and therefore 
motherhood) can no longer be considered as matters of biological fatality. Other more 
complex technological interventions make it possible to replace intercourse with artificial 
insemination, or let a woman host an embryo of which she is not the genetic mother; 
moreover, after a certain minimum gestation time, foetuses can now survive and develop 
outside the mother’s womb. All these new techniques open the way to choices that were not 
“naturally” available, such as having a child from a dead husband, or getting pregnant after 
the end of one’s childbearing age. In these cases, the obvious contrast between what is done 
by means of technology and what would happen according to “nature” suggests that on each 
occasion we face a choice between a technology-guided and a nature-guided line of conduct. 
But these two kinds of behavior are not “chosen” by people in the same way and to the same 
extent. In most cases, it is reasonable to assume that what happens without technological 
intervention has a default status: the issue of choice only arises when something (a precise 
goal, for example) makes the use of technology pertinent, and so the two situations are not 
symmetrical. So, while whatever technology does rather obviously pertains to culture, it does 
not follow that what happens without the use of technology should be counted as cultural 
as well. After all, it seems only fair to concede that the body enjoys a sort of givenness which 
philosophy should not sweep under the carpet but seriously thematize.5
It is quite understandable that people seeking to free themselves from gender models should 
attempt to shift the biology of reproduction from nature to culture: taking it all to be a cultural 
matter removes from gender models any possible biological legitimization. There might 
be other ways of rejecting gender essentialism, however, which do not need such a move. 
For example, it should be possible to see the nature/culture distinction as a continuous line 
between two poles, and recognize, in contrast to the way the distinction is construed when 
turned into a dichotomy, that culture has its determinism and nature its flexibility. As to our 
bodies, it should be possible to take them as starting points (be these resources or constraints), 
namely as things that do not speak for themselves but which we elaborate on and assign 
significance to. Of course, it is no easy task to construct a defense from essentialism along 
these lines, especially due to the widespread expectation that any theory that is not anti-
essentialist must be essentialist, and vice versa.
Given the difficulties in dealing with essentialist assumptions about gender, one would expect 
that looking at language again would be useful, no longer to specify assumptions about gender 
making them available to criticism, but to investigate how it is that these assumptions are so 
pervasive of our experience and activity and tend to be perceived as normative, making one’s 
5 More attention to this theme has been paid by phenomenology: a very interesting example is Heinämaa (2014). In 
my own work (Sbisà 1996), I have put forward a conception of feminine subjectivity as developing in the elaboration of 
female sex-related experiences.
3. How do gender 
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gender appear as one’s inescapable fate. Another way to concern ourselves with gender issues 
in philosophy might therefore be to discuss, not so much the content of gender concepts, as 
their nature or structure, and the way they work in cognition and communication. 
Let us first examine which ways of conceptualizing gender are available in principle. To begin 
with, gender can be (and often is) conceptualized as dichotomically exhaustive: there are 
two genders and each individual has to belong to one of them, or even, every property that 
an individual may have must be part of one or other of the two gender concepts. In this case, 
individuals have to belong to a gender, and if the latter assumption is also taken to hold, this 
gender will determine all their properties. This is the most restrictive way of conceptualizing 
gender. Emblematic of this is the astonishing claim I happened to come across recently on a 
poster promoting protest against the alleged influence of so-called “gender theory” in Italian 
educational programmes: “boys are male and girls are female”.6
To lessen the compulsoriness and pervasiveness of gender, one may conceive of gender 
concepts as comprising only gender-relevant properties. This makes it possible, at least in 
theory, that an individual lacking those properties might fail to belong to a gender. Moreover, 
properties not relevant to gender could be possessed by individuals of any gender and 
therefore, for example, shared by individuals belonging to different genders. It seems to 
me that our usual way of conceiving of gender matches this model at least in this respect. 
Compulsoriness of gender would be also mitigated if a society and its language were to 
allow for an open number of genders: this would be made possible if the contents of existing 
gender concepts were conceived of as non-exhaustive of the possible sets of gender relevant 
properties. However, this way of conceiving genders is not without risks, since it fosters the 
individual’s identification with a gender, thereby indirectly confirming that gender belonging 
is compulsory after all. 
As a further alternative, gender belonging may be conceived of as gradable. In this perspective, 
one individual can be deemed more masculine than another, or even more masculine than 
feminine (or the other way around), depending on the number of properties he/she possesses 
belonging either to the masculine gender concept or to the feminine gender concept. Those 
properties are still either feminine or masculine, and it is their proportion that determines 
gender belonging. Adopting this perspective enables us to talk of more (or less) feminine 
women and more (or less) masculine men, and although we may be accepting actual people 
as “hybrid”, the fixed borders and received contents of gender concepts themselves are 
confirmed.
This brief exploration of possible ways of conceptualizing gender is perhaps enough to show, 
or at least to strongly suggest, that none of these ways is quite free from the pervasiveness 
and compulsoriness that make gender concepts such a source of trouble in real life. Clearly, 
the solution to these troubles cannot be found in the structure of gender concepts considered 
in isolation, and so it is worth considering whether problems with gender concepts may be 
rooted in general facts about language and cognition.
Gender labels are usually employed to make generic statements such as “Men love soccer” 
or “Women are emotional”. Recent research on generics, by Sarah-Jane Leslie in particular 
(Leslie 2007, 2008, 2017),7 maintains that such statements are not equivalent to quantified 
statements, but are held to be true when the property assigned to the category is prevalent in 
the category or else when, even if not prevalent, the property is characteristic of the category 
or striking for some other reason (e.g., members of the category that possess it are dangerous, 
6 I saw this poster in Rome in September 2017.
7 For an overview, see Leslie and Lerner, 2016.
138
MARINA SBISÀ
as in “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus”). Elaborating upon various experimental findings 
(showing, for example, that children understand generics as generalizations about kinds 
or categories before they fully master quantified statements, and that people tend to recall 
universally quantified statements as generics),8 Leslie claims that generics are the most basic 
way in which cognitive generalizations are expressed in language. So, generics support the 
fundamental cognitive activity of categorization both in the area of natural sciences (notably 
biology) and in social cognition, but at a price: the use of generics appears to regularly 
activate essentialist beliefs,9 that is, the category is taken to be grounded in an essence, 
which means that members of the category are taken to share something that causally 
grounds their manifestation of certain properties (Leslie 2017). It should be noted that this 
use of generics does not suggest that the category they are about has fuzzy borders: rather, 
it makes the classic view of a category as having a perfectly delimited extension compatible 
with the possibility (and actual existence) of exceptions. Accepting a generic disposes the 
receiver to infer that any arbitrarily chosen member of that category is endowed with the 
property expressed by the predicate of the generic. It seems to me that the essentialist beliefs 
observed by Leslie in association with the use of bare plurals as subjects of generics could 
also be described as existential presuppositions (and accommodations thereof): the category 
is presupposed to “exist” as a category, and therefore, to have an essence, and the receiver is 
implicitly invited to share such a background assumption. It is insofar as a certain category is 
assumed to exist and be causally grounded (so that its members at least share the disposition 
to manifest certain properties), that it (or its members, qua its members) may become the 
target of derogatory assessment and discrimination.
All this may explain some of the troubles we incur as speakers or receivers of generic 
statements about genders. What is explained, though, it not avoided or overcome. If Leslie 
is right about the way in which generics function, and therefore about how gender concepts 
work, what should philosophers do with generalizations about social kinds, gender in 
particular? Should we avoid using gender generics (for example, assertions the subject of 
which is expressed by bare plurals like “men” and “women”)? Leslie (2017) recommends the 
use of adjectives in place of nouns, since the former do not activate essentialist beliefs to 
the same extent as the latter: but this would hardly work with gender, and might even be a 
waste of energy, distracting us from tackling other sources of gender discrimination (as Saul 
2017 warns). Should we, then, examine and reject the gender generics which fail to meet the 
conditions for a generic statement to be true (for example, the properties they predicate 
are not appropriate to generalization – not really “striking”, not really functional to the 
primary social function of the category)? Or would it be enough to argue that the normative 
understanding of gender generics is ill-founded? Establishing this last point would cancel part 
of the harmful implications of the use of gender generics, but would still not be enough to stop 
them being used to discriminate a whole gender category.
At this point, there is a side issue that needs to be mentioned: I have assumed throughout that 
philosophy has a professional deontology. But does it actually have a deontology and should 
it have one? And if so, what kind? Some colleagues might say that philosophers should only 
seek truth and give reasons for those claims that they make in so doing. In the 20th century, 
numerous thinkers added to this, or else preferred to say that philosophers should refrain 
8 About children’s understanding of generics, see Gelman (2010); Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka and Flukes (2008); Gelman 
and Raman (2003); Hollander, Gelman and Star (2002); Leslie (2012). About recalling quantified statements as generics, 
see Gelman, Sánchez Tapia and Leslie (2016); Leslie and Gelman (2012).
9 Gelman, Ware and Kleinberg (2010); Rhodes, Leslie and Tworek (2012).
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from making claims that are not suitable for being assessed as true or false, and should help 
non-philosophers distinguish claims that are so suitable from claims that are not. But apart 
from this direct or indirect relationship to truth, and the appeal to reasons, do philosophers 
have any further responsibilities as regards the society to which they belong? My reply to this 
question is simple: everybody is responsible for what her speech brings about (illocutions) 
and to some extent also for their consequences on psychological attitudes and behavior 
(perlocutions); but even more responsible is whoever knows more or sees farther than others, 
as should be true of philosophers, or is in a position that can de facto have influence on others, 
as sometimes happens to them. I therefore think that philosophers facing choices about how 
to deal with matters that have moral or political implications should care as much about 
what is right as about what is true. Incidentally, these aims may well not be in competition. 
On the negative side, a philosopher should avoid licensing implications that may be expected 
to be harmful. On the positive side, a number of morally or politically relevant goals, such as 
freedom of individual realization, self-determination (within reasonable limits), smoothness in 
interpersonal relations, and transparency and reversibility of relational asymmetries, are such 
that philosophy can and should help in the pursuit of. 
Returning in the light of these reflections to Leslie’s worries and recommendations about the 
harmful assumptions associated with social kind and gender generics, I think that they are 
basically legitimate and worth consideration. Obviously, changing people’s linguistic habits 
by decree is obviously not a viable option, and after all, it is doubtful whether there is any 
simple way in which it would be worth changing them: but research on how certain harmful 
assumptions about genders are communicated and how their communication could be avoided 
or their content questioned can certainly be of some help on our way towards dealing with 
gender concepts in correct and appropriate ways.
It seems that we have come to an impasse. We can make socially shared assumptions about 
gender explicit and criticize these assumptions. We can criticize not just their content, but 
also their essentialist implications. We are aware that certain quite common ways of speaking 
(the use of gender generics), along with their important cognitive function, may also carry 
harmful presuppositions about gender categories, play a normative function, and pave the way 
to discrimination. But all this does not seem to give firm grounds to the rejection of gender 
discrimination, the refutation of essentialist beliefs about the genders, and the neutralization 
of the normative import of gender concepts. To these aims, we might profit from another 
(albeit converging) line of reasoning: I would suggest that philosophy tackled gender issues 
by considering them as a test of people’s capability and willingness to recognize others as 
subjects or, if you prefer, as human persons.10
By “intersubjective recognition”, I am referring to the process by which two human 
individuals recognize each other as subjects. It is a basic process in human life, integral both to 
interpersonal relations and to broader social ones.11 It is not a unilateral process. An attitude 
attributing subjectivity to an individual is not a private fact about the recognizer but, through 
10 In what follows I will speak of “subjects”, in order to leave issues about the definition of “person” aside.
11 Many hints at this process and its indispensable role can be found in analytic philosophy. Recognition of mental 
functions, capacities and dispositions is taken into consideration and even given a central place in accounts provided 
by various philosophers of the process of understanding another subject’s language and meaning. At the very least, I 
would like to mention Davidson’s Charity Principle (1984), Grice’s Cooperative Principle (1989: 22-40), and Dennett’s 
“intentional stance” (1987). I have touched upon this theme on various occasions, most recently in my (2013). The 
idea of intersubjective recognition would also profit from a comparison with the theme of intersubjectivity in 
phenomenology, but the task is so huge that I am in no position to even begin hinting at it.
4. Gender 
issues and 
intersubjective 
recognition
140
MARINA SBISÀ
her behavior and speech, contributes to establishing the intersubjectively shared space of the 
encounter and to characterizing its participants as subjects endowed with certain attitudes, 
dispositions, and other action-related properties. It cannot in general be entertained for long if 
there is no response or feedback on the part of the recognition’s target. The recognition of the 
other’s subjectivity, therefore, necessarily involves a framework of intersubjectivity.
Being incapable of such recognition (which involves, for example, not realising that beliefs, 
intentions, desires and other attitudes vary across individuals and thus being unable to 
correctly attribute attitudes to others) is not merely being insensitive, but is actually a 
symptom of certain kinds of psychiatric disorders (see Baron Cohen 1997, Frith 2003). Local, 
but systematic, refusal to recognize certain others as subjects, possibly associated with the 
refusal of granting them human rights – as happens in reduction to slavery, or in genocide – is 
a unanimously condemned stance. Indeed, it should be pointed out that those who (for some 
reason of their own) do not want to condemn certain other people for taking such a stance 
make no attempt to defend them directly, but adopt a negationist strategy instead, attempting 
to deny that the events manifesting that stance have taken place or that they were an actual 
manifestation of that stance. There is no doubt that a responsible philosophy, in analysing 
subject-other relations, should foster practices of intersubjective recognition, rather than 
hinder them, and the first thing to do is to pay attention to how they work. 
Recognizing someone as a subject involves assigning her various kinds of competence: 
attitudes, dispositions, but also rights, obligations and other deontic properties (amounting 
to what may be called, adapting a notion from narrative semiotics, the subject’s “deontic 
competence”)12 that sometimes correspond to some kind of specific social status. It is tempting 
to think of this recognition as an all-in-one attribution, but while that may be so by default, 
in cases in which there are hurdles or problems either on the part of the recognizing subject 
or on the part of the subject to be recognized, in order to understand what is going on it 
is necessary to analyze various levels of attribution that may not all be active at the same 
time. Recognition of the other as a subject, then, consists at the very least of recognizing her 
as a center of perspective, while further steps consist of recognizing her as capable of (or 
actually exercising) agency, as a speaker mastering a language and expressing meaning by it, 
and finally, as a speaker-agent of illocutionary acts, endowed with the deontic competence 
necessary for her designed performance, and affecting, by her acts, the deontic competence 
of addressees or other target participants. Recognition of another human being as a subject is 
completely achieved when it involves all these levels of subjectivity and moreover, is granted 
unconditionally. Indeed, it can only be flawed when given under-a-condition: for example, 
if I take you to be an agent only insofar as you do certain things I want to be done, or to be a 
speaker insofar as that is indispensable to the exercise of a certain subordinate social role, or 
to be a center of perspective only when you perform your gender role in a way functional to 
my needs. When recognition is conditional in these ways, it can be suddenly withdrawn in 
ways which show that it was never actual and effective. It becomes apparent that I never really 
expected you to have your own perspective on your relationship to me, never really thought 
you were capable of autonomous decision-making, and never would grant that you be in a 
position to perform authority-presupposing illocutionary acts.
12 In narrative semiotics (Greimas 1970, 1983; Greimas and Courtés 1979), the dispositions and the deontic properties 
that prompt the subject’s action or enable her to act constitute her “modal competence” for acting. Focusing upon 
an agent’s deontic properties, which in my perspective differ from attitudes or dispositions because they are granted 
and withdrawn on the basis of social or interpersonal agreement, I use the label “deontic competence”. In my work on 
illocutionary acts since the 1980s, I have connected changes in the deontic competence of participants to illocutionary 
acts as their conventional effects (1984, 1989).
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When the other is recognized as a subject because he or she is similar to us, we are faced with 
an ambiguous kind of recognition. A recognition based upon the assumption that the subject 
recognized is similar to the recognizer would indeed be a conditional one and would therefore 
be flawed. But what if the cognitive bases of recognition, consisting in an ability to attribute 
attitudes and agency to other people, should involve some kind of simulation of the others’ 
stance and perspective (as in simulation theory, see Goldman 2006), on the basis of our own? 
Would this amount to making every recognition dependent on similarities between the subject 
to be recognized and the recognizing one? In many cases, perhaps, it will be enough if the 
interlocutors’ capacities to entertain attitudes and to act are considered similar, or even just 
parallel. Moreover, if it is true, as research on the role of mirror neurons in social cognition 
suggests (see Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2007), that what we do is 
simply use the same action schemes both to project our own action and to understand what 
another agent is doing, this clearly does not require any previous assessment of similarities 
between recognizer and recognized. Rather, the feeling of a common belonging to humankind 
(or to the animal kindgom, or to life in the universe) will come later. But if there is a category 
of which both the recognizing and the recognized subject are held to be members, and this 
membership (involving participation in the category’s “essence”) works as a condition for the 
recognition, that recognition is flawed. 
I would say that women have long suffered from being recognized as subjects both 
conditionally and partially (namely, not at all levels). This may happen to men too, in certain 
circumstances and for specific motivations; with racism, by the way, it happens to both 
genders at once; but for women, it is a chronic condition. The “silencing” of women, so much 
discussed in the philosophy of language and in political philosophy (Langton 1993 and Hornsby 
and Langton 1998 are key contributions to this debate),13 can be seen as a manifestation of the 
failure to recognize the other’s subjectivity and deontic competence unconditionally: a typical 
and often dramatic case of “silencing” occurs when a woman refuses a man’s sexual advances, 
but the force of her utterance and the attitudes and the deontic competence it involves, 
both as regards the preconditions and the result of her speech act, are not recognized. It is 
no coincidence that the women’s movement of the 1970s based feminine autonomy upon 
unconditional intersubjective recognition occurring among women: the words used for 
describing this process were less abstract and more emotional, but insofar as it worked, that 
was what was going on. 
The issue of intersubjective recognition could be further investigated by considering it in 
the narrative dimension. I am not referring here to narrative theories of the subject in the 
philosophy of mind, but to the analytical techniques and terminology of narrative semiotics 
(Greimas 1970, 1983; Greimas and Courtés 1979). There, the Subject is first of all a narrative 
“actant”, that is, a narrative element defined for its functions in the narrative syntax: 
receiving a task, carrying it out, and being rewarded. The Subject is then enriched by the 
attribution of dispositions and deontic properties, to be turned into a more specific “actantial 
role”, and is manifested in discourse by an agent (an “actor”) endowed with descriptive 
characteristics. Whatever the details of the analytic terminology employed, in narrative 
semiotics the role of Subject is not one that can be played in isolation: another function in 
the narrative syntax is required to be at work in order for the Subject to receive from it its 
task, as well as its reward. That function, called the “Destinant”, is therefore indispensable 
to there being a Subject at all. It is the Destinant who assigns the Subject his or her task and 
13 Contributions to the debate include: Bird (2002); Caponetto (2017); Hornsby (2011); Jacobson (1995): Maitra (2009); 
McGowan (2009), (2017); McGowan et al. (2011); Mikkola (2011); Sbisà (2009).
